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ABSTRACT
Small businesses are recognized for their potential role in advancing economic growth, 
generation of employment (Storey, 1994) and assistance in recovery from persistent recessions 
(Deakin, 1996). The important role played by venture capital in the formation and development 
of such new and high technology businesses is established and recognized (Kirchhoff &  Phillips, 
1998; Timmons et al, 1983). During the 1990s, venture capital has recorded extraordinary growth 
at the international level. The research on venture capital has not only lagged behind the 
development in this industry (Wright and Robbie, 1997) but has remained dominated by the 
United States.
Within the venture capital field, while researchers have, to some extent, already covered several 
aspects of venture capital operation, the post-funding era of the venture capitalists/portfolio 
companies remains a rich area for research. (Gorman and Sahlman 1989; Rosenstien et al, 1993; 
Stier and Greenwood, 1995; Gompers, 1998; Barney, 1994).
Venture capitalists usually claim that, unlike other financiers, they provide more than finance. 
This means that through active involvement in the portfolio company, they provide valuable 
assistance in areas like finance, networking, strategy formulation and operations. Research 
scholars, in recent years, have turned their attention to the confirmation of the substance of this 
claim. During the process of this research many factors have been uncovered which have some 
bearing on the value-added relationship between a venture capital firm and a portfolio company. 
However, the final verdict on the value-added role of venture capitalists has remained elusive.
Most of the research studies in the area of value-addition by venture capital firms have confined 
themselves to verifying whether certain factors, affect the relationship between a venture capital 
firm and its portfolio company. Their disparate findings seem somewhat disjointed and need to 
be fully coalesced into an integral whole. There has been a noticeable dearth of literature relating 
to the development of a theory, which explains the basic dynamics governing this relationship. 
This thesis is an attempt to fill this gap in venture capital research.
vn
To make this research study more robust, a theoretical base is adopted The resource exchange 
theory was found ideally suited to explain the relationship between venture capitalists and their 
portfolio companies. While this concept has been applied in some popular works, there have 
been only moderate attempts to link it with venture capital.
A  model of the value-added relationship is built in this thesis. During the process o f developing 
this model different factors affecting this relationship are identified, examined and classified 
These factors are placed in a logical set-up within the basic model. An attempt is also made to 
explain the important role played by organizational resources in a value-added relationship.
While the validity of the proposed resource-exchange model could not be proven beyond doubt, 
it has been established that the resource pool o f venture capital firms and their portfolio 
companies differ. The relevant resource pool may not be the only reason behind a value-added 
relationship, however, venture capital firms consider themselves to be better equipped if they 
have more experience in the industry of the portfolio company. Overall, venture capital firms’ 
involvement is guided by perceived need rather than their resource pool. While willingness to be 
involved depends on other factors, firm policy is the primary motive behind an active 
involvement of venture capital firms in their portfolio companies.
vm
1: The Problem and its Setting
1 Chapter 1: The Problem and its Setting
1.1 Background Information
Venture capital, sometimes also called risk capital or private equity, is one source of equity 
investment. Venture capital, in essence, has evolved as a result of an equity supply gap, which 
exists for high-risk ventures with high prospective growth and consequent high returns. Its 
origination was informal (Batterson, 1986; Bygrave and Timmons 1992; Qark, 1987) and it was 
primarily dependent on wealthy individuals called “angels” as suppliers of funds, as equity 
investors without intermediaries (Seymour and Wetzel, 1981). The initial effort to recognise and 
institutionalise venture capital as a formal alternative source of financing began in the United 
Sates in the mid 1940s with the establishment of the American Research and Development 
Corporation (ARD), a firm dedicated to raising funds from different sources and using these as 
an equity investor in new ventures. The success of the Digital Equipment Corporation, one of 
ARD’s portfolio companies, catapulted ARD into the limelight. The venture capital industry has 
since revolutionised the United Sates economy by backing start-up companies like Microsoft, 
Netscape, Yahoo, Federal Express, Intel etc.
Although a venture capital firm fills a much needed funding gap by financing growing 
companies, a review of the detailed operations of venture capital reveals that venture capital firms 
provide more than finance to their portfolio companies. As experienced professionals, venture 
capitalists pass on their knowledge and experience to the entrepreneurs through active 
involvement with their portfolio companies. The importance of this aspect of a venture capital 
firm’s work has prompted researchers to call a venture capitalist a relationship investor, builder, 
innovator and partner, sounding board member and business consultant, coach/mentor, 
financier and friend/confidant (Fried and Hisrish, 1994; Sapeinza and Timmons, 1989;
1
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Landstorm, 1990; Lorenz, 1989). Research shows that the most important contributions of 
venture capital firms relate to the area o f financial advice, strategy formulation, crisis management 
and access to business networks (MacMillan et a l; 1988, Gorman and Sahlman, 1989; Rosenstien 
et al., 1989; Ehrlich et a l, 1994; Elango et al., 1995). Although the venture capital firms’ major 
involvement in the portfolio companies is by virtue of a seat on the board of directors, they may 
also keep in regular contact through telephone and formal or informal meetings (Fiet, 1995) or 
through reports submitted by the portfolio companies (Sweeting, 1991).
1.2 N eed for this research
Over the years, researchers have tried to measure the results of venture capital firm s’ involvement 
in their portfolio companies. This research activity gained particular momentum from the late 
1980s. The attempt at measuring venture capital firms’ involvement contribution, termed value 
added, in the portfolio company has been tried with multiple approaches. The criteria of value 
added is taken to be the time spent by a venture capital firm with a portfolio company (Gorman 
and Sahlman, 1989), the number of activities in which the venture capital firm  is involved 
(Rosenstein et al., 1989; Pandey and Jang, 1996; MacMillan et al., 1988) or the frequency of 
venture capital firm/portfolio company interaction (Sapienza and Gupta, 1994; Sapienza, 1992). 
Moreover, the value added findings are alternatively based on the survey of venture capital firms’ 
perceptions (MacMillan et a l, 1988) or portfolio companies’ perceptions (Fried and Hisrish, 
1994; Rosenstein et aL, 1993; Rosenstein et al., 1989, Rosenstein et al., 1990) or both (Sapienza 
and Timmons, 1989; Sapienza, 1992; Sapienza et al., 1996). Very few researchers have relied on 
the case study method (Stier and Greenwood, 1995). Finally, research has also been carried out in 
terms o f performance evaluation of the portfolio company after initial public offerings.
The research, so far, has largely remained inconclusive about the value-added contribution of 
venture capital firms. The problem has been further complicated by the findings that venture
2
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capital firms, who are more involved in their portfolio companies, do not necessarily perform 
better themselves nor do their portfolio companies (MacMillan et aL, 1989). Most of the research 
on value added has confined itself to an application of agency theory, which although useful, has 
been deficient in respect to its appropriateness to venture capital firm s/portfolio companies’ 
relations because it does not explain the possibility of opportunistic behaviour by the principal 
(venture capital firm). This thesis, thus digresses from the often trodden path of the application 
of “agency theory” (Amit et aL, 1990, Gompers, 1995; Sahlman, 1990) and provides a new 
perspective to this question.
A  number of research studies have been conducted which have tried to measure the value-added 
relationship and determine factors, which can possibly effect the value added. During this 
process, the influence of many factors has been confirmed. However, there has been little effort 
to classify these factors and set up a relationship between them in an over-all model, which 
explains the value-added process.
Apart from  value added, this thesis also fulfils the need for research in markets other than the 
United Sates and Europe (Frear and Wetzel, 1990). Some of the Asian markets have recorded 
remarkable growth in venture capital during the 1990s. However, not much research seems to 
have been conducted in Asian countries in the area of venture capital
1.3 O bjectives o f the study
This study supports the view that the venture capital firms/portfolio company’s relations could 
be seen from  the resource-based perspective. It also argues that the value added by venture 
capital firms, in portfolio companies, is a function of resource exchange.
A  critical component of the success of a venture is the accumulation of resources from the 
environment, which helps the business to exploit available opportunities. The fate of venture
3
1: The PrrM em ard its Setting
capital firms is inextricably linked with the performance of their portfolio companies. While 
venture capital firms add a vital resource of finance to the resource pool of a portfolio company, 
their contribution towards portfolio companies extends beyond finance. Because of the nature of 
their work, venture capital firms acquire skills in developing strategies, forming management 
teams, timing the development of the companies and building up a network of relationships. 
These skills or resources are vital for a growing company. Thus, venture capital firms will add to 
the probability of success of the portfolio companies by contributing to their resource pool. 
However, as explained in this thesis, this resource transfer/exchange depends on many factors 
such as relationship characteristics, resource characteristics and more importantly on the 
willingness o f the parties to enter into a resource exchange relation. This thesis, however, is not 
an exercise in reinventing the wheel and therefore, the past research conducted in the area of 
venture capital has been accepted as relevant and a useful starting point. During the process of 
explaining the relationship between venture capital firms and portfolio companies, a holistic 
model has been constructed and past research conducted in this area has been shown to 
contribute logically toward the framework of resource exchange theory. Lasdy, part o f this 
model has been tested in Singapore and Hong Kong, and during the process, valuable insight 
gained into peculiarities of venture capital in these countries.
This dissertation basically addresses the following three-part research question: Does resource 
exchange theory offer a useful perspective for studying inter-firm relations? Does the value 
addition as perceived by venture capital firms depend on the resource exchange relations 
between venture capital firm and portfolio companies? Does the Asian interpretation of venture 
capital allow a wider applicability for the findings of this thesis?
4
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1.4 Contribution to venture capital literature
This study is expected to contribute to the existing literature on venture capital in several ways. It 
provides an insight into how the involvement of venture capital firms in their portfolio 
companies can be seen and analysed through a resource exchange perspective. Moreover, while 
past research studies have identified isolated factors as they effect the value-added relationship 
between venture capital firms and their portfolio companies, this study attempts to construct a 
holistic model of this relationship. A  three dimensional model has been pur forward which 
include the characteristics o f venture capital firm s/portfolio companies, the characteristics of 
relationships and the characteristics of resources. Furthermore, since this study is conducted in 
Asia it also adds to a very limited literature on involvement of venture capital firms in their 
portfolio companies in Asia.
1.5 Limitation of this study
It was felt that the survey method was the most appropriate for this research. Similar studies have 
been conducted in other countries, mostly using an empirical approach, and have provided a 
valid standard for comparisons of the findings. Because the measures in this study rely on the 
perception of the venture capital firms, caution must be exercised in their application and 
interpretation. Bias and inaccuracy are potential threats wherever perceptual measures are used 
Apart from  the language difficulties, this study acknowledges the differences in definitions and 
concepts that are used in different cultural settings. Such problems exist whether investigators are 
using primary or secondary data sources.
1.6 Defining Venture Capital
As discussed in Chapter 2 of this thesis, there is no generally accepted definition of venture 
capital. The term venture capital has been used widely and its definition varies between countries 
and even regions within countries (Venture Capital Journal, 1989). Generally speaking, venture
5
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capital is third party equity financing provided with management support to potentially high 
growth companies where the main objective is capital gain. In Asia, this term is used rather 
loosely and there is little attempt to draw a difference between private equity and venture capital 
Thus all third party equity investment in unlisted companies is considered venture capital Since 
this study is being conducted in Asia the same concept will be followed unless otherwise 
indicated
1.7 Structure of the Dissertation
The remainder of this dissertation consists of eight chapters. Chapter 2, is used to present 
background information on the venture capital industry in Asia and the little dragon economies, 
traces industry history and delineates differences and similarities across countries. In chapter 3, 
research that has, so far, been conducted in the area of involvement of venture capital firms with 
portfolio companies is reviewed The relationship of the venture capital firms with their portfolio 
companies, drawing upon the resource-based theory, is explained in chapter 4. The research 
model is also presented in this chapter. The development of propositions, which primarily rely on 
the research model, is explained in chapter 5. Chapter 6 contains the research methodology 
including a description of the sample and data collection m ethod Chapter 7 and 8 contain the 
result o f analysis and a discussion on the findings. The dissertation concludes with chapter 9. It 
also contains a discussion of the practical implications of the research findings, has an outline of 
the limitations of this research and delineates directions for future research in this area.
6
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2 Chapter 2: Industry Review
2.1 Introduction
Because of the diversity of the venture capital industry, it is debatable whether existing research 
studies on venture capital, predominantly undertaken in Europe and the United States, are 
applicable to Asian countries. As this study is based on Asian venture capital markets and as there 
is sufficient evidence that the local venture capital culture has a profound effect on the venture 
capital strategies used in each market (Jeng and Wells, 2000), a relevant industry review is 
appropriate. In this chapter, the history of venture capital in Asia and the progress and structure 
of the venture capital industry in the “ little dragons1” countries is traced.
It needs to be mentioned that existing research cannot be termed irrelevant because the concept 
of formal venture capital sprang from  the United States and most Asian countries have tried to 
emulate this m odel There also exists an extensive relationship between different venture capital 
funds at an international level, which can produce similarities, to some extent, in their 
operations2.
2.2 Defining Venture Capital
The term venture capital is used far more frequently than it is understood (Cornelius, 2000). The 
indiscriminate use of this word is almost threatening to relegate it to the status o f evocative 
metaphor, applied so loosely that it ceases to hold any meaning. The generally held concept of 
venture capital is based on the United States model, largely because the institutionalisation of 
venture capital started in the United States. It is still the largest venture capital market and many




international venture capital markets have developed based on the United Sates model. Venture 
capital has been defined as broadly as “the investment by professional investors of long term, risk 
equity finance where the primary reward is eventual capital gain rather than interest income” 
(Wright and Robbie, 1997) or as precisely as “long term financing (equity or potential equity) 
leveraged with management support and provided to unlisted, potentially high growth 
businesses” (Cornelius, 1992). Between these two standpoints, there is an array of definitions 
(EVCA, 1998: A V Q , 1999: Pratt, 1998: O ECD, 1999).
The problem, that there is no generally accepted definition of venture capital, has been 
compounded by the internationalisation of this term and hence multiple perceptions of venture 
capital, which are sometimes, downright erroneous. It is, however, quite difficult to define 
precisely what venture capital means. According to the Venture Capital Journal (1989), there is 
no accepted definition of venture capital even within a single country, let alone worldwide. The 
majority o f the literature on regional comparisons of venture capital, perhaps recognising the 
futility o f the exercise, takes the situation as it is and does not make a clear attempt to delineate 
differences or distinguish between different interpretations (O ECD, 1996; Wright et al., 1999; 
M llhaupt, 1997).
Available definitions of venture capital primarily derive their inspiration from the classical 
structure that originated in the United States, based on the pioneering experiment of General 
Georges Doriot. The idea caught on and venture capital became a buzzword By the late 1980s, 
venture capital firms within the United States were stretching the term to include financial 
practices which were not venture capital in the classical sense. Some called this practice 
“opportunism” by investment bankers (Bavaria, 1992). These new practices collided with 2
2 A  result o f institutions is that organisations often develop in a similar isomorphic manner (Slack &  Hirelings, 1994).
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substantially altered market factors including the poor performance of venture capital firms 
during the period. Venture capital, even within the United States, started losing its classical 
characteristics. It was not patient and brave money any more (Bygrave and Timmons, 1992).
The institutionalised venture capital idea, primarily borrowed from the United States, became 
really popular in Asia in the early 1990s when the venture capital industry in the United States 
itself was undergoing a change in strategic focus. Thus, the picture of venture capital in Asia, 
which emerges from  the available literature, is much broader in concept than would be 
encompassed by definitions of venture capital (Goutarelli, 1977; Brophy, 1986). Bygrave and 
Timmons (1992) have even argued that countries, except the United States, never really 
developed classical venture capital at any stage. In Asian countries, even in cases where a venture 
capital market has a significantly different structure3 from the traditional model, the term signifies 
a broader concept (Borton, 1992). Although exact definitions might vary, broadly speaking, 
venture capital in Asia primarily refers to “equity investments in growing unlisted companies” 
(AVCJ, 1999). The investment scope covers all industries of all sizes at virtually all investment 
stages. Since, like Asia, Europe constitutes many diverse economies, the European notion of 
venture capital is closer to the broader Asian viewpoint (EVCA, 1998: A V Q , 1999). Although 
venture capital is usually referred to as a subset of private equity, it seems that in Asia and Europe 
these terms are used interchangeably.
3 A  com parison o f Japanese venture capital with the United States model provides a classic example o f different venture capital 
industry structures. The m ost common form  o f venture capital in the United States is liability lim ited partnership accounting for 
about two third o f venture capital invested in 1988 (Barry, 1994). Alm ost all Japanese venture capital firms are subsidiaries or 
affiliates o f large banks or insurance companies. This arrangement is similar to what is termed corporate venture capital in the 
United States (Cornelius, 2000). "While United States venture capital firms act as conduits fo r channelling funds raised from  
other sources, Japanese venture capital firms mainly invest their own funds (K ato et aL, 1995). Unlike United States venture 
capital, Japanese venture capital is not associated with active monitoring. In  fact, until 1995, Japanese law prohibited employees 
o f venture capital firm s from  being on the board o f their portfolio companies (Hamao et aL, 2000).The Japanese venture capital 
market is also unusual fo r the time it takes for young companies to be listed. This period, which is around 30 years in Japan, is 
about 4-5 years in the United States (Hulme, 1994).
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Although m ost of Asia and the United States have followed almost similar paths toward the 
transformation of venture capital from its initial position as technology-based investment in new 
ventures to a broader range of investments which include mature companies (Cornelius, 2000), 
the usage o f this term within the two regions carries a different emphasis. The National Venture 
Capital Association of the United States (NVCA, 2000)4 defines venture capital as “money 
provided by professionals who invest alongside management in young, rapidly growing 
companies that have the potential to develop into significant economic contributors” . While 
making a clear reference to early stage companies and technology, it goes on to explain that a 
“venture capitalist may invest in a company throughout the company's life cycle and therefore 
some funds focus on later stage investing.... At the other end of the spectrum, some venture 
funds specialise in the acquisition, turnaround or re-capitalisation of public and private 
companies that represent favourable investment opportunities.”
Venture capital markets continue to develop and readjust across regions and countries. There has 
been an increasing trend in the networking of global venture capital, sometimes referred to as 
“ strategic alliances” . These networks create pools of capital by raising funds from traditional 
venture capital resources and investing them in ventures throughout the world. The result is a 
global information exchange and joint venture relationships among European, American, 
Australian and Asian companies. Thus, internationally, the perception of what constitutes venture 
capital is undergoing a change as venture capital firms reach a compromise on their different 
viewpoints. With the concept of venture capital being continually adjusted in different countries 
(Lau, 2000), any comparison between markets needs to be viewed in the light o f how venture 
capital is currently perceived structured and is being transformed.
4 Definition available on official website, h ttp:// www.nvca.com, accessed on January 17,2000.
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2.3 Growth of Venture Capital in the Asian Region
Like any other part of the world, equity financing is not new to the Asian region and has been 
around for, possibly, hundreds of years. In East Asia the “huay” , an informal system of banking 
involves a group of people who each subscribe to one or more shares in a common fund through 
a fixed subscription. These funds are invested in different businesses (Choy, 1990). In South Asia, 
this kind of capital is supplied informally by friends, relatives and family members. The idea of 
equity investment, although rarely practiced in the Muslim culture of the Middle East on a wider 
scale, has always been present in the shape of “Modaraba” , third party equity investment (Harper, 
1997). Traditionally, most businesses in Asia have been family owned over generations (Chen, 
1995; Brown, 1995). Third-party proposals to invest in a company's future are not considered 
acceptable by the family owning that business. In most of Asia, family members usually 
contribute to a business. Smaller and newer ventures are earmarked for young family members 
so, when venture capital was introduced into this region, many questioned the need for the 
venture capital market and doubted whether it had a future (Montagu, 1988 b). From the 
perspective o f the Asian businessman, moving beyond the known circle o f investors was a 
relatively new experience.
'When venture capital, primarily backed by businessmen from the United States, came to Asia 
during the early 1970s, few entrepreneurs, even when strapped for cash, considered approaching 
a venture capital firm. The alien concept bred suspicion and tapping equity from  family and 
friends remained the driving forces behind company growth and security. The initial United 
States venture capital investment in Asia faltered. Cultural differences were considered part of the 
reason (Morrow, 1991). The investors, seemingly, could not develop the necessary long-term 
relationships with clients in Asia that would ensure successful investments (Mantagu-Pollok, 
1988). Western style due diligence did not seem to work and foreign investors also had a hard
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time coping with local accounting practices (Pohndorf, 1997). After this initial setback, any real 
prospect o f venture capital development in Asia depended on overcoming cultural barriers and 
involving local participation on the supply side of this market.
In the mid-1970s, the role of development banks, which were widely seen by respective 
governments as a tool for national economic development in developing countries, increased. 
Asian development banks, backed by the government of the country, started looking for more 
creative financing arrangements and opportunities. Venture capital was identified as one possible 
mode o f operation. By the early eighties there were close to 100 venture capital firms operating in 
the Asian region (Kravits, 1985). Soon a formal institutionalisation of the market was underway. 
There were, however, no assurances that traditional venture capital was likely to succeed without 
problems in the unique Asian environment.
During the 1980s Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, and South Korea experienced tremendous 
economic growth. Combined, the exports of these four nations were about 80 percent those of 
Japan (Schilit, 1992), the highest exporting nation in Asia. As these countries moved from a 
labour-intensive manufacturing environment to technology-oriented undertaking, the need for 
venture capital became more obvious and growth in the technology sector formed the basis for 
such activity (Hou, 1988). Continued development, especially in East Asia, produced cash rich 
companies eager to invest in start-up technologies at home or abroad in order to diversify their 
technologies and further their technological development. There was an increasing awareness, 
among respective governments, that venture capital played a very real role in the economic 
development process. There were some warnings that the American style system could not be 
copied by any other infrastructure, as evidenced by numerous failed attempts to mirror the 
United States model in Europe and Japan (Pratt, 1990). Asian countries, including the litde
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dragons, continued to move forward toward what they considered to be hi-tech venture capital 
projects. There is today, a large amount of private money going into venture capital in these 
countries. In 1997 these countries had a combined investment portfolio of more than U SD  10 
billion.
2.1 Little Dragons-Venture Capital Investment Portfolio ( 1997)5
USD millions %age of Total Venture Capital 
Investment in Asia
Hong Kong 4,691 22.86%




Modified from AVQ, 1999
Venture capital investment in the little dragon countries accounts for almost half o f the venture 
capital market in Asia. Venture capital is not only well entrenched in these countries but has a 
comparatively successful history in terms of growth. Compared to the rest of Asia, the larger size 
of venture capital in these markets is far beyond their comparative size in terms of area and 
population. Together the little dragon countries provide a very fertile ground for further research 
in the area o f venture capital
2.3.1 Development of Venture Capital Industry
Governments in little dragon economies, joined by countries like Hong Kong, which do not 
usually intervene in the capital markets (Lassene and Schiitte, 1995), have taken an active stand 
and a variety of approaches to foster and monitor venture capital development. Respective 
governments have not only targeted and promoted specific industries through grants and tax 
incentives but also, in some cases, taken up the role o f venture capital firms. Venture capital in
13
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most o f these countries has been used as a development tool and in most cases governments 
have played a key role in deciding what qualifies as venture capital. In Taiwan, for example, the 
Ministry of Finance defines venture capital primarily as equity investment in growing unlisted 
companies. It goes on to limit venture capital by specifying the investment focus as domestic 
technological firms, domestic or foreign venture capital firms and domestic general 
manufacturing industries (Pandey and Jang, 1996).
The first example of active government support was provided in 1983 by the Taiwanese 
government, when it enacted venture capital regulations. It provided investors with generous tax 
breaks, handing local investors tax credits that effectively gave them back 20% of any money 
invested in hi-tech. This was followed by investment by the state-run Bank of Communication in 
eight funds. The government regulated the investment through tax credits, which are only 
available to companies that invest in 'strategic' hi-tech areas like personal computing 
technologies, precision machines, or biotechnology. Government institutions such as the Bank of 
Communications (BO Q , the Development Fund of the Executive Yuan and the China 
Development Corporation (C D Q  are themselves large investors in hi-tech firms and venture 
funds (Montagu-Pollock, 1990-91).
Sensing high investment returns, many venture capital firms in Taiwan forfeited tax concessions 
and diversified investments into the service and manufacturing sectors. The Taiwanese 
government in the early 1990’s eased restriction on investors wishing to reach outside of the 
high-tech area. The Government also moved away from seed-stage investment in favour o f more 
mature companies. During 1990-91 the Taiwanese venture capital industry consisted of 12 
venture capital firms with a total capital under management of U SD  250 million (Asian Finance 5
5 A V Q  (1999) distinguishes and provides separate data about venture capital pool (Capital under management or committed
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b, 1990-91). Annual fund raising in the Taiwanese venture capital industry took off in the mid 
1990s, and grew more than 15 times between 1994 and 1997. The number of venture capital 
funds increased to 74 and the total venture capital pool or venture capital under management 
touched U SD  2 billion by 1997 (Guide to Venture Capital in Asia, A V Q , 1999).
The story of venture capital is similar in Singapore. The Economic Development Board (EDB) 
has been supporting venture capital since 1984 giving generous grants, making investments and 
approving Pioneer Service Status, which gives venture capital funds corporate tax holidays for up 
to 10 years. Getting the E D B ’s backing involves transferring technology to Singapore. If a 
portion of a fund's capital, as approved by the ED B on a case-to-case basis, was used for seed 
finance, the E D B  also allowed investors to write-off up to 100% of capital losses against other 
income. The ED B  itself, a particularly large investor in venture capital, intended to exploit 
opportunities in strategic industries. Venture Capital in Singapore though privy to Government 
support, differs from  the Taiwanese example in one important way. Its venture capital strategy is 
outward looking. Investing in other countries in the region is acceptable as long as the ED B 
identifies a link between the investment and the future development of the home economy. The 
Government, showing its bias for high-tech start-ups, has geared its tax and legislative 
concessions to this sector. Any investment in a venture capital project, therefore, is limited by 
financial necessity, to the Government's approved list. Singapore's venture capital industry tends 
to move cautiously within Government guidelines and consequently its growth is less spectacular 
than that of Taiwan, however, it has grown at a continuous pace. During 1990-91 Singapore had 
10 venture capital firms with a total venture capital pool of U SD  300 Million (Asian Finance, 
1990-91). During 1997 the total venture capital pool in Singapore exceeded U SD  4 Billion with 
around 60 venture capital funds (Guide to Venture Capital in Asia, A V Q , 1999).
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The South Korean example is similar to the scenarios in Taiwan and Singapore. Venture capital 
financing found expression in Korea as early as 1973, with the creation of the Korea Technology 
Advancement Corporation (KTACj to commercialise the research and development (R&D) 
results o f the K orea Institute of Science and Technology (KIST), a public R&D  Institute. N ot 
until the early 1980s did a booming interest in high-tech start-up industries set the funding wheels 
firmly in motion. The Government set up three firms to further technological research and 
development. Although these firms ended up lending rather than investing in equity, venture 
capital had begun. In 1986, the South Korean Government passed the Small and Medium 
Enterprise Start-up Support Act (SMESS), which gave tax benefits on the capital gains of start-up 
investment companies. In the same year its sister act, the New Technology Financial Support Act 
(NTFSA), enabled firms to make investment funds that could absorb idle private capital. Initially, 
South Korea created a venture capital industry highly focused on eariy-stage, hi-tech financing, 
because the Government's strict incentive conditions ensured that 92% of funds went into eariy- 
stage companies. Although the Government remains the chief sponsor of venture capital 
projects, the focus on early stage business has drifted away. The Government increased the 
allowable age of companies in which venture capital could be invested from  three years to five 
years in 1989, and permitted partial investment in mature companies (aged more than five years) 
in 1992. Rules were relaxed further after local funds found themselves in trouble. New laws 
granting tax breaks to venture investors and lifting the usual ceiling on foreign investment came 
into effect in 1997. Foreigners were allowed to purchase stocks of more than 55% in a company 
listed on the Korean Stock Exchange. This ceiling was completely abolished the next year 
resulting in a 160% increase in foreign ownership (AV Q , 1999). In 1998, the South Korean 
Government also allowed pension funds, which at that time managed more than U SD  40 billion, 
to invest in start-ups alongside a venture capital firm. An important feature of the Korean
16
2: Industry R eikw
venture capital market is that local players, thanks to regulatory barriers and resistance to 
outsiders, have long dominated this market. During 1990-91 about 33 venture capital firms were 
operating in South Korea with funds under management of U SD  900 Million. The total venture 
capital pool has since grown to U SD  1.9 billion being managed by 128 funds at the end o f 1997.
Among the little dragons, Hong Kong was the last to provide incentives to hi-tech industry 
development and the Government clung to its laissez-faire traditions for a long time. As a result 
Hong K ong saw its industries increasingly overtaken by hi-tech developments elsewhere. 
Requests from  Hong Kong entrepreneurs triggered the Government into action in 1992 and the 
Industrial Department announced a large allocation for applied research and corporate 
development projects on a dollar-for-dollar 'matching' basis with private investment. The 
Industrial Technology Centre provides funds for start-up hi-tech ventures, and provides support 
facilities and low-rent space for hi-tech firms. Hong Kong assumed new importance, after being 
taken over by China, as a springboard into China. Because large amounts o f venture capital 
invested in China are routed through Hong Kong, the growth of venture capital in Hong Kong 
looks spectacular. After Japan, Hong Kong is the largest single venture capital base in Asia. Its 
venture capital pool was more than USD 9 billion with 91 venture capital funds in 1997.
2.3.2 Structure and Organisation
Gompared to the United States, where venture capital took off in the late 1970s, the 
institutionalisation and increased importance of venture capital is largely a phenomenon of the 
1980s and 1990s in most European countries. Little dragon economies recorded a comparatively 
visible venture capital market only during the 1990s. Some venture capitalists believe that, 
compared to other regions, venture capital in these countries is still in its infancy (Wong, 2001).
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Thus one of the common features of the venture capital industry in little dragon economies is 
that each country is in similar phase of growth6.
Venture capital in little dragon economies, as a whole, m aybe classified into several general areas. 
First, there are start-up and hi-tech funds, which may be privately owned, or government 
sponsored. Privately owned funds are primarily based on the United States model and driven 
mostly by foreign investors, though managed by local professionals. The government-sponsored 
investment funds offer tax and regulatory concessions to investors who agree to back projects 
deemed worthwhile by government planning authorities. Secondly there are funds that are 
involved in corporate restructuring. These funds seek out more established enterprises with 
proven track records. Instead o f providing seed money, they tend to offer capital for a firm's 
expansion. In contrast with the 5-10 year commitments pledged by traditional venture capital 
firms, they prefer 2-3 year turnovers with an eye on acquisition or consolidation of a group of like 
enterprises. Third, there are infrastructure funds. These funds mostly invest in infrastructure 
projects like bridges, docks and highways. Another category gaining importance can be termed 
“privatisation funds” . Privatisation funds exploit opportunities created by respective 
governments’ increasing attention to privatisation, making available enterprises, which are 
undercapitalised, and/or desperately need modernisation. A  more recent trend visible in the 
global venture capital area, including this region, has been that o f "networks," sometimes referred 
to as "strategic alliances." These networks are linkages between venture capital companies around 
the world. These networks create pools by raising money from pension funds, insurance
6 The venture capital industry is viewed as cyclical in nature (Fried and H isrish, 1992) . The experience of die U nited States exhibits 
an association between the venture capital industry and the stock market, whereby, the venture capital industry recorded 
accelerated growth in a bull market (O EC D , 1997). The United States venture capital market perform ed poorly between 1987­
1991 with growth returning in 1992. The venture capital market in m ost o f the European countries is comparatively new and so 
far has seen only one downturn between 1991-1993.
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companies, banks, corporations, and wealthy individuals in much the same way that traditional 
American venture capital firms do, and then invest these funds in ventures throughout the world
In addition to established venture capital funds, other venture capital players include;
(a) private equity/family wealth where corporate empires are essentially family controlled 
vehicles;
(b) private equity and wealth channelled through private bankers, off-shore trusts and tax 
efficient vehicles;
(c) and private investment clubs consisting of friends or co-investors. For example, overseas 
Chinese networks.
The actual availability of venture capital is difficult to measure precisely because of the peculiar 
features of individual countries exacerbated by issues common to all venture capital markets. 
Since venture capital frrms in little dragon countries tend to invest overseas, the number of firms 
is not a true reflection of the available capital in a specific market. M ost of the data is supplied by 
respective governments and expressed in terms of their own currency. Since the rate of exchange 
applied depends on the type o f rate e.g. spot, inter-bank etc, the source of exchange rate 
information and the chosen point in time, there might be some differences in reported amounts 
in different articles and research studies (AVQ , 1999; Asian Finance 1990-91; Phalon and 
Katiyama, 1988; Pandey, 1996; Rah et al., 1994). Moreover, some venture capital firms are
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engaged in venture capital intermittently. Venture capital estimates thus, may differ depending on 
the source7 *.
2.2 Little Dragons- Total Venture Capital Pool (USD Millions)
Hong Kong Singapore S. Korea Taiwan
1991 N A 868 1,547 412
1992 N A 896 1,629 470
1993 N A 1,013 1,687 508
1994 N A 1,833 1,902 562
1995 N.A 3,164 2,567 696
1996 8,019 3,981 3,224 1,336
1997 9,632 4,468 1,857 1,913
Modified from AVQ, 1999
2.3 Little Dragons -Annual Venture Capital Investment (USD Millions)
Hong Kong Singapore Korea Taiwan
1992 N.A 120 111 61
1993 N.A 186 111 148
1994 N.A 236 443 132
1995 N.A 240 745 216
1996 1183 461 1,139 429
1997 778 388 920 643
Modified from AVQ, 1999
It appears that in these countries, the total venture capital pool has increased at an average annual 
growth rate o f more than 10% between 1991-96. 1997 has proven to be an eventful year in the 
history of venture capital in Asia. The growth of venture capital slowed down considerably. 
South K orea was the hardest hit in terms of total venture capital pool. Except for Taiwan, 
venture capital investment declined in all countries.
7 The prim ary source fo r data on Asian venture capital in this thesis is “The Guide to  Venture Capital In  Asia-1999” published by
Asian Venture Capital Journal Further calculations have been marie to  make data comparable across countries. Some mistakes in 
A V CJ data were pointed out and the data has been rectified through later correspondence. M inor differences between A V Q  




At the end o f 1997 there were about 350 venture capital funds operating in little dragon 
countries. These funds had an average capital under management of around USD50 million. 
There are significant differences in fund sizes between these countries. In Hong Kong the 
average fund manages more than USD 100 million whereas in South Korea it is less than USD 15 
million. The venture capital funds were managing around TJSD28 million of average investment 
portfolios comprising 13 projects each. More than 1500 professionals were working in the 
venture capital industry in the little dragon countries with each fund being managed by 
approximately 4 professionals on average. This means that each professional is handling an 
average investment portfolio of a little more than USD6.6 million and about 3 projects. As a 
percentage of G D P 8 the size of the venture capital market in Singapore or Hong Kong is bigger 
than that in South Korea or Taiwan.
Although no specific data is available for the little dragon countries, research indicates that 
mezzanine and turnaround funds in Asia are larger in comparison to funds focussing on early 
stage investments as are funds with a regional investment focus (Aylward, 1998). Moreover, 
funds that have parent company involvement, or are comparatively older, tend to be smaller as 
measured by the proportion of equity to funds raised.
2.4 Little Dragons-Venture Capital Investment by Financing Stage (1997-USD Millions)
Country Seed Start-up Expansion Mezzanine Turnaround Buyout Others
Hong Kong 206 1,618 2,186 113 23 469 75
South Korea 239 493 1,148 374 154 82 0
Singapore 9 57 381 699 379 33 25 0
Taiwan 97 208 642 309 14 6 0
Total 599 2,700 4,675 1,174 225 583 75
Percentage Share 5.97% 26.92% 46.60% 11.71% 2.24% 5.81% 0.75%
Modified from data provided by AVQ, 1999
8 Venture capital pool in Singapore and H ong K ong is more than 1% o f their G D P.
9 According to the A V Q  Directory the seed and Mezzanine (Pre-IPO) investment in Singapore is 3.6%  and 24% recpectively
whereas according to  a Singapore government survey (1999) available on the Internet, it is 34% and 12% respectively. A V Q  
stands by its data. See Annex. 1 fo r details.
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Within the little dragon countries, venture capital is primarily directed toward expansion projects 
instead of start-ups and seed stage projects. Venture capitalists in these countries “ ... do not 
invest in start-up or young stage [sic]. We see some American style in South Korea, Taiwan and 
Singapore, but most cases are large sized private equity funds’ investments in stabilised and 
proven companies for their growth or expansion purpose” 10. The reason usually forwarded for 
this difference is the small amount of money that goes into R&D spending in these countries. 
For example, Hong Kong spends only 0.1% of G D P on research and development (Slater, 
1998). Individual countries exhibit diverse trends in the distribution of venture capital according 
to the stage o f matunty o f portfolio companies. About 40% of venture capital is invested in seed 
and start-up financing in H ong Kong whereas in Taiwan it is 24%.
2.5 Little Dragons-Venture Capital Investment by Source of Finance ( 1997-USD Millions)
Corporations Private Pension Government Insurance Banks Reinvestment Others
Individuals Funds Agencies Companies (C Gains)
Hong Kong 2,435 164 605 47 957 216 0 267
Korea 921 77 32 249 57 199 90 864
Singapore 691 93 55 138 101 346 0 150
Taiwan 852 212 38 50 61 38 0 26
Total 4,899 546 731 484 1,176 800 90 130 7
Percentage 48.83% 5.44% 7.29% 4.83% 11.24% 7.97% 0.89% 13.02%
Share
Modified from data provided byAVCf
As for source of funding, little similarity appears between countries except for the fact that 
coporations provide a large part o f venture capital funds. In H ong Kong and Taiwan 
corporations account for more than 50% of venture capital. In Singapore and South Korea the 
government’s share is comparatively larger with close to 10% of venture capital coming from 
government agencies. This fact seems to suggest that governments, in general, have relied more




on measures to promote venture capital rather than actual supply of funds. In Singapore, banks 
are the second largest source of venture capital (22%) whereas in Hong Kong insurance 
companies are the second most important source of venture capital. Taiwan is conspicuous for a 
very large proportion (16.6%) of venture capital coming from  private individuals. Except for 
Hong Kong, pension funds do not account for more than 10% of venture capital in any country. 
South K orea is likely to see an increased contribution from  pension funds following permission 
by the South Korean Government to allow pension funds to invest in venture capital 
(Thompson, 1999).
2.6 Little Dragons-Venture Capital Investment by Industry- ( 1997-USD Millions)
Hong Kong Korea Singapore Taiwan Total %age
Consumer Related 1,004 167 165 20 1,356 13.52%
Computer Related 145 261 201 365 972 9.69%
Electronics Related 99 391 249 495 1,234 12.30%
Industrial Products 938 628 178 94 1,838 18.33%
Medical/Biotechnology 145 50 133 13 341 3.40%
Communications 615 252 182 97 1,146 11.43%
Energy 202 37 39 8 286 2.85%
Transportation 432 79 26 31 568 5.66%
Construction 647 86 131 8 872 8.69%
Financial Services 103 40 73 41 257 2.56%
Other Services 127 127 78 20 352 3.51%
Other Manufacturing 230 374 119 84 807 8.05%
Overall, over one half o f the venture capital is distributed between industries relating to 
electronics, consumer products, communications and industrial products. Sophisticated 
technology areas like biotechnology and computers account for only a little more than 13% of 
venture capital investments. There is a broad spectrum of investment strategies in individual 
countries. In Hong K ong and South Korea a larger portion (more than 20%) goes to industrial 
products. Hong Kong stands out for its comparatively larger investments in consumer related
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products. Only Taiwan exhibits industry concentration with 65% of venture capital invested in 
computer related and electronics industry.
Compared to Taiwan, venture capital in other countries is more international in nature. An 
investment portfolio of a typical venture capital firm may include an array of projects of a similar 
bent from  more than one country. Risk diversification, is usually put forward as a reason for this 
strategy of regional rather than local investment (Stine, 1990; Meyer &  Shao, 1995). Previous 
research shows that venture capital firms do not normally seek risk diversification by industry, 
stage of maturity of portfolio companies or complexity of technology (Gorman and Sahlman, 
1986; Cornelius, 1992)). Thus, geographical diversification can be a valid reason fo r this strategy 
(Stine, 1990).
The venture capital market is only a decade old in litde dragon countries and has been affected by 
a recent crisis with most Asian stock markets producing negative returns (Periitz, 2000). Given 
the impact o f a venture capital downturn, venture capital performance vis-à-vis public equity 
cannot be examined fairly (Scheela et aL, 2000; Pohndorf, 1997). However, some authors claim 
that despite the industry’s shorter record, and the inherent risks that accompany any investment, 
the internal rate of return (IRR) makes venture capital in Asia a worthwhile endeavour for an 
investor (Lasserre and Probert, 1994; Tanaka, 1994: Payne, 2000). For example, although no 
research data is presented, it has been claimed that between 20-40% of venture capital investors 
earned a 30-40% internal rate of return in Hong Kong during 1990 (Asian Finance, 1990-91) and 
after the Asian crisis investment returns in South Korea were reputed to be around 20-40% 
(Seoul Venture Investment Co. Ltd., 1999).
There has been very litde research in the area of venture capital processes in the litde dragon 
economies. As for venture capital firm’s evaluation criteria within these countries, previous
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research suggests marked differences. In Singapore, the entrepreneur's personality and experience 
was found to be most important evaluation criteria used by venture capital firms while financial 
considerations were least important (Ray, 1991). Rah et al. (1994) have examined investment 
evaluation criteria of venture capital firms in South Korea who rank managerial capability, market 
attractiveness, superior product and technology, financial ability, availability of raw material and 
superiority of product and technology as most important. The rate of return on investment and 
market considerations are more important to Taiwanese venture capital firms while product 
characteristics are considered least important (Pandey and Kim, 1997).
In Taiwan venture capital firms are believed to be proactive and most o f the deals are generated 
by the venture capital firms themselves (Pandey, 1996). In South Korea most of the significant 
venture capital firms are subsidiaries of financial institutions or larger companies with deal-flow 
primarily derived from the parent company (Rah et al., 1994). Except for Taiwan, it is unlikely 
that a venture capital firm will resort to the use of preferred stock as an investment option11. 
There is more variety in venture capital deals in Taiwan, ranging from preferred stock to more 
complicated convertible debts and hybrid debt/equity instruments (Chen and Lee, 2000). 
However, venture capital firms are structured as corporations (A V Q , 1999) in all little dragon 
economies, rather than limited partnerships as in the classical venture capital structure12. Venture 
capital management firms sometimes themselves have a divisional or multinational structure or 
they m aybe a subsidiary of an investment bank or commercial banking firm.
11 In  Asia, different classes o f stocks with different voting rights are not usually permitted. A  survey o f 52 venture capital firms in 
developing countries, 40 o f which belonged to A sia, has found that preferred stock constitute only 5% o f long term  investments 
in portfolio companies and convertible stock averaged less than 2%  (Aylwand, 1998). Asian venture capital firm s, thus, m ostly 
rely on com m on stocks and other means o f managing risks o f the portfolio company.
12 Although it is acknowledged as an important difference, the term venture capital firm  has been used in later discussion to indicate 
a venture capital firm  or a company, for consistency o f expression.
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Initial public offering is not considered a popular exit in little dragon countries. Venture backed 
firms typically have to struggle for a long time to be listed on a stock market because of stria  pre­
conditions. To list a stock on the Hong Kong exchange in reality takes years of profitability, with 
the expectation that the company will soon be generating USD10-15 million in profits annually 
(Schilit, 1992). Purchase by a third party or buyback by the company are the most popular modes 
of exit in Taiwan (Pandey, 1996). With a movement in most o f these countries toward a viable 
alternative stock market (Sender, 2000), there is a possibility that the exit route priorities may 
undergo some adjustment. The experiment with an O TC  (over-the-counter) stock market13 has 
produced mixed results and small market turnover has been a major problem in most markets. 
However, Taiwanese’ R .O .G  O TC (Republic of China Over The Counter Securities Exchange) 
and South K orea’s K O SD A Q  (Korea Securities Dealers Automated Quotations), has been 
relatively successful in terms of trading volume (Gilley, 1999; Business Korea, 2000,a).
The Asian venture capital market was expeaed to slow down, after the Asian financial crisis in 
1997 as it adversely affected equity markets and hopes of initial public offerings (IPOs) of new 
share issues (Asian Business b, 1998). However, contrary to expectations, the Asian venture 
capital market registered increasing importance both at the funding and advisory level. In the past 
venture capital firms functioned m osdy as passive investors, however, during the crisis they 
contributed more of the advice and contacts that companies needed to survive (Asian Business b, 
1998). “There is a trend toward greater management involvement and control largely a symptom 
of the Asia crisis and need for V C s to maximize their returns” 14. Many of the struggling firms 
were saved by venture capital. As corporate valuations lowered and currencies depreciated,
13 K O SQ A Q  in South K orea, SESD A Q  (Stock Exchange o f Singapore Dealing and Autom ated Q uotation system) in Singapore, 
R.O .C. O T C  in Taiwan and G EM  (Growth Enterprise Market) in H ong K ong.
14 Personal Correspondence: Nicholas Ashby, Managing D irector, G lobal Alliance Capital (Malaysia) Sdn. Bhd. Malaysia. April 5, 
1999
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venture capital investors took minority stakes in unlisted firms in the expectation that they could 
cash out via initial public offerings within a few years. Companies also welcomed venture capital 
because, in crises, this capital came cheap compared to loans at prevailing high interest rates. 
Even listed companies were courting venture capital via private placements (Asian Business b, 
1998). Governments seemed to be undeterred by the crisis and the South Korean Government 
announced on February 11,1998 that it would set aside USD620 million in 1998 to help finance 
2000 venture firms (TheEconcm st, 1998).
Some venture capitalists feel that the crisis has left a positive and indelible impression on the 
Asian market. " ... the crisis was the once in a life time opportunitiesfsic] for venture capital 
investment as it nosed down deal price and many good ventures were in need of working capital 
and growth capital which were financed in debt form. In addition, the crises made them change 
their attitude on debt financing. They became to listen carefully to equity financing [sic]” 15. 
Others are sceptical. “There is a short term need for capital, but whether the structural and 
latitudinal changes have taken place to make the market more attractive, is unproven” 16.
Venture capital in tiger economies is more international in nature and is similar to 
Europe(O ECD , 1997). It is one of the reasons why venture capital as a term is interpreted so 
loosely in these countries. The current structure and process of venture capital in little dragon 
countries is the result of many other factors, including individual culture and geography, and the 
nature o f the evolutionary process of the venture capital industry17. The most noticeable aspect 
o f venture capital in little dragon countries is its comparable infancy. Thus the venture capital
15 Personal Correspondence: Jung-Kyoo Yang, Chief International Business D eptt, Korea Technology Corporation, South K orea. 
M arch 18,1999.
16 Personal Correspondence: Jane Crawford, Managing Director, 31 pic South E ast Asia, Singapore . March 23,1999
17 Ivan Zimonyi, manager o f the Developm ent Finance D ivision at the Asian Development Bank quoted in Asian Finance, Six 
Problem s That N eed to be Overcom e, Anonymous 14(5)56,63., 1988
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market in these countries also reflects the initial stages o f a fast developing venture capital 
market. A  comparison o f stages o f financing of venture capital investment over a period in these 
countries shows that, as is common to new markets, initially venture capital was more focused on 
seed and start-up financing and has gradually moved away from  the initial stages. M ost of these 
markets, probably because of lack of experience (McCurry, 2000), are shy of sophisticated 
financing (eg LBO) and financing techniques. Akin to the novelty are also the sources of 
financing. At this stage, corporations and banks are the largest source of venture capital but as 
the market develops pension funds’ share, which are a more common source of venture capital in 
a developed market like the United States, is increasing. Venture capital investment by industry 
in little dragon countries is skewed toward industrial goods, energy and the construction business 
as is expected from growing economies.
Because o f the historical ownership structure, the use o f venture capital in these countries is not 
as widespread as in the United States. The closed ownership structure has resulted in the limited 
use of equity participation incentives to new employees18. Since this particular aspect of venture 
capital is particularly important in high technology industries, where human resource is more 
expensive, it m aybe the reason why venture capital in these countries is not as high tech as in the 
United States. Another reason, for limited high-tech emphasis, is the lack of protection available 
to intellectual property which forms the core of many technology start-ups. Since intellectual 
property protection is weak in these countries, venture capitalists award lesser status to intangible 
assets such as patents or copyrights. Thus, portfolio company valuation is based on tangible 
assets resulting in bank-like financing driven by collaterals. The element of risk however remains 
unaffected even in case of tangible assets because of less developed accounting practices in these
18 Fam ily control is not restricted to private companies. F or example, in Singapore ethnic Chinese fam ily businesses control 81% o f 
Singapore’s listed companies by capitalisation (Chen and Soh, 2000)
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countries. As company regulations in these countries are still developing, the environment in 
these countries is not very accommodating to the use of a wider variety of investment 
instruments19. Thus venture capital financing is not structured flexibly enough to suit investors 
and thus investors have very limited instruments to choose from  In most o f the little dragon 
countries, venture capital firms follow a corporate structure compared to limited partnerships as 
in the United States. While this structure is more formal and system driven, it takes away the 
right o f the investors to dissolve the fund at the end o f stated period. Thus the venture capitalists 
have less incentive to perform as well to claim back the investment. This factor is likely to make 
venture capitalists less adventurous in these countries. Although little dragon countries are only 
now moving toward a secondary stock market, which is viable for disinvestment by venture 
capitalists, the stock market is not widely used as an exit route. There is, however, very limited 
information and research as to which alternative mode o f exit is more popular.
There is very little research on the value added aspect of venture capitalists in little dragon 
countries. However, based on factors that have influenced the structure and process of venture 
capital in little dragon countries, an educated guess can be made. This aspect o f venture capital 
has been discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4.
2.4 Conclusion
Venture capital and its interpretation is not limited to technology, stage of business, value 
addition, capital gains etc. All over Asia, the term venture capital is construed broadly and the 
difference between venture capital and private equity, in general, is non-existent. Formal venture 
capital has a short history in little dragon countries. Venture capital has evolved with respective
19 Since venture capital financing usually entails successive rounds o f financing, involving different investors with different interests, 
it is often desirable to use a diversity o f investment vehicles, whether equity (e.g. various form s of preferred shares), or debt (e.g. 
notes), o r a hybrid nature (.e.g. convertible notes), to  accommodate the particular requirement o f each class o f investors.
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governments playing a large role in directing and defining the industry. The current industry 
structure is now  a result of a blend of cultures, regulatory environments and developmental 
needs.
Despite the fact that little dragon countries have different economic structures, their venture 
capital industries have several common and unique features. The common areas include industry 
maturity, the corporate structure of venture capital firms, attitude toward entrepreneurial culture, 
use o f stock options and significant involvement of governments in venture capital. The value 
addition question, taken up in greater detail in this thesis cannot be studied in isolation and 
should be seen in the light of all the factors that have shaped the current venture capital industry.
In line with the review of venture capital industry in the little dragon countries, the next chapter 




3 Chapter 3: Literature Review
3.1 Introduction
The question o f value added by venture capital firms through their participation in the portfolio 
companies is explored in this chapter. First, existing research that has been carried out that 
directly or indirectly relates to the involvement of venture capital firms in their portfolio 
companies is reviewed. The different research findings, which are specific to the value added 
debate, are then discussed. The perspective of the value added debate is also explored. The 
chapter concludes with a summary of the directions of the findings to date.
3.2 Venture Capital Research in the Past
Venture Capital has become common as an innovative means to finance new ventures in the 
United States (Bygrave et al., 1989) and in other part o f the world (Manigart, 1994). Despite this 
fact, overall research in venture capital has lagged behind the development of the industry 
(Wright and Robbie, 1997). Barry (1994) enumerates the reasons and argues that the theoretical 
problems (relating to venture capital) are complex, multi-faceted and difficult to solve. Moreover, 
its very nature creates difficulties for the empiricist because data on private investment by private 
investors is difficult to obtain. In general, research on venture capital gained prominence in the 
late 1960s and early 1970s, as indicated by many publications during this period. This interest, 
however, subsided to a considerable extent in the following decade. From  the late 1980s there 
has been a renewed research interest in venture capital. An examination of 122 research studies 
related specifically to venture capital and published after 1984 and before 1998 was carried out. 
O f these, 40 were published between 1985-1989 and 61 between 1990-1994 suggesting a 
noticeable rise in research interest. 1995-1997 included 21 studies which, although fewer, indicate 
a continued interest. The research list, however, is not exhaustive and the results point toward a
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general trend. Tybjee and Bruno (1984) have classified the previous research in venture capital 
beginning with interest in procurement of investment opportunities (deal origination), fund 
policies (deal screening), evaluation procedures (deal evaluation) and the structuring of the 
investment agreement (deal structuring). The examination of environments in which venture 
capital firms operate, can also be added to this list (Cornelius, 1992). Brophy (1986) notes that the 
role of finance in entrepreneurial-driven-emeiging-growth-companies was the main area of 
research in the 1960s. Attention during the 1970s shifted to the processes of venture capital and 
its link to m odem  finance theories (Bancroft and Burgin 1977; Driscoll, 1974). Research in the 
eighties has focused mainly on the characteristics o f the venture capital portfolio, the investment 
decision process and flows of venture capital (Davis et a l, 1984; McMillan et al., 1985; Robinson, 
1987; Gatson and Bell, 1988; Wetzel, 1985). Dunng the late eighties there was a gradual increase 
of interest in the venture capital firm / portfolio company relationship (Sapienza and Timmons, 
1989; Rosenstein et al., 1989; Perry 1988; McMillan et aL, 1988) and a growing recognition of 
venture capital markets outside the United Sates (Alan, 1989). The first half of the 1990s not only 
saw several studies focusing attention on various other markets but also testing the applicability 
of previous research findings in these markets (Ray, 1994; Rah et al., 1994; Ray, 1991). These 
studies, however, were mostly limited to western countries (Sweeting, 1997; Knight, 1994; 
Landstrom, 1993; Sapienza et al., 1994; Sapienza et aL, 1995).
3.2.1 Research in Venture Capital Involvement
The institutionalisation and recognition of venture capital, as a viable financing alternative, began 
in the United States. It is, therefore, understandable why most of the research in this area is 
confined to United States and/or Europe. So far, the research, as regards venture capital 
firm /portfolio company relations, has covered both the financial and non-financial assistance 
provided by the venture capital firm to portfolio companies. The subject of involvement of
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venture capital firms with their portfolio companies has received more attention during the 
1990s. The interest was largely sparked by a suggestion from  Timmons and Sapienza (1992) that 
only those venture capital firms are likely to survive an industry shake out which distinguish 
themselves through value adding involvement in their portfolio companies. However, the 
literature discussing the non-financial aspects o f the venture capital firm’s involvement in the 
portfolio company has attended more to the extent and focus of the venture capital firm’s 
involvement rather than answering the question o f whether the venture capital firms’ 
involvement in their portfolio companies add value to their portfolio companies (MacMillan et 
a l, 1988; Flynn, 1992). The research interest in the field of the venture capital firm’s involvement 
has coincided with the movement of venture capital research beyond the exploratory stage 
(Bruno, 1986). Consequently, most of the research is based on questionnaires and personal 
interviews. Another characteristic of research in this area is a comparatively larger focus on high 
technology companies (Wright and Robbie, 1997). Countries besides the United States have, 
however, not necessarily shared the technology focus in venture capital research (Murray, 1992; 
Rizzoni, 1991; Mason and Harrison, 1992).
3.2.2 Is Previous Research in Venture Capital Relevant in an International Context?
Considerable diversity exists between venture capital markets in different countries (Hurry et al.,
1992). This difference forces us, at times, to redefine venture capital in many individual situations. 
Questions about the inclusion of very large management buyouts/buyins and later stage 
investments within the sphere of venture capital, as in the United Kingdom  (Murray, 1995), are 
still being debated (Bygrave and Timmons, 1992; NVCA, 2000). Thus, for researchers 
contemplating investigation o f less explored markets, grappling with the definition of venture 
capital is one of the more searching questions that must be answered satisfactorily. Designing a 
research question is made more difficult by the fact that respective environments influence
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elementary research parameters. Thus, the term value added may be interpreted differently. 
While, it is expected that the difference in interpretation may result in a new perspective that is 
not comparable with the existing body of literature, the existing literature cannot be termed 
irrelevant. Internationalisation of venture capital and past efforts toward replication of the United 
Sates model in many Asian countries point towards a possible broad convergence on many 
features o f venture capital. Many inferences, thus, may turn out to be transportable across 
countries. The existing literature, in any case, serves as a useful starting point for venture capital 
research.
3.3 Venture Capital Fiim /Poitfolio Company Relationship Dynamics
In the classical20 sense venture capital firms are organised as limited liability partnerships and seek
to finance new or developing high growth firms which do not have access to the public securities 
market or institutional lenders (Morris, 1991). A  venture capital firm acts as a financial 
intermediary receiving funds from subscribers and investing on their behalf in portfolio 
companies, invariably, in the shape of equity or long-term debt which may be convertible into 
equity at a later stage (Robbie &  Wright, 1996). Venture capital firms, consequendy, can be 
theorised as a professional service not dissimilar to commercial banking, investment banking or 
even insurance (Swartz, 1991). Venture capital firms usually invest in groups, commonly termed 
‘syndicates’, with one of the firms acting as ‘lead’. The syndicate structure of a venture capital 
market holds several advantages for venture capital firms (Lemer, 1994)21. The post investment 
relationship between a venture capital firm and a portfolio company typically lasts from 3 to 10 
years (Sapienza and Amason, 1993). A  venture capital firm offers more than finance (Roberts a,
20 The venture capital market m odel as developed in the United States.
21 Syndication m ay lead to a superior selection o f investments. Syndication also gives venture capitalists a a  chance to check out 
their own thinking against other knowledgeable sources Syndicating first-round venture investments m ay lead to better decisions 
about whether to invest in firm s. Syndication is also a mechanism through which venture capitalists exploit informational 
asymmetries.
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1991; Fried and Hisrich, 1995) by actively monitoring the project and participating, within 
limitations, in decision-making processes. They may, sometimes, assume a managerial role within 
the portfolio company. To some researchers, this appears to be one of the m ost significant 
distinguishing features that sets the Venture capital firm apart from  other capital providers (Rock, 
1991; Perry, 1988). Venture capital has been characterised as the combination o f capital and 
consulting (Wame, 1988).
The post investment involvement of a venture capital firm and its portfolio company is unlikely 
to follow a set pattern. Basically, the complexity grows out o f the three dimensions o f the venture 
capital firm /portfolio company relationship. First, portfolio companies do differ according to 
size, industry, technology etc. Secondly, relationship parameters, like the relative amount and 
share of equity and the lead status role of venture capital firms, may influence relationship 
patterns. Thirdly, venture capital firms also differ. For a while, a misconception about the 
homogeneity o f the venture capital business clouded this third dimension of the relationship. 
However, it was later found that even within the United States the venture capital industry is not 
homogenous, as believed in the past (Fried and Hisrich, 1988). In fact researchers started 
examining the differences (Robinson, 1987; Florida and Kenny, 1988; Sapienza and Timmons, 
1989) among venture capital firms long before venture capital became recognised as a 
heterogeneous industry (Bygrave and Timmons, 1992). Because of the networking of co­
investors the relationship between a venture capital firm and a portfolio company was not 
believed to be dyadic (Stier and Greenwood, 1995). However, the concentration of research 
studies focusing exclusively on the relationship between the lead investor and the portfolio 
company (Rosenstein et aL, 1989; Pandey and Jang, 1996; Sapienza and Gupta, 1994; Sapienza, 
1992) is indicative of a one to one relationship.
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The relationship between the venture capitalist and the entrepreneur is governed by several 
structural governance mechanisms (Fried and Hisrich, 1995; Rosenstien, 1988; Reid et al., 1997; 
Barney et aL, 1989; Gladstone, 1989; Barney et aL, 1994). One of the monitoring mechanisms is 
to adjust contact frequency. Gom pers (1995) has shown that a decrease in industry ratios o f 
tangible assets to total assets, higher market to book ratios and greater R&D concentration results 
in more active monitoring of the portfolio company. Compensation schemes are put in place to 
offer the entrepreneur appropriate incentives. Convertible securities are used which give Venture 
capital firms an option to sell their stake back to the entrepreneur. Covenants are also used to 
manage risk (Cornelius, 1992) and to limit entrepreneurial behaviour detrimental to value 
maximisation efforts of venture capital firms (Gompers and Lemer, 1996). Although Gompers 
(1995) has downplayed the role of accounting information and reports submitted by the portfolio 
companies to their Venture capital firms for facilitating governance, some researchers (Robbie et 
aL, 1992; Sweeting, 1991) have specifically addressed the subject as very important.
3.3.1 The Extent of Influence and Governance
Whether and how venture capital firms can influence a portfolio company’s decisions, 
considering their “arm’s length” (MacMillan et al., 1988) position, has attracted very little 
attention. The argument to explain influence (Gomez-Meija et aL, 1990) is based on resource- 
dependence theory (Yutchman and Seashore, 1967) as Stiglitz and Weiss (1982) have applied it to 
the banking industry. As influence is the process of exercising power, the amount of power that 
A  exercises on B depends on the degree to which B depends on A  for things B needs. Portfolio 
companies are primarily dependent on venture capital firms for capital (Frederiksen et aL, 1990). 
The uncertainty in portfolio companies’ circumstances also increases the dependence of portfolio 
companies on the venture capital firms. The dependency, and hence potential for influence, is 
also increased in that there are not many alternative sources of financing for high tech firms
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(Rosenstien et al., 1993). The primary reason for the lack of alternative financing is because the 
value of portfolio companies lies in their potential growth rather than their tangible assets (Jeng 
and Wells, 2000). A  venture capital firm’s influence is multiplied further if it is able to add 
important resources to the resource pool o f a portfolio company. This argument stems from  the 
findings of Salancik and Pfeffer (1974) who have indicated that the power of a department in an 
organisation is a function of the number and extent of important resources contributed by the 
department. Thus venture capital firms are in a position to exercise, whether they choose to or 
not, enormous real and potential power over the portfolio company. Although, venture capital 
firms are not the only equity investors to be involved in investees (Adamati et a l, 1994; Gatson 
and Bell, 1988), the fact that venture capital firms do exercise a greater control over portfolio 
• companies is supported by the studies which have found that venture capital firms have been 
known to perform some key corporate functions (Sahlman, 1990) and even take complete 
control of the portfolio company dismissing the original entrepreneur (Qian et al., 1990). 
Although it cannot be said with certainty whether the influence of venture capital firms on 
portfolio companies has undergone a change, evidence shows that the power that financial 
institutions exercised over corporations has declined (Herman, 1981).
Before going through past research, which focuses on the extent of involvement of the venture 
capital firm in its portfolio company, it needs to be mentioned that there are differences among 
researchers regarding the use of a common scale to measure involvement. The criteria most 
researchers have used is the amount of time spent by the venture capital firm with their portfolio 
companies (Gorman and Sahlman, 1989), the number of activities that a venture capital firm is 
involved in (Rosenstein et al., 1989; Pandey and Jang, 1996; MacMillan et al., 1988) or the 
frequency of venture capital firm/portfolio company interaction (Sapienza and Gupta, 1994; 
Sapienza, 1992).
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A  venture capital firm’s involvement with a portfolio company is usually at a senior level 
(Macmillan et al., 1988) and the senior partners may spend as much as 60% of their time in post 
investment activity (Gorman and Sahlman, 1986). Venture capital firms differ in the amount of 
time they spend with their portfolio companies (Robinson, 1987; Gorman and Sahlman, 1986). 
Lead venture capital firms are generally more involved with their portfolio companies than the 
non-lead firms (Gorman and Sahlman, 1986; Elango et a l, 1995). A  comparison of research 
conducted by Gorman and Sahlman (1986) and Elango et al. (1995) indicates the different 
amounts o f time venture capitalists spend with their portfolio companies. The earlier study shows 
markedly less time allocation compared to the later study. This may suggest that venture capital 
firms’ involvement in their portfolio companies is increasing. The difference is probably 
understated as the first study concentrates on early stage ventures where the involvement is 
thought to be higher (Sapienza, 1992). MacMillan et aL (1988) have classified the involvement of 
venture capital firms in their portfolio companies as low (laissez-faire), moderate and high (close 
tracker). This classification is generally accepted and often quoted in research studies relating to 
the involvement of venture capital firms.
Macmillan et al. (1988) have also concluded that venture capital firms are more involved with 
their portfolio companies simply because they chose to be involved. Barry (1994) has refined this 
conclusion by citing evidence that the choice of involvement is in turn dependent on the need to 
be involved as perceived by the venture capital firm. Sadder (1993), however, has argued that 
although involvement may be a matter o f choice, in some comparable cases, the difference in 
involvement is dependent on contingent factors (Sweeting, 1991), some of which, may not be 
under the control o f the venture capital firm  There have been a number of research studies that 
have found adequate evidence that these “ contingent factors’ do influence the involvement of a 
venture capital firm (Sapienza et al., 1996; Sapienza and Timmons, 1989; Barney et al., 1996).
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3.3.1.1 Contributing Factors Determining the Extent of Venture Capital Firm’s 
Involvement
Based on the above two point o f views, the research on factors influencing involvement can 
broadly be divided into two parts. Firstly, a venture capital firm’s involvement is dependent on 
their perceived role, which is, primarily, managing the risks of the proposed venture (Macmillan 
et a l, 1985; Ruhunka and Young, 1991; Driscoll, 1974). Secondly, it is also dependent on a 
number o f other factors over which venture capital firms have little control
3.3.1.1.1 M anaging Risk
The argument that venture capital firms may exercise greater influence on a portfolio company 
when there is a perception of higher risks is based on Galbraith’s (1973) information processing 
theory. The theory concludes that the complexity of a decision making process is dependent on 
“task uncertainty” . Task uncertainty, in this case, is the gap between the information necessary to 
make effective decisions and the information already possessed by the decision-makers. This 
suggests that the venture capital firm will seek greater control, and hence more information from 
the portfolio company in the case of higher risk, as perceived by the venture capital firm, 
resulting in greater interaction. Sapienza et al. (1994) have found general evidence in support of 
the argument and state that there is less involvement of venture capital firms in monitoring 
activities in the portfolio companies with comparatively lesser risk. It needs to be mentioned that, 
though a venture capital firms’ involvement may be an attempt to reduce risk, greater 
involvement is not always cost effective and needs to be balanced against the benefits 
obtained(Bamey et a l, 1989; MacMillan et al., 1988). The existing literature on venture capital, in 
regard to risks faced by a venture capital firm vis-à-vis a portfolio company, has looked at this 
problem from  two basic viewpoints. One group of researchers simply considers these as parts of 
business risks while others see these risks as essentially emanating from agency relations, believed
39
3: Literatim  Review
to exist, between a venture capital firm and a portfolio company. There is, however, considerable 
overlap, from  both points of view, in regard to factors that are understood to affect a venture 
capital firm ’s involvement with its portfolio company.
3.3.1.1.2 Business Risk
Business risk, faced by venture capital firms, has been defined as the uncertainty associated with 
obtaining a return on investment in a new firm due to that firm’s competitive environment 
(Barney et al., 1989). The business risks, in regard to venture capital, have been broadly 
conceptualised in terms of venture performance, the technology being pursued by the venture 
and venture stage (Sapienza et al., 1995). There is sufficient consensus that venture 
performance and technology has a direct relation with the venture capital firm’s involvement 
(Sadder, 1993). Research conducted in the United Kingdom  has gone as far as to confirm that, 
irrespective o f the initial strategy preference, heightened intrusion by a venture capital firm 
resulted when the investee company was in particularly difficult circumstances (Murray, 1991). 
The relations between venture stage and involvement has remained a subject o f debate. The 
research findings in this case can simply be classified into studies which did not find any 
correlation between the stage of the portfolio company and the heightened venture capital firms’ 
involvement (MacMillan et a l, 1988; Elango et aL, 1995), and studies which found otherwise 
(Gorman and Sahlman, 1986).
3.3.1.1.3 Agency Risk
The literature on agency risk in venture capital considers the relationship between a venture 
capital firm  and a portfolio company from a principal/agent viewpoint (Reid, 1996; Fiet, 1995; 
G ian  et aL, 1990). An agency relation is one where a “principal” i.e. a venture capital firm 
delegates its authority to an "agent", a portfolio company, to perform some service for the 
principal. This point of view has its basis in the division that exists between management and
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ownership, as in the case of corporations (Goase, 1937; Hoffman. 1982; Howe and Patterson, 
1985). Agency theory is acknowledged “by its emphasis on the risk attitudes of principals and 
agents" (Barney &  Hesteiiy, 1996:124).
Agency risks, as faced by a venture capital firm, are primarily classified into moral hazard risk and 
adverse selection risk. Moral hazard is a risk where the entrepreneur may not put forth the efforts 
originally agreed upon. The risk of adverse selection pertains to the possibility of an entrepreneur 
misrepresenting his/her abilities. The basic premise holds that the frequency of a venture capital 
firm /portfolio company interaction will be greater when high agency risks necessitate greater 
monitoring by the venture capital firm (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Barney et al., 1989; Reid, 1987). 
As applied to venture capital firm/portfolio company relations, there exist multiple sources of 
agency risks (Callahan and Sharp, 1985). So far, the variables that effect governance, derived from 
agency theory and found positively related to involvement, include venture capitalist/chief 
executive officer goal congruence, stage of the business, degree of technical innovation and 
physical distance between the venture capital firm and the portfolio company (Sapienza and 
Gupta, 1994). The involvement has been found to be negatively related to the experience of the 
chief executive o f the portfolio company and the extent of the venture capitalists’/entrepreneurs 
personal relationship (Barney et al., 1989; Gomez-Meija et al., 1990, Sapienza and Gupta, 1994). 
The agency risk factors of the venture capital firm/portfolio company experience and the length 
of the venture capital firm’s association with the portfolio company has produced mixed results 
at an international level (Sapeinza et aL, 1995; Sapienza et a l, 1996). There is disagreement on the 
application o f agency theory to venture capital firm / portfolio company relations (Cable and 
Shane, 1997). The empirical research on venture capital suggests that there may not always exist a 
hierarchical relationship between a venture capital firm and a portfolio company. Moreover, there 
is room  for opportunistic behaviour on the part of a principal (venture capital firm) making
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desertion a possibility (Sahlman, 1990), which challenges one o f the basic premises of agency 
theory. Furthermore, the portfolio company's performance, to some extent, also depends on the 
competence of the venture capitalist.
3.3.1.1.4 Contingent Factors
The venture capital firms’ own circumstances, which are beyond their control, are also likely to 
effect the extent of involvement. The venture capital industry has become increasingly specialised 
(Robinson, 1987; Swartz, 1991; Gorman and Sahlman, 1986). Research studies have identified 
technology being pursued (Tybjee and Bruno, 1984; Sadder, 1993) and the investment stage of 
the portfolio company (Gorman and Sahlman, 1986; Robinson, 1987) as possible areas in which 
venture capital firms may specialise. Thus, venture capital firms specialising in particular stages or 
technologies, may be forced to get more involved in their portfolio companies because of high 
risk factors. Similarly, the size of the venture capital firm in terms of capital under management 
(Elango et aL, 1995) and the experience of the venture capitalists (Sapienza et a l, 1996) may 
reflect on the venture capital firm’s decision to be more involved with the portfolio company. 
Moreover, geographic proximity of the venture capital firm with the portfolio company may also 
effect the extent of involvement as venture capital firms located close to their portfolio 
companies tend to be more involved in their portfolio companies (Gomez-Meija et al., 1990). 
The research conducted by Wright et al. (1994), though restricted to management buyouts, found 
that larger deals attracted repeated and active monitoring by venture capital firms in the United 
Kingdom. Cultures differ across countries and so does the concept of venture capital. These 
differences ultimately influence methods of doing venture capital business (Clark, 1987). These 
differences are also reflected in the extent and frequency of a venture capital firm’s/portfolio 
company’s interaction (Sapienza et al., 1994; Jog et a l, 1991).
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3.3.2 The Choice Of Platforms
The most common (Robert, 1983) and influential (Landstrom, 1990) method of venture capital
firms’ involvement in their portfolio companies is through participation on the Board of 
Directors. Although any contribution or initiative to contribute by the venture capital firm may 
not be the result of, or by virtue of, their seat on the Board, there is a direct relationship between 
the increased role of the venture capital firm on the Board and management’s favourable 
assessment of the resources (finance, experience, expertise, technical assistance etc) provided by 
the venture capital firm (Landstrom, 1990). The existing literature, while discussing a venture
capital firm’s contribution, rarely distinguishes the involvement of the venture capital firm 
through different platforms. Nevertheless, it is generally agreed that the greatest involvement o f a 
venture capital firm  in its portfolio company is through representation on the Board (MacMillan 
et aL, 1989). Even in those cases where venture capital firms dp have membership on the board, 
they may also be involved through formal/informal meetings (Gomez-Meija, 1990). The venture 
capital firm may also take advantage of making unexpected telephone calls to C E O ’s in an effort 
to update themselves as to the status of the business and provide an opportunity for the CEO  to 
discuss important issues (Fiet, 1995).
Research studies on board representation of venture capital firms in portfolio companies have 
analysed the actual representation decision, its size and the influence board members cany within 
the board o f directors. A  venture capitalists’ desire to be represented on the board of a portfolio 
company may depend on its choice (AVQ, 1999) or the presence of various other factors. Local 
regulations may prevent a venture capital firm from claiming a seat on the board. In Japan, for 
example, it is unusual for a venture capital firm’s representative to be on the board of a portfolio 
company due to antitrust laws (Spencer, 1995). Furthermore, in cases o f syndicate financing, 
representation o f non-lead managers on the board of a portfolio company is also uncommon
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(Rosenstein, 1990). The size of a venture capital firm’s investment may have some bearing on 
their representation (Elango et aL, 1995). The number of board members that will represent a 
venture capital firm will also depend on circumstances. It has been determined that a portfolio 
company with proximity to a venture capital firm is likely to have more venture capital board 
member involvement/representation than others (Lemer, 1995). Lem er (1995) has also 
concluded that there is heightened involvement of venture capital firms on the board in times of 
crises, and the number of board members representing a venture capital firm increases between 
financing rounds when the firm’s C EO  is replaced in the interval Venture capitalists’ number 
and influence on the Board also tends to be determined by the diversity of ownership in a 
portfolio company. The company with a comparatively wider ownership (mainly public limited 
companies), tend to be influenced more by the C EO  in regard to the selection o f the board of 
directors (Rosenstien, 1990). It has also been established that, generally, the Board of a high-tech 
portfolio company is dominated by venture capital firms (Rosenstein et aL, 1993).
In regard to the direct interaction between a venture capitalist and an entrepreneur, one of the 
limiting factors for a venture capitalist is the paucity of time. The decision to interact is also 
influenced by the apprehension that excessive intrusion in the portfolio company may cause 
resentment on the part of the portfolio company and/or encourage complacency where the chief 
executive of the portfolio company will not take risks thereby jeopardising the entrepreneurial 
spirit o f the project. It has also been argued that as a result of greater contact, the chief executive 
of the portfolio company may cease feeling inhibited about taking a decision contrary to the 
wishes and interest of the venture capital firm. The risk is greater when he/she has a greater 
predilection to serve self-satisfying goals (Barney et aL, 1989). The last argument appears tenable 
because the chief executive o f the portfolio company has also much at stake in the shape of 
h is/her equity investment, which ranks him/her almost equal to the venture capital firm in terms
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of expectations from  the venture. Thus, the chances of adverse selection or bad judgement may 
be greater than those of moral hazard or self-satisfying motives. It needs to be emphasised, 
however, that the incentive for the venture capital firm to be in contact with the chief executive 
of the portfolio company will always remain (Sapienza and Gupta (1994), because expecting 
‘perfection’ from  the management team of the portfolio company, in all circumstances, is 
impossible. Moreover, managerial competence in the portfolio company is usually the greatest 
concern o f the venture capital firm (Ruhunka and Young, 1987).
An alternative way of looking at the issue of venture capital governance is suggested here in 
Table 3.1. In order to understand the value-added role of investors, like venture capital firms, 
there is a need to make a distinction between value-added investors and others. Governance is a 
broad term and covers the activities of all types of investors. It should be separated into elements 
which will draw attention to the role of an investor vis-a-vis his/her investment. The division of 
governance into three modes each, with their own unique features, is useful. The basic objective 
of “monitoring” is to seek information from an investee company and to analyse this information 
in order to determine the extent o f risk. Monitoring indicates to the venture capital firm when to 
make adjustments in other governance modes. Information about an investee company is 
gathered from  multiple platforms ranging from telephone conversations with the management of 
the investee company to on-site physical inspection. Moreover, there are several external sources, 
which help determine the extent of risk in a broader industry scenario. The scope and amount of 
information flow can be adjusted by increasing/decreasing the number, frequency and time 
allocation o f the relevant platform.
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3.1 C lassificatk m  o f Governance M odes 
M onitoring
^ # 1 l . .......—





Analyse and Assess Control Minimise
Platform s Internal
•  Telephone
•  Form al/ informal 
Meetings
•  Board Participation
•  Reports
•  Physical Inspection 
External
•  Competitors
•  Industry data
•  Journals/ 
Newspapers etc
•  Compensation 
schemes




•  Formal/Informal 
Meetings









•  Frequency of 
Interaction
•  Participation in 
Number o f Activities
•  Time spent
Stage Mostly post-investment Mostly pre-investment Post-Investment
A pproach ' Hands-off Passive Pro-active
Controlling indicates a different governance mode. One of the objectives of controlling is to set 
standards of performance and behaviour for the management of the portfolio company. Another 
objective is to develop adequate and appropriate incentives for the portfolio company 
management in order to achieve the desired level of performance. This exercise ensures that the 
risks already identified are prevented from increasing any further. This goal is primarily achieved 
through the use of convertible debts and ratchet (staged) financing (Gompers, 1997). Potential 
moral hazards are also controlled though various covenants contained in the financing agreement 
(Barney et al., 1994; Chan et aL, 1990). Control is also established through innovative
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compensation schemes employed to offer appropriate incentives (Sahlman, 1994). M ajor changes 
in these variables are less likely to occur after the investment has been made. Thus, these controls 
are passive by nature.
The purpose of what is classified as “ involvement” is to add value by increasing the chances of 
survival of the portfolio company and hence minimising risk. This is primarily achieved through 
actual participation in the portfolio company's business activities. This classification underscores 
the point that while other suppliers of funds, like banks, only monitor and control their 
investments from  relevant platforms, what makes a venture capitalist special is his involvement 
with the investee, where the value-added objective assumes more prominence. It is argued 
further that the involvement issue is akin to the value-added question. It, however, needs to be 
emphasised that while some governance platforms are easily identified with a governance mode, 
it is difficult to draw a line between others. For example, a telephone conversation may start with 
the venture capitalist seeking information from the entrepreneur Le. monitoring, and may end 
with the venture capitalist conveying useful information/advice Le. involvement.
3.3.3 Areas And Focus Of The Venture Capital Finn’s Involvement In The Portfolio 
Company
The last half o f the 1980s saw efforts on the part of researchers to identify (Timmons and 
Bygrave, 1986; MacMillan et aL, 1989; Gorman and Sahlman, 1989) and rank (Perry, 1988; 
Sapienza and Timmons, 1989; Landstrom, 1990) the activities (in order of importance and the 
extent of involvement) in which venture capital firms were involved with their portfolio 
companies. MacMillan et aL (1989) identified as many as 20 activities in their study, including;
1) assistance in finding and selecting key management team personnel;
2) solicitation o f essential suppliers and customers;
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3) strategic planning;
4) assistance in obtaining additional financing;
5) operational planning ; and
6) replacement of management personnel when appropriate.
Gorman and Sahlman (1989) added the provision of network of contacts to this list. This activity 
is now identified as one of the more important areas of contribution (Litder and Sweeting, 1989; 
Jarillo, 1989).
Although researchers differ slightly (Rosenstein, 1988; Rosenstein et al., 1990; MacMillan et al., 
1989; Ehrlich et al., 1994), an indicative study by Rosenstein et al. (1989) regarding the focus of a 
venture capital firm’s involvement found that the chief executive of the portfolio company 
regarded the five most important areas of the venture capital firms’ involvement according to 
ranking as;
1) a sounding board to the management team;
2) interfacing with the investor group;
3) monitoring the operations;
4) monitoring financial performance; and
5) recruitment/replacement of the chief executive of the portfolio company.
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The evidence that captive22 venture capital firms tend to have more financial expertise whereas 
independent venture capital firms have more industrial expertise and hence greater involvement 
(Beecroft, 1994) suggests that the focus of the venture capital firm’s involvement depends on the 
skills and expertise available to the venture capital firm. Moreover, the emphasis or importance of 
any activity has been found to be dependent on the stage at which the venture capital firm 
discovers its investment (Sapienza and Timmons, 1989; Fried and Hisrich, 1994; Rosenstein, 
1993). Venture capitalists have been “characterised” as coach, mentor and adviser based on their 
particular activities (Sapienza and Timmons, 1989; Landstrom, 1990) but this approach tends to 
generalise the relationship, which depends on multiple factors. The factor dependent 
characterisation (Lorenz, 1989; Olofsson, 1985) approach is comparatively recent and appears to 
be more useful than simple characterisation of the venture capitalist’s role.
3.4 The Value Added Question
Managerial support activities on the part of equity investors can help to add value to the firm 
(Thurow, 1992; Klien, 1987). Even discounting the actual contribution, one of the objectives of 
the venture capital firm through involvement with the portfolio company is an attempt to add 
value (Bhide, 1994). Amit et a l (1998) have argued that venture capital firms will generally 
operate in an environment where their relative efficiency in selecting, monitoring and adding 
value to the investment gives them a comparative advantage. The attempt to add value, in fact, is 
difficult to segregate from  the venture capital firm’s efforts to protea the investment and is 
considered part of the venture capital process (Silver, 1985; Sadder, 1993). The question of value 
added, however, has been a tricky one for research scholars. The basic problem emerges from the 
f a a  that it is very difficult to assess the im paa of particular decisions on the value of the 
company. Any attempt at determination of value-added would lean toward subjectivity and
22 A  venture capital firm fully or partially owned by another business.
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generalisation. It is, thus, not surprising that most of the studies are built around the perception 
of the venture capitalist and/or the entrepreneur as regards addition of value. Moreover, while 
venture capital firms, are involved in a number of activities, their actual value added contribution 
may not be in all areas of activity. Furthermore, the venture capital firm and its portfolio 
company differ in composition, expertise, culture and a host o f other factors. These differences 
reflect on the capacity of venture capital firms to add value and the appetite of a portfolio 
company to absorb added value. Technology oriented firms, for example, are considered 
particularly receptive to value addition by equity investors because of their capability to absorb 
inputs (Forest, 1990; Landstrom, 1990). In some cases the value added question may not arise 
altogether because venture capital firms, for whatever reasons, may not be involved in their 
portfolio companies. Research has shown that international differences do influence involvement 
and may also prevent generalisation of findings (Sapienza et al., 1996). The argument over 
addition o f value by venture capital firms in their portfolio companies has been debated for a 
number o f years. The researchers, in regard to the value addition question, have taken two 
general approaches. One set of studies considers the perception of venture capitalists/ chief 
executives o f the portfolio company and the other looks at the perception of venture capital 
firms in regard to value added.
3.4.1 The Rationale
Researchers have put forward several arguments to substantiate the existence of circumstances in 
a venture capital/portfolio company relationship, which should result in value addition. One of 
the arguments stems from the basic premise that organisations use information to reduce 
uncertainty and curtail ambiguities (Daft and Lengel, 1986). This approach requires subjective 
judgement and intuition (Daft and Lengel; Simon, 1987). Proper understanding of the problems, 
therefore, is more important than information to better control ambiguities. When a venture
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capital firm  and a portfolio company interact with each other value is added when better 
understanding develops and creative solutions to problems are found (Bourgeois and Eisenhardt, 
1988). Another argument in this context is based on the organisational learning model, which 
assumes that learning improves performance (Argyris, 1994; Mezias and Glynn, 1993). Besides 
any financial or non-financial assistance, portfolio companies get added value through learning 
from  venture capital firms (Fiol and Lyles, 1985; Rock, 1991; Sapienza, 1992). “As venture 
capitalists have observed various cases o f business matters in other portfolio companies, they are 
in a good position to give advice”23. The very process o f asking questions and engaging in due 
diligence operations sharpens the thinking of the company management and inspires them to 
think through their growth plans and potential problem areas in a more targeted manner (Sadder, 
1993).
Since there is a need for small firms to focus on their strategic objectives (Roberts, 1991), a 
venture capital firm can add value through regular checks forcing, CEO s to follow dominant 
logic, focus on it, and limit the number of objectives (Prahalad and Bettis, 1986). The contractual 
arrangements said to be designed to control opportunism (Barney et a l, 1994) by the CEO , 
prevents management from  non value maximising activities, links compensation with 
performance, offers incentives to keep good managers (Wright and Robbie, 1997) and is really 
geared toward value maximisation (Sahlman, 1990). Staged investments also enable a venture 
capital firm  to terminate involvement and cut back losses (Gompers, 1995) hence maximising 
value. A  further rationale of possible value added has been forwarded by Caravalho (1996), which 
is based on his finding that more than 3A o f venture capital firms operate in an informal network 
and a majority of venture capital firms reported acting on the suggestions of other venture capital
23 Personal correspondence record; Comments byJung-Kyoo Yang, Chief, International Business Department, K orea Technology 
Corporation, South K orea
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firms in as important a matter as hiring a new manager. Based on this, Caravalho (1996) argued, 
that through the mechanism of networking, a venture capital firm  adds value by transferring 
organisational capital to firms. He includes organisation culture, experience and knowledge in 
organisation capital.
Reputed venture capital firms, by backing a start-up, add a seal o f approval to a portfolio 
company (Fried and Hisrish, 1994). This can translate into an increased availability o f a whole 
gamut o f resources for the portfolio company at comparatively better terms compared to those 
businesses, not backed by venture capital firms. Supporting institutions like lawyers, accounting 
firms, auditors and lessors are known to gather around an “approved” portfolio company in the 
hope of reaping benefits at a later stage (Magginson and Weiss, 1991; The Econom ist, 1997 (a); 
Jarillo, 1989).
3.4.2 Venture Capital Firm /Entrepreneuris Perception
Venture capital firms exp ea that their involvement in the portfolio company will increase the 
likelihood o f the success o f the venture (Rock, 1991; Perry, 1988) and may even be welcomed by 
the portfolio com pany (Fried and Hisrish, 1994; Bygrave and Timmons, 1992; Silver, 1985). The 
previous research studies as far as the methodology is concerned, have been predominantly based 
on survey instruments, case studies or interview data from  venture capital firms about specific 
companies (Gorm an and Sahlman, 1986; MacMillan et al., 1988; Rosenstein, 1988). Using similar 
methodology, researchers have also colleaed data from  entrepreneurs about the involvement of 
respective venture capital firms in different aaivities (Fried and Hisrish, 1994; Rosenstein et a l, 
1993; Rosenstein et al., 1989, Rosenstein et al., 1990). Lastly, by pairing the venture capital 
firm /portfolio company as unit o f analysis, data has been colleaed from  both participants to 
evaluate the relationship (Sapienza and Timmons, 1989; Sapienza, 1992; Sapienza et al., 1996).
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Some o f the studies have restricted themselves to high technology portfolio companies (Barney 
et aL, 1996; Ehrlich et aL, 1994; Sapienza and Amason, 1993; Stier and Greenwood, 1995).
The research results, overall, are conflicting (Cherin and Hergert, 1988; Sapienza, 1992). N o 
relation has been found between intensity of involvement, perception o f value addition and 
venture performance (Rosenstien et aL, 1989; MacMillan et aL, 1988). The CEO s o f the portfolio 
companies do not see venture capitalists on the board as adding more value than any other board 
member (Rosenstein et aL, 1989) unless the venture capital firm is highly reputed (Rosenstien et 
aL, 1993). Rosenstien et a l (1993) also found that the perception o f value added is greater where 
higher activity is reported. According to them, monitoring of operating and financial 
performance and formulation of marketing plans have been identified by C EO ’s as areas in 
which venture capital firms apply great effort but do not produce as much value added as 
expected. Based on these findings they concluded that the value added depended on the type of 
activity undertaken.
Studies in the United Kingdom  (Harrison and Mason, 1992) and the Netherlands (VanWakeren 
et al., 1989) have found that entrepreneurs in the United Kingdom  rate acting as a sounding 
board and advising on strategic matters as the m ost important value adding activity of venture 
capitalists. They depend more on the assistance o f venture capital firms than they do on other 
types o f investors. Gom ez et al.(1990) found through personal interviews that CEO ’s of 
portfolio companies recognise the financial and networking contribution o f venture capital firms 
as a positive value adding activity. They also found that managerial involvement by the venture 
capital firm  was perceived negatively by the C E O s’. These results may explain Flyn’s (1992) 
findings that venture capital firms have a low involvement in the administrative aspects of the 
new ventures. Murray (1994) has narrowed down finance as the only area where the portfolio
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com pany considers the skills of the venture capital firm better than that provided by other 
investors. In contrast a British Venture Capital Association Survey (1992) has found that 
portfolio com panies’ perception toward welcoming post investment involvement undergo a 
change, and they start preferring active non-financial assistance.
The value added contribution was initially found, by Sapienza and Timmons (1989), to vary 
according to the stage of matunty of the portfolio company, experience o f the C E O  and the 
amount o f equity stake o f the venture capital firm in the portfolio company. Sapienza, however, 
in his later study (1992) o f 51 matched pairs of venture capital firm s/C EO ’s discounted stage as a 
factor. Instead, he found that a higher level o f innovation being pursued, compared to a 
competitor, was positively related to value added. This means that a portfolio company pursuing 
more intricate technology is more likely to experience a greater involvement of the venture 
capital firm24. A  second finding from  the Sapienza (1992) study was that greater and/or open 
interaction between venture capitalists/CEO  resulted in a higher perception o f value-added. This 
is basically a personal compatibility between C E O  of the portfolio company and the venture 
capitalist. He also found the perception of value added to be related to venture performance.
3.4.3 Portfolio Company Performance
The research studies relating to the performance o f the portfolio company can be divided into 
pre-IPO and post IPO  analysis o f the performance. Although pre-IPO value added perception 
has been found to be both direcdy correlated (Sapienza, 1992) and unrelated (Rosenstein et al., 
1989) to venture performance, the post-IPO success rate o f venture capital-backed ventures was 
found to be significantly higher than the success rate of new ventures generally (Nash, 1988; 
D avis and Stetson, 1984; M aier and Walker, 1987). These findings are debatable because a better
24 Perry (1988) and Tim m ons and Bygrave (1986) have pointed out the technology aspect o f the relationship in earlier studies.
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success rate o f venture backed firms may largely be the result o f other factors including the all 
important fact that the selection o f the venture is a very rigorous exercise with discreet success 
criteria (Bruno and Tybjee, 1985; Tybjee and Bruno, 1984; Marrifield, 1987; Hall and Hofer, 
1993; Rah et al., 1994; Knight, 1994). Thus, only those ventures are cleared for funding which 
stand a better chance of survival (Q ian, 1983). However, balancing this advantage is the fact that 
venture capital firms end up financing ventures that cannot tap conventional sources o f financing 
because o f the risks involved25. Thus, the performance o f venture-capital-backed ventures, even 
when it is at par with non-venture-capital backed ventures, means added value. Other possible 
factors believed to result in value added, by effecting post-IPO  performance, include the 
incentive to exit (Berglof, 1994), the proper syndication o f investment (Adamati and Pfleiderer, 
1994) and the staging of investment (Bergmann and Hege, 1997). Barney et a l (1996) have 
concluded that venture capital backing does improve the performance o f the portfolio companies 
but only marginally.
The increased presence of a venture capitalist on the board, as evidenced by their numbers, has 
not been found to have any association with the performance o f the venture (Rosenstien, 1993). 
It is generally acknowledged that there is a need for more research to investigate the relation 
between venture capital finance and the success o f a venture (Brophy, 1986; Bygrave, 1987; 
Timmons, Fast and Bygrave, 1983; Tybjee and Bruno, 1984).
Based on post-IPO  performance analysis, the notion o f value added was earlier rejected by 
Cherin and Hergert (1988) when they did not find any statistical difference between the risk- 
adjusted returns of venture backed and non-venture backed companies, after the initial public 
offering, over a period of two years. Sapienza and Timmons (1989) have expressed reservations
25 W inners curse.
55
3: L  iterative R eikw
about the m ethodology used in this study through an analogy with two students studying at 
Harvard who come from  different schools. They aigue that, in this case, differences in grades at 
Harvard m ay not be a reflection of the quality of training provided by the respective schools. 
Cherin and Hergert (1988) have themselves admitted that any value added may have already been 
discounted through the initial price. Sapienza and Timmons (1989) have also questioned the 
adequacy o f a two-year period to allow for the surfacing o f differences between venture-capital- 
backed and non-venture-capital-backed ventures. Following on the premise that value added is 
discounted through price at IPO  stage, Brophy and V eiga (1988) postulated that the companies 
backed by venture capital should be less under-priced from  the beginning and early returns 
should vary less than firms which are not in receipt o f venture capital. They found that venture 
capital backed companies outperform ed others over 20 days after the initial public offering. They 
also found that unlike non-venture backed companies, venture capital backed ventures do not 
gain substantially from  having a prestigious underwnter. However, Gom pers and Lem er (1999) 
have pointed out that underwnters m ay play a role in reducing asymmetric information thereby 
reducing chances of a negative price reaction for an IPO .
Stein and Bygrave (1990) hypothesised that venture capital firms with more seats on the Board of 
a com pany add more value and thus the related portfolio companies should perform better post 
IPO . They did find higher returns fo r these companies over a period of four years after IPO. 
Apparently, Cherin and Hergert (1988) have not only conducted their study over a shorter period 
but also ignored the extent o f the post-IPO  association between the venture capital firm and the 
portfolio company. Bharat &  Omesh (1995) in a relatively recent study with more parameters of 
operating performance have found that the market appears to recognise the value of venture 
capital firm  monitoring which is reflected in the higher levels o f market to book ratios and P /E  
ratios at the time o f an initial public offering. Going further, they have also found that venture
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capital backed IPO  firms have superior operating performance compared to non-venture backed 
IPO  firms over a three-year post issue period. Besides this, there is considerable evidence that 
companies who go private through LB O /M B O  experience considerable improvement in 
performance (Kaplan, 1989; Muscarella and Vetsuypens, 1990; Smith, 1990).
3.5 Conclusion
The surge in interest in venture capital throughout the world owes more to formal 
institutionalisation o f this market rather than the novelty o f this concept. Since the United States 
has always been on the forefront of this institutionalisation, it is not surprising that m ost of the 
development and research relating to this market has originated from  the United States. As the 
formal recognition o f this concept has crossed international boundaries so has the research 
interest. However, academics have had a hard time keeping pace with the speed at which the 
world has formally embraced this idea. Researchers have covered different aspects o f this market 
as it has progressed and the 1990s has seen a growing interest in the value added role of the 
venture capital firm. The 1990s also saw  a number of in-depth research studies o f the venture 
capital market in countries other than the United States. Asia remains, largely, an unexplored 
territory. However, because of their fast developing venture capital market, Asian markets are an 
ideal ground (Scheela, 1994) for research in venture capital.
The recent surge in venture capital has sparked interest in venture capital by investors and policy 
makers creating more room for research (Gompers, 1998). F or policy makers, attempting to 
promote venture capital, it is critically important to find out the different aspects o f the venture 
capital market which are important fo r making more venture capital available and insuring the 
success o f enterprising new ventures (Poterba, 1989; Gompers and Lemer, 1997; Jeng and Wells, 
1997). F o r investors, better understanding of the market will improve their chances o f focused
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investment strategies. Venture capital firms and companies financed by venture capital operate in 
an environment where the size is relatively small but the risks are high. F or researchers, this harsh 
environment presents extreme and borderline cases for the testing o f not only business theories 
but also other emerging theories from  a number of disciplines (Kierulff, 1986: Brophy, 1986), 
providing new opportunities for research.
While researchers have taken a keen interest in value added by venture capital firms in their 
portfolio companies in the last twenty years, this area of research is still relatively new. Many 
venture capital firms pride themselves on and advertise their value-added potential; however, 
their contribution to the portfolio companies has never been proven categorically by research. 
While previous research has confirmed that firms backed by venture capital perform better, the 
actual value added analysis by researchers has sometimes produced conflicting results. Thus there 
is room  for further research on the value added question (Barney, 1994; Gom pers, 1998).
The research conducted, so far, in value addition by venture capital firms has discovered many 
factors, which affect this relationship. Although value-added has been measured differently, there 
seems to be strong indications that the presence of certain factors does affect value-added 
without regard to how it is measured. There has been, however, little attempt to classify these 
factors in a logical relationship to each other and the value-added phenomena. Gassification of 
these factors will help future research in three different ways. Firstly, it will be clearer to the 
researchers exactly what is being measured and how it relates to other factors being considered. 
Secondly, the classification o f these factors will help in a more focused research. Lastly, 
identifying broad classifications m ay also explain the reason for conflicting research results.
Another noticeable feature o f previous research in value added by venture capital firms is the lack 
of a theoretical base. Sapienza et aL (1996) has noted that studies o f venture capital firm’s
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activities and value added have tended to be descriptive and somewhat atheoretical. There is thus, 
a need to put together a theory, which explains the basic model relating to value addition that is 
also in line with the research conducted in this area.
A  large majority o f value added research has been conducted in the United States which is a 
mature venture capital market. Although some research has been conducted at international level 
(Sapienza et aL, 1995, Sapienza et al., 1996), it is limited to Europe which shares a comparatively 
similar culture with United States. A  research study conducted in a different cultural setting will 
provide more information about how the value added question responds to cultural differences 
and how value added is seen in a developing venture capital market
M ost o f the previous research studies have analysed the different activities that venture capitalists 
are involved in with their portfolio companies as an indication of value added without going into 
the potential of venture capital firms to add value or the potential of portfolio companies to 
absorb value. Sapienza et al (1995), however, have explored the value added question on the basis 
o f dependency theory (Pfeffer and Salanchik, 1978). He argues that value m ay be the result o f 
resource dependence o f the portfolio company. Thus, value added can be seen as a resource 
question.
This study is an attempt to build on all the above ideas. As discussed in the next chapter, the 
resource exchange perspective, in view o f the network-dyad relationship between a venture 
capital firm  and a portfolio company, has been identified as a more appropriate theoretical base 
as an explanation o f value-added. An effort has also been made to put together a comprehensive 
m odel o f value added which is also in line with the research conducted in this area.
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4 Chapter 4: Theoretical Framework
4.1 Introduction
The resource-based theory, around which the construction o f propositions revolves, is explained 
in this chapter. The nature o f the relationship (network dyad) between the venture capital firm 
and the portfolio company is also described. The later explanation of the resource exchange 
paradigm and theoretical model logically follows from  both o f these. This chapter also includes a 
discussion o f the resource exchange model as applied to the relationship between venture capital 
firms and their portfolio companies.
4.2 Resource26 Based View of the firm
Within the strategy field, scholars have been concerned primarily with explaining the differences 
in firm  performance (Rumelt et aL, 1991). O ut o f many possible explanations, two prominent 
theories that, arguably, have made m ajor contributions to  understanding these differences are 
transaction costs theory and resource based theory of the firm.
Although the term resource-based was originally attributed to Wemerfelt (1984), the resource- 
based paradigm is primarily based on the seminal work of Edith Penrose (1959) and Joseph 
Schumpeter (1934). The theory argues that the differences in firms’ performances are primarily 
because o f the heterogeneity of their businesses (Barney, 1991; Rumelt, 1991). The unique assets 
and capabilities o f each firm are important factors, which give rise to imperfect competition and 
provide opportunities for firms to reap super-normal profits. Early strategic decision models, 
based on the theory, propose setting rational objectives followed by an internal appraisal of 
capabilities and an external appraisal o f outside opportunities. The resultant fit between
26 The term  resources has been used in this thesis to  indicate resources, capabilities o r resource-based rapahilirips
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capabilities and opportunities shape a firm’s feasible expansion path, diversification and growth 
strategies (M ahoney &Pandian, 1992; Thomas et al.,1999; A nsoff, 1965). N ovel combinations of 
resources resulting from accumulation and exchange also generate new sources of value for firms 
(Schumpeter, 1934; Moran and Ghoshal, 1996). This process also encourages innovation as it 
feeds on diverse resource inputs (Kanter, 1988) and combinative capacities (Kogut and Zander, 
1992).
Since the list o f resources possessed by firms is likely to be long and all resources may not create 
competitive advantage, researchers have tried to sim plify the identification process by 
characterising and categorising these resources. Barney (1991) proposed that advantage-creating 
resources m ust possess the attributes o f value, rareness, inimitability and non-substitutability. 
Grant (1991) has argued that the level of durability, transparency, transferability and replicability 
are important factors. Amit and Shoemaker (1993) have produced a list of eight characteristics of 
advantage creating resources27 while Gollis and M otgomery (1995) have limited these to five28.
The efforts to  classify resources have been plagued by nomenclature problems. The terms more 
comm only used in the literature are skills, competencies, resources, capabilities and even 
resource-based capabilities. M ajoor and Witteloostuijn (1996) define resources as tangible and 
intangible assets, which are tied semi-permanently to the firm. Some writers used the term 
resources to  refer to anything, which could be thought o f as a strength or weakness o f a given 
firm  (Learned et a l, 1969; W emerfelt, 1984). More recent writers have used the term to mean 
positive assets and attributes enabling conception and implementation of strategies that improve 
effectiveness (Draft, 1983; Barney, 1991). There have been numerous attempts to categorise
27 Nam ely, com plem entarity, scarcity, low  tradability, inimitability, lim ited substitutability, appropriability, durability and overlap 
with strategic industry focus.
28 Inimitability, durability, appropriability, siiisritutabiiityand competitive superiority.
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resources starting with the basic classification by A nsoff (1964) o f physical (inventory, plant), 
m onetaiy (money, credit) and human (labor, management). Andrews (1971) later added 
corporate competencies to this classification. The concept o f competencies further evolved into a 
more detailed description o f organizational resources (H ofer &  Schendel, 1978) and reputational 
resources (Dollinger, 1995). Table 4.1 presents a comprehensive view of resource classification 
in view of past research. It is based on ideas derived from  Brush et al. (1997) and Fahy (2000).
While the resource-based theory is considered relevant to all firms, it is generally believed to be 
particularly suitable for new and small businesses (Cooper et al., 1991; Handjimanolis, 2000). 
Dierickx and Gool (1989) have drawn a distinction between stock and flows of resources. They 
argue that the flow  of resources not only increases stock o f resources but also ensures that critical 
stocks are not dissipated or rendered useless. As small and new ventures have fewer stocks of 
resources, the m ost critical role o f the entrepreneurs o f sm all and new ventures is the acquisition, 
development and application o f resources that can lead to  competitive advantage and superior 
performance.
The union o f the resource based view with strategic management started in early 80’s 
(Rumelt,1984; W emfelt,1984; Barney, 1986b; Teece,1982). Resource-based theory, in recent 
years, has contributed significantly to the literature on strategic management (Peteraf, 1993; 
Grant, 1991; M ahoney and Pandian, 1992). While Porter’s (1980) book shifted the attention 
toward external, industry-based competitive issues, resource-based theory has directed scholars 
back toward the internal strengths and weaknesses o f the firm (Priem and B utler, 2001 a).
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4.1 Classification of Resources
Basic Classification Sub Classification Definition
Tangible Assets (Hofer & 
Sehende! 1978)
Fixed Assets (Wemerfelt, 
1989)
Property Based (Miller and 
Shamsie (1996)
Facilities and Equipment (Hofer &Schende! 1978), 
(Wemerfelt, 1989)
Technology (Dollinger, 1995)
Financial Resources (Ansoff, 1964) (Bygrave, 1992)
Capabilities (Half 1992), 
Invisible Assets (Itaim, 1987)
Intermediate goods (Amit and 
Shoemaker, 1993)
Core Skills
(Irvin and Michaels, 1989)
Organizational 




Organizational relationships, structures 
(Tomer, 1987)
Routines, culture (Hofer &Schende! 1978; Wemerfelt, 
1989)
Knowledge (Dollinger, 1995)
Achieved Attributes (Becker, 1964)
Education and Experience (Cooper, 1981; Glade, 1967) 
Track Record and Reputation (Dollinger, 1995; Brophy, 
1992)
Training (Barney, 1991)
Relationship and networks (Bondieu, 1983)
Family (Liebenstein, 1968)
Race and ethnicity
Political connections (Glade, 1967)
Reputation of groups (Barney, 1991)
Individual (Fahy, 2000) 
Human
(Brush and Greene, 
1996; Brush et aL, 
1997)
Achieved Attributes (Becker, 1964)
Education and Experience (Cooper, 1981; Glade, 1967) 




Social (Brush and 
Greene, 1996; 
Brush et aL, 1997)
Relationship and networks (Bordieu, 1983) 
Family (Liebenstein, 1968)
Race and ethnicity
Political connections (Glade, 1967)
Reputation of groups (Barney, 1991)
Knowledge-based 
Müler and Shamsie (1996)
Blueprints (Wemerfelt, 1989)
Trademarks, patents and databases (Half 1992, Williams, 
1992)
Despite the fact that, in recent years, there has been a renewed interest displayed in the role of 
resources as the means o f creating competitive advantage (Coyne, 1986; Ghemawat, 1986; Hall, 
1989; Grant, 1991; Mahoney and Pandian, 1992; Williams, 1992), the resource based view does 
suffer from  a number o f weaknesses. It is often difficult to pinpoint the resource separately or in
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combination, which accounts for a firm’s competitive advantage. Some researchers have gone to 
the extent of saying that the ultimate resource responsible for a firm ’s competitive advantage can 
never be identified (Collis, 1994). Moreover, resources cannot be evaluated in isolation because 
their value is determined in the interplay with market forces. A  resource that is valuable in a 
particular industry or at a particular time might fail to have the same value in a different industry 
or chronological context (Collis and Montgomery, 1995). The fact that some resources may 
become specialised, in essence, producing a bundle (or bundles) o f co- specialised assets (Teece, 
1986; Conner, 1991;Bamey, 1991) further complicates the issue. The attempt at developing a 
resource based predictive model o f new venture success, failure and growth (Cooper et aL, 1991) 
has been met with scepticism. The identification process also seem s to be retrospective rather 
than predictive since once the factors, which have contributed to the firm’s success, are 
recognised, they are labelled as a source of competitive advantage. This particular aspect of 
resource-based theory has led some scholars to term it as tautological (Priem and Butler, 2001 
b)29.
4.3 Venture Capital Firm/Portfolio Company Network Dyad
The relationship between the venture capital firm  and the portfolio company does not fit 
precisely into well-known relationships o f either market or hierarchy. In the market relationship 
governance relies largely on price for control. It is basically competitive rather than symbiotic. 
Hierarchical relationships are governed by authority as between an employer and an employee. 
Researchers, who follow the market/hierarchy approach, believe that an agency relationship, 
which is a form  o f hierarchical relationship, exists between the venture capital firm and the 
portfolio com pany (Ried, 1996; Fiet, 1995; Chan et al., 1990). Since there is room for
29 F o r an interesting expose on the status o f resource-based view as a theory see Priem  and Buder (2001 a), Priem  and Butler (2001 
b) andR yall (1998)
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opportunistic behaviour by the principal and the performance of the portfolio company depends, 
to som e extent, on competency of the venture capital firm, the existence of an agency 
relationship between the venture capital firm and the portfolio company is not always accepted. 
Cornelius and Su (2000) assert that several covenants in the contractual arrangement, between a 
venture capital firm  and a portfolio company, are not identifiable with a classic principal/agent 
relationship. M any venture capitalists believe this relationship to be partnership oriented rather 
than a principal/agent relationship (Cornelius, 2000). Some venture capitalists see the 
principal/agent relationship as a downgrading of relations. “It is important that both parties share 
the same interest and act in the same direction to avoid the principal/agent relationship”30. Smith 
(1988) suggests that the relationship between the two can be more appropriately viewed as 
reciprocal agency obligations. Thus, there is doubt whether traditional agency theory can be 
applied to the venture capital firm /portfolio company relations. It is worth noticing that the 
venture capital firm /portfolio company relationship is not the only one, which does not 
correspond adequately to the two popular notions of agency and hierarchy31. There is, thus, a 
need to examine alternative relational arrangements. These alternatives have been variously called 
quasifirm (Eccles, 1981) relational contracting (Macauly, 1963) hybrids (Powell, 1987) and 
networks (Powell, 1990).
Powell (1990) first offered network form as a distinct organisational arrangement compared to 
hierarchical o r market relationships. Networks can be defined as a set o f nodes and relationships 
that connect the nodes (Formbrum, 1982). A  more recent definition of networks by Dubini and 
Aldrich (1991) terms them as patterned relationships between individuals, groups and
30 Personal correspondence: Frédéric D e Laminne, General M anager, E-Gapital, Belgium, M ay2,2001.
31 These relationships have been shown to exist in a variety o f settings including international business (Contractor and Lorange, 




organisations. From  the resource-based perspective, network ties are considered as links to 
clusters o f resources (Burt, 1992; Tichy, 1981). Network relationships between firms are believed 
to be lateral rather than vertical (Baker, 1992).
The literature on networks has been taken in two broad directions. Researchers adopting the first 
direction are concerned with networks o f organizations and their patterns of interaction. The unit 
o f analysis is the broad network itself (Borch and Arthur, 1995; Grandori and Soda, 1995; Gray 
1985; H akansson and Johanson, 1993). Researchers adopting the second direction focus on the 
firm as the unit of analysis and are concerned with understanding how the firm creates and 
manages a network (Aldrich and Zimmer 1986; Dubini and Aldrich 1991; Venkataraman 1989).
Generally speaking, firms more likely to engage in network arrangements will be those that need 
to exchange difficult to codify knowledge intensive skills, best transferred through processes of 
collaborative information sharing. Powell (1990) has particularly mentioned firms engaged in fast 
moving industries with short product cycles as most likely to engage in network partnerships in 
order to reposition products rapidly and respond quickly to changing market conditions and 
technological developments. Dubini and Aldrich (1991) have added new ventures to this list. In 
a network exchange relationship, the value of the resource is one of the central factors explaining 
relationship behaviours and outcomes (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Pfeffer and Nowak, 1976; 
Thorelli, 1986; Harrigan, 1986). Bradach and Eccles(1989) have ascribed the control elements of 
price, authority and trust to market, hierarchical and network arrangements respectively. 
Com plex network relationships m aybe combinations of all or any two arrangements with control 
mechanisms existing in different proportions. In a network form  of arrangement, additional 
control elements like personal relationships, reciprocity, co-ordination, concern for reputation
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etc. also play an important role (Larson, 1992). While economic control is present, social control 
plays a crucial role in network arrangements.
Portfolio companies use a primary resource (finance) supplied by the venture capital firm. The 
venture capital firm is not usually actively involved in the day  to-day utilisation of this resource. 
Under these circumstances, a predominant control mechanism for the venture capital firm 
remains trust. In the case o f venture capital firm /portfolio company relations trust has two 
dimensions. Trust in the managerial abilities of the portfolio company for effective utilisation of 
the resource and moral trust in the management. However, venture capital firm /portfolio 
company relations are not a matter o f trust only and other control elements also come into play. 
For example, personal relationships between venture capitalists and the C EO  of the portfolio 
company, exchange history, risk level o f the portfolio company etc. have been known to affect 
relational arrangements between the parties (Barney et al., 1989).
The network model is believed to offer several advantages over other models (Larson and Starr, 
1993). It is considered dynamic because it focuses on a complex relationship between the units. It 
emphasises exchange processes between entities and identifies the economic and social aspects of 
these exchange linkages. It also highlights the fickle nature o f exchange relationships (Gabarro, 
1987), which allows for further understanding of the stability and flexibility o f collective activities. 
It also has the potential to account for the forces involved in organisational growth (Jarillo, 1988).
Inter-organizational relations can be studied in a multitude of ways, ranging from  the 
investigation o f overall network properties, to dyad properties and to relational properties o f the 
network's m ember firms (Keister, 1999). One of the fundamental premises in this thesis is that 
portfolio companies and venture capital firms operate in a network environment and also use 
network nodes to obtain resources. The relationship between the venture capital firm and the
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portfolio com pany is one such relation. While we cannot ignore the network nature of the 
relationship, it is viable to study this relation in a dyadic framework32 in what Larson (1992) terms 
as a network dyad.
4.4 Resource Exchange and Inter-Finn Relations
Since it is posited that a complex network arrangement exists between the venture capital firm 
and the portfolio company, it then follows that social aspects o f the relationship should play a 
vital role toward mutual satisfaction and the success o f the alliance. Larson (1992) has shown that 
the social aspects o f alliances, as they exist between the venture capital firm and the portfolio 
company, are critical to their co-ordination and maintenance. She specifically showed that when 
the economic interest o f entrepreneurs and outsiders are governed through positive social 
interaction, such partnerships endure. With these considerations in mind, it would be worthwhile 
to look fo r the explanation o f a fruitful relationship, between the two, from  a social point o f 
view. Thus a model, which relies on social principles effecting relationship dimensions, will be 
put to an appropriate use if applied to the relationship between the venture capital firm  and the 
portfolio company. Thus there seems to be a sufficiently strong case to explain the relationship 
between the venture capital firm  and the portfolio company from  social exchange perspectives 
under the banner o f resource-based theory.
The resource exchange paradigm, which can be termed as a hybrid o f resource-based and social 
exchange theory (Cook and Em erson 1984; Em erson 1976), is not new. The social exchange, a 
sociological theory, is based on the exchange of rewards and costs to quantify the values o f 
outcomes, from  different situations, for an individual The social exchange theory is comprised of 
three main concepts, relational outcomes, relational satisfaction, and relational stability. Resource
32 Som e researchers have treated the relationship between venture capital firm s and the portfolio com pany as essentially dyadic 
(Route and M aidique, 1986; M acM illan et aL, 1987; Sapienza, 1992).
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exchange theory focuses on the exchange of resources between units applying the social 
exchange principles.
Resource exchange theory can be divided into two closely related approaches. The first deals 
with micro processes in an organisation. Important work in this regard includes Thibault and 
Kelley (1959) Homans (1961) and Em erson (1962), who have relied on ideas from  operant 
psychology (Blau, 1964; Coleman, 1966). These works were primarily based on an individual 
oriented theory, which studied individuals and very small groups. The second strand of the 
resource exchange m odel has been developed in the work o f Yutchman and Seashore (1967) and 
White (1974) and a number of other writers, who have focused primarily on the macro­
organisational process. The works o f Yutchman and Seashore (1967) and White (1974) are also 
important because they brought into consideration the constraints and the contingencies that are 
imposed on the organisation by outside factors. Since this development, the resource exchange 
paradigm has been a basis for a number of studies on agency theory and the relationship between 
management and the owners of companies (Eisenhardt, 1989; Glasberg &  Schwartz, 1983). 
Similarities between individual oriented and firm oriented resource exchange theory has 
remained. Georgiou (1973) has explained this by arguing that a focus on the organisation as a 
unit of analysis is arbitrary and the basic strategic factor in the organisation remains the 
individual.
4.5 Application of the resource-exchange paradigm  to the value added question
In addition to industry experience, the operational skills o f new ventures' management are also
important to the development of the venture (e.g., Roure & K eeley, 1990; Rock, 1991). As the 
management o f new ventures differ in industry experience (MacMillan et aL, 1989; Sapienza 
1992), they are also likely to differ in the level o f operational skills and the resources available
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within the organisation. E fforts by new venture management to acquire skills, technological or 
otherwise, are facilitated by their relationship with venture capitalists. F or a new venture 
management, venture capitalists provide an initial channel for acquiring critical information and 
resources (Barney et al., 1996; Fiet, 1995a). The timely acquisition o f resources from  venture 
capital firms is a comparatively low-cost method o f adding to the resource pool and reducing the 
risk o f failure (Anderson & N arus, 1990; Fiet,1995 a; Sapienza &  Amason, 1993). It is argued that 
since the success o f a firm  primarily depends on the availability of resources and the capability to 
use them efficiently, the perception o f value addition, from  whatever sources, will depend on the 
receipt o f these resources by the portfolio company. It is further argued that the perception of 
value addition by a venture capital firm will depend on the existence of a relationship in which 
both sides perceive an exchange of resources. Thus, value added is a function of resource 
excharge. The question of determination of resources has been left open at this point, because 
there are limitless ways to conceive of a firm’s resources (Shrader and Simon, 1997).
The kind o f resources that a firm needs to gather from  its environment depends on its objectives. 
Entrepreneurs, and hence portfolio companies, tend to specialise in two types of resources. The 
first resource needed is the ability to identify un-exploited opportunities and the skill to combine 
intangible and tangible resources to exploit these opportunities in a novel fashion. The second 
resource is the capacity to specialise in the day-to-day development o f new businesses activities 
(MacMillan et a l, 1989). Venture capital firms, on the other hand, specialise in creating networks 
of individuals and institutions to reduce the costs o f acquiring capital, to find customers and 
suppliers and to establish the credibility o f portfolio companies (Lam, 1991; MacMillan et al., 
1989; Sahlman, 1990). Consequently, the resource composition of venture capital firms and 
portfolio companies may vary. There can also be considerable overlap between the resources, 
their quality, magnitude and concentration within venture capital firms and their portfolio
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companies. A  portfolio com pany may find resources possessed by a venture capital firm 
attractive and beneficial, since according to resource-based theory, an increase in the pool of 
resources improves performance o f a firm.
The perception o f higher value added should depend, to a large extent, on convergence of 
perspective (Sapienza and Timmons, 1989) and a meeting o f minds of the C E O  o f the portfolio 
com pany and the management o f the venture capital firm. This is, however, only one factor 
among m any variables in the value-added m odel that effect the value-added perception. This 
factor, however, may not be the basis o f a value-added relationship. For example, an important 
relationship characteristic o f prior affiliation has been found to be linked with initial satisfactory 
relations but not to the longer-term benefits of the partners (Saxton, 1997). Other variables in the 
category o f relational characteristics are geographical proximity (Gomez-Mejia et al., 1990), 
compatibility o f objectives, clear expectations and obligations, trust and personal compatibility 
(Larson, 1992). Similar variables have been categorised as relational dimensions and accounted 
for as factors, which, though not the basis fo r exchange relation, do affect the breadth of 
resource exchange. However, the link between shared vision and relational dimensions suggests 
that som e relational factors m aybe influenced by the shared vision o f the partners. F or example, 
comm on values and beliefs provide the harmony o f interest that minimise the possibility of 
opportunistic behavior (Ouchi, 1980; Tsai and Ghoshal, 1998) and promote trust. Thus, it is 
argued that the value-added phenomenon is a logical consequence of the venture capital 
firm /portfolio com pany network dyad, created by  the situation in which they find themselves. 
Thus, even in cases where convergence of perspective is limited, the entrepreneur will see a 
venture capital firm  as adding value if useful resources are being shared.
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4.5.1 The Venture Capital Firm /Portfolio Company Resource Exchange M odel
In  order to develop the resource exchange model presented as figure 4.1, a model o f venture
perform ance with environmental interaction conceived by Chandler et al. (1994) and the process 
m odel o f entrepreneurial dyads as developed by Larson (1992) and Larson and Starr (1993) have 
been relied on. Basic ideas from  both these models have been incorporated and extended to the 
relationship between venture capital firms and their portfolio companies.
According to Larson (1992) network dyads develop in three phases. The coming together of 
dyads requires some preconditions o f exchange, which enhances the chances of early co­
operation between them  Larson and Starr (1993) argue that personal reputation; histories and 
personal friendships are important factors in explaining why firms form  dyads. Knowing people 
personally and by reputation increases the chances of better assessment o f their capabilities, 
which can result in better economic relationships later. The relationship based on reputation also 
puts a burden on dyads to succeed because failure could have a serious impact on the reputation 
o f both the parties and subsequently, on business.
Resources are obtained using “relational contracts” or a social exchange relationship based on 
custom s, practices and mutual expectations. Later only those dyadic relationships are retained and 
developed which supply sufficient resources. Larson and Starr(1993) argue that network relations 
start only as one dimensional i.e. economic or social but later take on a two dimensional 
appearance involving both social and economic exchanges or “ socio-economic exchanges” . The 
second phase o f the association establishes conditions necessary to build the relationship. These 
necessary conditions include mutual economic advantage and a trial period. The participants, 
however, m ay not enjoy the benefits proportionately. In the next phase, rules and procedures are 
established and clear expectations are outlined A  relationship o f mutual trust is established based
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on reciprocity. The last phase results in further integration and the association is primarily 
governed by social controls. The focus of Larson’s (1992) argument, explaining the formation 
and workability o f a network dyad is based on relationship characteristics rather than the network 
participant’s characteristics.
As perceived by Chandler et aL (1994) at the initial level, founders interact with the environment 
to conceive o r discover business opportunities. O f the available opportunities, some get selected. 
Opportunities are created by changing circumstances, chaos, confusion, inconsistencies, lags or 
leads, knowledge and information gaps and a variety o f other vacuums in an industry or market 
(Timmons, 1990). The competitive advantage of the firm  depends on how effectively it can take 
advantage o f the opportunities, which ultimately depend on an entrepreneur’s perception of both 
the environment and the internal abilities o f the firm to exploit these (Andrews, 1971; Thompson 
and Strickland, 1990). Resources can conversely, limit the choices a firm may have and ultimately, 
the level o f profit it may exp ea (Wemfelt, 1989).
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Figure 4.1. Resources, Venture Strategy and Performance
Based on Chandler &  Hanks, Market Attractiveness, Resource-Based Capabilities, Venture Strategies 
And Venture Performance, Journal of Business Venturing, 9:331-349,1994
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One o f the basic assumptions of resource-based theory is that resources and capabilities can vary 
significandy across firms33 (Barney and Hetterly, 1996). It is the heterogeneity o f these productive 
resources that gives each firm its unique character and effectiveness (Penrose 1959). 
Organisations, through transactions with the elements in their environment, acquire resources. 
This is true about all organisations whether we are talking about public organizations, private 
organisations, small or large organisations or organisations that are bureaucratic or organic (Bums 
and Stalker, 1961). Opportunities, however, are not fixed and m ay change with a change in 
conditions an d/ or change in a firm’s knowledge and consequently with a change in the internal 
supply o f resources. The availability of resources within a start-up firm depends, among other 
factors, on the founders’ ability to gather these from  the environment and develop strategies for 
effective use (Grant, 1991). I f a firm has, or has access to, adequate resources it can survive easily, 
grow more rapidly, is more profitable and has more “organisational slack” (Singh et al., 1986). 
Thus a firm  in possession o f a wide variety o f resources is likely to have more opportunities 
available to it and will be able to exploit more o f the available opportunities. A  positive relation 
has already been established between perceived resource-based capabilities and the performance 
of start-up manufacturing firms (Chandler et a l, 1994).
This model has been modified and the venture capital firm has been introduced as an entity that 
supplies resources and supplements the efforts o f the portfolio company to gather resources 
from  its environment. lik e  any other business, the venture capital firm  gathers resources and 
capabilities from  its environment, which enables it to exploit the available opportunities. As part 
o f its business, the venture capitals firm transfers its m ost important resource i.e. finance to new 
ventures and entrusts them with its competent use. In order to ensure that this resource is used
33 Heterogeneity.
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effectively, the venture capital firm may provide other resources as well or supplement the efforts 
o f the portfolio companies to gather more resource based capabilities from  the environment.
A  venture capital firm ’s resource contributions span all three broad categories o f resources34. 
From  a venture capitalist’s perspective, making its own resources available to the portfolio 
company will increase the portfolio company’s pool o f resources and enhance its chances of not 
only having wider choice of opportunities but also their effective exploitation. “[The] More talent 
and expertise in different areas that V C brings to the table, complement the company 
founders.”35 This increases the likelihood of successful outcomes and subsequent returns to the 
venture capital firm. Both the venture capital firm and its portfolio company possess a unique 
pool of resources. The portfolio company needs all those resources that will expand the 
opportunities and enable it to exploit them m ost effectively. Moreover, for growth-oriented 
companies especially, additional resources are needed to search for opportunities. A  venture 
capital firms has a further need for resources because it needs to provide resources for its own 
survival as well as to  provide for the portfolio company if necessary.
34 Tangibles, invisibles and knowledge-based.
35 Personal correspondence: Com m ents by  a venture capitalist from  Singapore (identity kept confidential on request), August 15, 
2000.
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Figure 4.2: V C /PC  Value Added Relationship- A Resource Exchange Perspective
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Mere possession  o f resources is not enough and any possible resource exchange requires a 
thorough awareness o f the venture capital firm’s, and the portfolio company’s, resources. 
Venture capitalists should “understand what competencies we have as V C s [venture capitalists]. 
Ensure that the V C  [venture capitalist] is organized in a way that these competencies are 
transferred to  the portfolio company... .”36. On the other hand “the more knowledge they 
[venture capitalists] have about the company [portfolio company] the more they can help them re 
biz [business], re networking etc”37.
G ear assessm ent of an organization’s resources is also important for the determination of the 
resource gap, the need to fill this gap from  the environment and the extent of the resultant 
sacrifice/cost. Knowing the resources and capabilities o f each other helps both the parties avoid 
any uncertainty and misunderstanding in the subsequent relationship and develops an economic 
trust in each other’s capabilities. Thus, how both the venture capital firm and the portfolio 
com pany assess each other in the initial stages has an influence on subsequent relations and 
involvement and thus value added. F or venture capital firms, part of the reason for the due 
diligence process is the exploration of the resources possessed by the portfolio company and 
their suitability and usefulness in survival efforts. Being part o f the venture capital firm’s 
functions, this information is even gathered by venture capital firms who have no intention of 
being significantly involved with the portfolio company later on. As far as portfolio companies 
are concerned, past research reviewed does not reveal any factor that has a significant bearing on 
the choice o f the venture capital firm by the portfolio company. However, it has been suggested
36 Personal correspondence: Com m ents b y  a  venture capitalist from  Singapore (identity kept confidential on request), A ugust 19, 
2000.
37 Personal correspondence: H arjeev K andhari, N ew  M edia Spark, United K ingdom , A pril 18,2000
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that the portfolio companies should be careful in choosing financial partners as the venture 
capital firms vary in the resources that they possess (Ehrlich et al., 1994; Sapienza, 1992).
As far as the resource assessment of the portfolio company is concerned, it an be argued that the 
business operating in a riskier environment, will have a lower assessment of its own resources 
and thus a higher demand for resources than a business operating in a less risky environment. 
The factors that affect the riskiness o f the business will also affect the rating o f available 
resources and the need to welcome input. This argument is based on a previous research finding 
which suggests that assistance is more highly valued when the task involves greater complexity 
and uncertainty (Ehrlich et al., 1994; Sapienza, 1992; Barney et al., 1996). The growth stage, the 
technology being pursued and the performance of the portfolio company are some o f the factors, 
which have been found to finally lead to a greater involvement of the venture capital firm 
(Sapienza, 1992; Sadder, 1993). Since this thesis argues that a portfolio company's self-resource 
assessment and a venture capitalist’s resource assessment o f the portfolio company m ay finally 
impact on the involvement and thus value added, the same risk factors38 have been taken into 
consideration fo r measuring resource perception.
It is argued that several factors may affect how venture capital firms perceive, or are perceived to 
be in possession of, adequate resources. According to resource exchange theory, possession of 
resources is translated into better performance for a business. Since performance comprises 
multiple criteria apart from  RO I, well performing venture capital firms are distinguished by 
certain characteristics derived from  a successful track record. As reputations travel, investors are 
more likely to  seek out and invest with successful venture capital firms resulting in an increase in 
capital under management and arguably the hiring of more professionals. Thus, the amount of
38 Le. growth stage, technology and performance.
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venture capital under management and the number of professionals working for a venture capital 
firm  m ay be an indicator of performance. Successful venture capital firms are also expected to 
last longer in terms o f the number of years in operation. The type of venture capital firm may 
also have som e bearing on how it perceives its own resource pool.
The dependence o f any organisation on another, and the consequent resource exchange, will 
arise in proportion to a need for the resources which the supplying organisation can provide to 
the dependent one (Thomson, 1967). Thus, for a possible exchange relationship, the need of the 
portfolio com pany must be matched by the availability of resources within the venture capital 
firm. The term  matching is used to indicate the availability and the need for a resource that will 
contribute toward the realisation o f the portfolio company's objectives immediately or in the 
future (White, 1974). The absence o f a reasonable match can lead to adverse consequences. For 
example, if the portfolio company already possesses sufficient industry experience and teams up 
with a venture capital firm  accustomed to providing extensive industry advice, their overlapping 
expertise m ay increase conflict (Barney et al. 1996). The need for resources primarily depends on 
perception. Sapienza et aL (1986) have indicated that even if the portfolio company is actually 
short o f a resource, it may not seek that particular resource regardless o f how the venture capital 
firm perceives the situation.
The possession o f information and the awareness o f the demand and supply of resources may 
not trigger a  resource transfer unless it is backed by a willingness o f the parties to affect the 
transfer. This is called “ intentionality’’ . Intentionality depends on many factors such as company 
policy, lead role, time, etc. These factors will be discussed in further detail in the next chapter.
The portfolio company, per se, has an incentive to utilise the resources o f the venture capital firm 
because they are free o f incidental costs. M oreover, new entrants into a business may have to pay
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higher prices to acquire these resources compared to prices paid by existing firms (Wemfelt, 
1984). There are, however, other factors, which m ay effect the portfolio company's decision to 
resort to venture capital firms. According to the resource dependence theory, organisations tend 
to avoid dependencies and being controlled by others (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Portfolio 
companies, fo r fear o f loss o f control and avoidance o f unnecessary interference by the venture 
capital firms, may not be willing to be dependent and be involved in an exchange relation. 
Conversely, the portfolio company may not resist the venture capital firms, interference for two 
reasons. Firstly, an affiliation with a venture capital firm enhances the portfolio company's 
reputation by earning it legitimacy and credibility. Secondly, the failure of a relationship could 
have a serious impact on its reputation and business prospects. H ow  important a particular 
resource is to the portfolio company will affect its readiness to sacrifice other considerations and 
its choice to avoid interaction will be considerably weakened (Hanigan; 1984). Furthermore, just 
as venture capital firms have their own policies regarding the extent of their involvement, the 
portfolio management team  may have its own resource strategy likely to influence resource 
exchange relations. The possibility of resource excharge also considerably weakens in the 
presence o f a negative attitude toward it. The question of resource excharge is also affected by 
the particular venture capital culture. There is sufficient evidence that the local venture capital 
culture has a profound effect on venture capital strategies, including involvement issues ([eng and 
Wells, 2000).
It is theorised that an exchange relationship between the venture capital firm  and the portfolio 
company will exist if the matching of resources are backed by a willingness to exchange. Both the 
parties should share a common perception about specific opportunities and the resources needed 
to exploit the opportunities effectively. The resource exchange relationship, as described, is 
dynamic and there is a constant shift between the opportunities and consequent requirements for
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resources, as perceived by both parries. This argument has been derived from  the belief that 
organisational emergence happens in spurts, where a trigger creates a revolution or 
reconfiguration of resources (Gartner, 1985). These triggers, for a new venture, m aybe internal 
or external. F or a portfolio company, an internal trigger m ay be reaching a milestone for further 
funding by venture capital firms (Lichtenstein, 1997). External triggers may be associated with 
industry based sources o f support (Brush and Greene, 1996).
Resource characteristic will have little bearing on the initial exchange process. However, 
particular characteristics, may add to the usefulness o f a resource thereby reducing uncertainty 
and leading to  an enhancement o f a value added relationship. Although the terminology used has 
been different (Peteraf, 1993), there appears to be general agreement in the related literature 
about the resource characteristics that contribute to a firm's sustained competitive advantage. At 
the m ost basic level, such resources must be valuable (i.e., rent producing) and nonsubstitutable 
(Barney, 1991: Dierickx &  Gool, 1989). In other words, fo r a resource to have enduring value it 
must contribute to the portfolio companys capability and the portfolio company should not be 
able to acquire this resource easily through alternative means. Next, resources must be rare 
an d/or specific to a portfolio company (Barney, 1991; Reed &  DeFillippi, 1990). That is, they 
must not be widely spread in an industry and easily identified as associated with a particular 
company, thus making them difficult to transfer or trade. Finally, such resources must be difficult 
to replicate because they are either tacit (causally ambiguous, that is, scarce because o f the unique 
train o f events that led to their accumulation) or socially complex (Teece, 1987; Winter, 1987). 
Tacit resources are skill based and people intensive. Such resources are "invisible" and based 
upon leaming-by-doing. These resources are accumulated through experience and refined by 
practice (Itami, 1987; Polanyi, 1962). Socially complex resources depend upon large numbers of
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people or team s engaged in coordinated action such that few  individuals, if any, have sufficient 
breadth o f knowledge to grasp the overall phenomenon (Barney, 1991; Reed &  DeFillippi, 1990).
The explanation so far, of a value added relationship m aybe interpreted as an attempt to “under 
socialise” (Granovetter, 1985) this complex alliance resulting in a model in which the importance 
of personal relationships is downplayed A  balanced approach would suggest that this 
relationship should be considered a combined function o f resource exchange and formation of a 
satisfactory social relationship (Saxton, 1997). However, it is argued that the social side of the 
issue only explains why this alliance is formed or relationship enhanced (Gulati, 1999) and it is 
not an essential element for the existence of a value added relationship.
Once the resources have been passed on to the portfolio company they must be used effectively. 
Effective usage results in a visible reduction in uncertainties, which can lead to a value added 
relationship (Bygave and Timmons, 1992). Hickson et al. (1971) argue that power accrues to 
those in the organisation able to reduce uncertainties fo r the organization. Thus in a dyadic 
relationship if both parties believe that uncertainties have been reduced because of the exchange, 
it will result in a greater influence of the venture capital firm  on the portfolio company and spur 
higher levels o f interaction and generate relational satisfaction. Unlike previous research that only 
considers more frequent interaction by the venture capitalist and the C EO  of the portfolio 
com pany as an outcome o f a reduction in uncertainties, it is argued here that frequency of 
interaction m ay also result in a higher level of satisfaction for both the parties. Thus a value- 
added relationship does not only depend on the frequency of interaction but also on the higher 
level o f satisfaction resulting from  the interactioa
There have been a number o f studies which have taken up the value added question without 
really defining value added (Sapienza et al., 1996; Sapienza et al., 1995; Cherin and Hergert, 1988;
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Landstrom , 1991). The resource-exchange perspective helps define value added. Since a firm is 
considered a bundle o f resources, any addition in its resource pool is likely to increase its chances 
of survival. Thus an addition in the resource pool can be interpreted as the creation of value. The 
resource exchange perspective provides an opportunity to  recognise the complexity of the value 
added question. It cannot be assumed, under this perspective, that value addition gets translated 
into visible measurable performance. Taking on the resource-exchange paradigm allows 
participants to  recognise that value addition has occurred prior to visible results being obvious. It 
recognises that the extent of value addition depends also on the nature of the interaction 
(characteristics o f resource). It also takes into account the importance of social aspects o f the 
relationships, which govern value addition. Under this paradigm, the translation of added value is 
governed by multiple factors, which may not always result in better performance. For example, 
the resources added will not make such an impact on a company if they do not pass the test of 
rarity, value and inimitability. Based on the resource exchange theory a strong case can be put 
forward for value addition from  the moment a venture capital firm  and a portfolio company 
decide to establish a relationship. The resource exchange model also makes a distinction between 
value addition and the maximisation o f value additioa Using the resource exchange perspective 
allows the researchers to make a distinction between stock and flows of resources. As described, 
considering value addition as a resource flow makes the concept o f “value-added” more dynamic 
than it has previously been considered.
From  the theoretical position outlined in this chapter several hypotheses have been extracted 
relating to  the venture capital firm /portfolio company relationship. The next chapter includes the 
research hypotheses and, after a detailed discussion on their validity, considers both sides of the 
question before adopting a position.
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5.1 Introduction
The basis fo r the research propositions outlined in this chapter have been primarily derived from  
the theoretical position adopted on the relationship between a venture capital firm and a 
portfolio company, as described in the previous chapter. In addition, previous research studies 
have also been used to support the formulation of the research hypotheses.
5.2 Propositions
Very few  research studies have examined venture capital in the Asian environment. Those which 
have, did not focus exclusively on the relationship between a venture capital firm and a portfolio 
company. Little attempt has been made to explain the dynamics of this relationship in Asia.
Past research in value addition by venture capital firms has covered American and European 
markets more extensively than Asian markets. The research findings in previous research studies 
may not be applicable to  Asian markets in general because o f inherent differences in culture and 
work values39. As explained in chapter 2, there are cultural, geographical and developmental 
differences between Asian and other countries in which previous research studies have been 
conducted. A s can be gathered from  that chapter, there is very little available information in the 
way o f research studies on the nature of venture capital markets in Asia, including the little 
dragon countries. Thus, enough arguments seem to exist to warrant a possible difference in the 
way in which venture capital firms operate in Asia and other countries.
Therefore, som e basic assumptions have been derived from  the study of the Asian venture 
capital market as a unit and applied to the Hong Kong and Singaporean venture capital markets
39 M anagem ent styles o f the venture capital firm s have been reported to differ across countries (Hurry et aL, 1992).
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as a useful starting point for this research. Previous research studies, conducted outside Asia, 
have also been used to support the propositions derived in this chapter. Following due process, 
these assumptions will be tested and the findings will add to our knowledge of the impact that 
culture and work values create in the Singapore and Hong K ong venture capital markets. They 
will also assist in determining the extent to which the conclusions drawn in this thesis are 
amenable to broader application.
5.2.1 The Extent o f Involvement
An Equity Investors position is different from  other investors. Creditors, for example, are 
involved in the investee business on a less regular basis than equity investors. While lack of 
involvement may not show  any less concern for the investment, equity investors’ greater 
involvement with the investee stems from  the high level of risk in their investments. They rank 
below all creditors in regard to final setdement, which puts them in the unique position where 
they will always be the first to record a loss. The higher risk that the equity investors take is 
compensated by the greater influence that they can exercise over the investee and, consequendy, 
their investment. Thus, the options to exercise this influence, in most cases, impart greater 
control over the investment to the equity investors than to the creditors. Since equity investors, in 
better times, gain disproportionately more than other investors, it also gives them an opportunity 
and incentive to use their existing resources and add value to their investment. Venture capital 
firms share similanties and differences with other equity investors on many counts, which make 
their involvement with the investees even more significant. Private investors and venture capital 
firms prefer funding businesses with a potential for high capital growth (Sullivan, 1991). These 
investors usually intend to liquidate their investment after a fixed term ranging 5 to 10 years 
(Wetzel, 1985). However, there are certain marked differences between private investors and 
venture capital firms. Venture capitalists are professional investors who invest on behalf of others
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and have different incentives or disincentives to be involved with the investee than have private 
investors. Their involvement m ay be due to their fiduciary duty, as an agent of the suppliers of 
venture capital funds. For a venture capital firm, acceptable performance allows them to raise 
follow-on funds and hence is a matter o f survival. Because limited liability partnerships are time 
constrained, suppliers o f venture capital funds will not contribute to new partnerships structured 
by under performing venture capital firms. Thus, there is always a risk of non-renewal if a venture 
capital firm  fails to  perform. F or a venture capital firm, the disincentive to be involved in its 
portfolio com pany m ay be due to the number o f investments being managed, the lack of 
resources within a venture capital frrm useful to a portfolio company and so on. Private investors 
do not have similar disincentives and they may well seek to help a friend or a family member 
(Sullivan, 1991) or derive non-financial rewards from  assisting other entrepreneurs in the growth 
of their ventures (Wetzel, 1985). The differences, between a venture capital firm and a private 
investor, translate into distinct investment and involvement strategies (Florida and Kenney, 1988; 
Frear and Wetzel, 1990; Ehrlich et al., 1994).
Being an experienced professional involved in a specialist business, the venture capitalist’s 
involvement and contribution is expected to be more than that of other investors (Thurow, 
1992). Earlier research in the United States pointed to both active (Fried and H srish, 1994) and 
passive (Gorman and Sahlman, 1986) involvement by venture capital firms in their portfolio 
companies. Rosenstein (1988)40 found that venture capital firms employed two different 
approaches to their portfolio companies. Immediately, after making an investment, one group 
replaced the founders’ team with more experienced professional managers. The other group of 
venture capital firms nurtured and worked with the existing management. In all cases, venture
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capital firm s put pressures on the management team  to achieve objectives that were consistent 
with the business plan. Rosenstein (1988) concluded that venture capital firm s take a highly active 
role in the management o f their portfolio companies, especially through participation on the 
board o f directors. In analysing responses from  62 venture capital firms, MacMillan et aL (1989) 
perform ed cluster analyses on the data relating to the involvement of venture capital firms and 
found a clear emergence o f three clusters which they classified as low (laissez-faire), moderate 
and high (close tracker) involvement venture capital firms. The involvement criteria were taken as 
the num ber o f activities that the venture capital firms undertook with their portfolio companies. 
Gorm an and Sahlman (1986) found that a lead venture capitalist visited each portfolio company 
an average o f 19 times per year and spent 100 hours (8.3 Hours/M onth) in direct contact (on site 
or by phone) with the company. The non-lead venture capitalist visited half as often and stayed 
2 /3rd as long. Elango et al. (1995) confirmed the existence o f three clear groups of investors and 
found that the high assistance group spent an av erage  o f 35.65 hours per month, the middle 
assistance group spent 12.75 hours and the low assistance group spent an average o f 6.76 hours 
per month with the portfolio company. The non-lead venture capital firm  averaged 4 hours per 
month. A  com parison of these two research studies, considering the time gap, could lead to the 
conclusion that, generally speaking, the venture capital firm  involvement in its portfolio has 
increased over time. The involvement o f a venture capital firm  in its portfolio company follows a 
different pattern at the international level. Research has shown that venture capital firms in the 
Netherlands are less involved with the CEO s o f their portfolio companies than in the United 
Kingdom  (Sapienza et al., 1994) and despite a relatively homogenous group of investments, a 
venture capital firm 's involvement does not follow  a consistent pattern in France. In Canada up 40
40 R osenstein’s (1988) study was based on  interviews with six D allas (U nited States) based venture capital partnerships and two 




to 85% o f venture capital firms were found to be active or very active in their level of 
involvement (fog et a l, 1991). N o research studies relating to the time that venture capital firms 
spend managing their portfolio companies in Asia were found
There are, theoretically strong arguments for and against a proposition for greater involvement of 
venture capital firms in their portfolio companies in Asia. Hall and H ofer (1990) have broadly 
classified culture as either monochronic or polychronic in nature. Polychronic people are 
committed to  maintaining close long-term interpersonal relationships whereas monochrome 
people are accustomed to maintaining short-term interpersonal work relationships. They 
conclude that a cultural characteristic o f Asians, in general, is to behave in a polychronic 
fashion41. Thus fo r an Asian portfolio company, once a personal relationship with the venture 
capitalist is established, frequent meetings and regular dialogue between parries may result in a 
greater involvement of the venture capital firm with the portfolio company. The portfolio 
company, in this case, may seek greater involvement since Asian managers, unlike the American 
managers, tend to increase dependence with time (Michael, 1997). Signals coming out of Asia 
also suggest that some o f the venture capital firms are actively involved with their portfolio 
companies (A V Q , 1999).
There are equally cogent reasons in Asia to suggest a possibility that venture capital firms m aybe 
less involved in their portfolio companies. An important feature of the Asian market is that 
families play a more prominent role in the economy (Gidoomal, 1997; Tahilia, 1997). Since most 
o f the portfolio companies are family owned, issues concerning control and dilution are 
important. Fam ilies value their control over their businesses and the dilution of control over the 
business is more important than the dilution in equity (Stine, 1990; Chen, 1995). A  venture
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capitalist from  H ong K ong has termed it as “Management obsession with an imperialistic sense 
of "control"41 2. Furthermore, family businesses are free of pressures fo r short-term profits (Bork 
et al., 1996) whereas venture capital firms have been known to press for short-term results 
(Gomez-Meija et al., 1990; Stier and Greenwood, 1995). The human resource, in a family 
business, also com es preferably from  the fam ily rather than from  the best qualified potential 
contributors. Venture capital firms may not always agree to this arrangement and thus may be 
kept at arm’s length by the portfolio company. Asian entrepreneurs m ay not be accepting of an 
investors’ involvement since, traditionally, friends and acquaintances make equity investments but 
do not get actively involved in the business. Lastly, “Venture capitalists require a rate o f return on 
their money that m ay not allow the investee to continue to operate and develop the business in 
the way, that, historically they have operated”43. Under these scenarios the venture capital firm 
may be eyed with suspicion and the venture capital firm  itself is likely to be careful in the matter 
of involvement. Some venture capitalists from  Asia also believe that venture capital firms should 
restrict themselves to board meetings and inspection o f monthly management accounts only.44 
Yet another argument against greater participation o f venture capital firms in portfolio companies 
in Hong K on g and Singapore is the fact, that since venture capital is comparatively new in these 
countries, the venture capitalists have not accumulated the experience necessary for high levels o f 
involvement in their portfolio companies. Since the accumulation o f resources by a business 
depends a great deal on experience, there is a greater likelihood that venture capital firms will be 
less equipped to add to the resource pool o f the portfolio company. The average size of
41 It needs to  be pointed out that this classification is very broad and not entirely tenable since A sia com prises m any diverse 
cultures.
42 Personal correspondence: Comments by a  venture capitalist from  H ong K ong (Identity kept confidential on request) April 2, 
2000
43 Personal C orrespondence: Com m ents by a Senior Solicitor specialising in venture capital from  Singapore (Identity kept 
confidential on  request), A pril 7 ,1999
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investment in both these countries is also smaller com pared to the average size o f the venture 
capital investment in the United States4 5. Thus, venture capital firms in the United States may 
find more allocation o f time financially viable. After considering both sides o f the argument it is 
proposed that venture capital firms in H ong K ong and Singapore will be less involved in the 
affairs of the portfolio com pany com pared to their American counterparts.
P reposition  1 : V enture cap ital firm s allocate less tame to  rm m gngportfolio com panies in  H ong 
Kong an d  Singtpore than in  the U ntied S tates.
5.2.2 The nature of Involvement
Gorman and Sahlman (1986), in a pioneering research work relating to the kind of activities in 
which venture capital firms are involved, found that venture capital firms contribute to the 
portfolio companies in the area o f financing, strategic and operational planning, management 
recruiting and providing a network o f contacts. MacMillan et al. (1988) built on Gorman and 
Sahlman’s w ork and identified 20 activities in their study. The top six activities were;
1) serving as sounding board to entrepreneur team;
2) obtaining alternative sources o f equity financing;
3) interfacing with the Investor group;
4) monitoring financial performance;
5) monitoring operational perform ance; and
44 Personal Correspondence: N icholas Ashby, M anaging D irector, G lobal Alliance Capital (Malaysia) Sdn. Bhd. Malaysia, April 5, 
1999.
45 A V Q  (1999), E lan go et aL (1995).
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6) obtaining alternative sources o f equity financing.
An important area o f strategic and functional management was found missing among the top 
areas o f involvement. MacMillan et al. (1988) argued that either the venture capitalist did not feel 
that involvement in strategic and functional areas was important or that due to the continual 
nature o f involvement in these activities, the venture capitalist may not have been able to devote 
substantial time to them. They also suggested that the low  involvement in these activities was the 
result o f the amount o f hands on participation entailed. They also speculated that the role o f a 
sounding board member, which was rated highest, might include acting as confidant or mentor. 
Following Gorman and Sahlman (1986), they did not ask venture capital firms to rate such roles. 
Rosenstein et a l (1989) adapted the survey instrument o f MacMillan et al. (1988) and gathered 
data, from  162 C EO s o f portfolio companies, about the areas o f the venture capital firms’ 
involvement. They found that C E O s ranked the five m ost important areas o f the venture capital 
firm s’ involvement as being a sounding board to the management team, interfacing with the 
investor group, monitoring the operating performance, monitoring the financial performance and 
recruitment/replacement o f the CEO . A  comparison of the studies conducted by MacMillan 
(1988) and Rosenstien (1989) indicates that venture capital firms and portfolio companies tend to 
generally agree on the areas where venture capital firms become involved with their portfolio 
companies. Sapienza and Timmons (1989) had similar results with the matched responses o f 
C E O s o f venture capital backed ventures and lead venture capital firms. A  survey in Sweden 
observed different styles o f venture involvement and classified these as consultancy oriented, 
m entor oriented, operation oriented and structure oriented (Landstrom, 1991). In the United 
Kingdom , venture capital firms are valued by their portfolio companies on the basis of being a 
sounding board for ideas, challenging the status quo, financial advice, guidance on strategic
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matters and their contacts and market information (BVCA, 1998). Thus the European and 
American studies found similar results.
A  survey conducted by Pandey and Jung (1996), in Taiwan, found that ranked by importance, 
venture capital firms are involved in managerial assistance, in financing policy and strategy, 
developing the product or service, internal management o f the firm, launching the product or 
service in the market and technology induction. A  case study conducted by Pandey (1998), 
undertaken in India, found that a Government owned venture capital firm  was involved in 
providing managerial assistance and support, monitoring and follow-up of assisted ventures and 
arrangement o f IPO. Thus, research studies in Asia, although few, generally point toward 
activities that are similar to the involvement activities o f venture capital firms in the United States 
or Europe, but with a different emphasis. However, since these two studies are limited to only 
two countries, they may not truly reflect an overall picture o f the Asian market. Moreover, both 
these markets are markedly different in terms o f venture capital market size and stage of 
development. The first study conducted by Pandey and Jung (1996) in Taiwan was focused on 
the difference in perception o f both venture capital firms and portfolio companies and did not 
attempt to  compare the results with previous research findings elsewhere. The research case 
study in India, by Pandey (1998), pertained to only one venture capital firm owned by the 
Government o f India. As government owned venture capital firms constitute a very small part of 
the Asian venture capital market (A V Q , 1999) the result cannot be assumed to mirror the 
behaviours o f the entire unit. Consequently, P an de/s findings cannot be generalised.
While there is a possibility that venture capital firms in Asia may be involved in similar activities 
throughout Asia, the same cannot be said about the importance that is attached to these activities 
by either the venture capital firms or the portfolio companies. There is some evidence that
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cultural factors do affect the kind of activities that venture capital firms are involved in (Pandey 
and Jung, 1996). However, m ost of the previous research tends to agree on the areas o f venture 
capital firm s, involvement and there is, so far, litde evidence o f a major deviation in these 
activities in other countries. Therefore, it is proposed that there will be no deviation in 
involvement activities undertaken by venture capital firms in Singapore and Hong Kong as 
compared to those in the United States.
P roposition  2 : V enture cap ital firm  in  Singapore an d  H ong Kong are inudw d in  sim ilar
aetm ties m th th eir portfolio  com panies a s w ntwe cap italfirm  in  the U nited States.
As far as the ranking of activities according to their importance is concerned, it has been found 
that the portfolio companies and the venture capital firms assign different ratings to different 
value added activities. In Finland, the activities of financing and active oversight are rated most 
important (Ahdekivi, 1990). In Sweden one survey observed that entrepreneurs rate access to 
capital, the venture capitalist’s competence, moral support and networks o f prime importance 
(Frederikson, 1990). As already stated, in Taiwan portfolio companies rated establishing 
management systems, providing management recruitment/training, assistance to explore new 
technologies, providing market channels, market planning and establishing accounting systems as 
among the more important activities undertaken by venture capitalists (Pandey and Jung, 1996). 
In the United States, MacMillan et al. (1988) found that the importance of activities varies with 
performance and high levels o f some activities (e.g. negotiation of employment terms) were 
associated with high performance, whereas high levels o f other activities, such as recruiting top 
management, were associated with poor performance. Although, seemingly, there is some 
difference in the importance that is attached to any activity, there has been little attempt in the 
past to compare these activities across countries and to find out whether these differences are
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significant. O n the basis o f the second proposition suggesting similarities in activities, it is further 
proposed that rankings o f the importance o f the activities in which venture capital firms are 
involved with their portfolio companies in H ong K ong, Singapore and the United States, will be 
similar.
P ropositkn  3 : The im portance c f w ine added activ ities attribu ted  to  w tu re cap ital firm  
d isp lay  sim ilar pattern s in  Singapore, H ong Kong an d  the U nited S tates.
5.2.3 Value-added and the venture capital firm
MacMillan et al. (1988) found that venture capital firms included in their study were generally 
quite satisfied with their involvement with portfolio companies. However, their observation, that 
both positive and negative correlations existed between involvement measures and venture 
performance made the commonly accepted link between value addition and venture performance 
rather controversial
One of the earliest studies taking up the value added question was by Rosenstein et al. (1989)46. 
They found that although entrepreneurs ranked the venture capital firm’s contribution 
particularly useful in the early stages o f the portfolio company’s life cycle, overall, entrepreneurs 
did not perceive that venture capitalists on their boards added more value than did other board 
members. They concluded by surmising that the value added depends on the type of activity 
undertaken. In a follow-up study, Rosenstein et a l (1993) interviewed CEO s about the 
involvement o f venture capital firms on their board o f directors. They found that C E O s rated the 
contribution o f venture capitalists more highly than the contribution o f outside investors if one 
of the top 20 venture capital firms was represented on the Board o f Directors. Sapienza and 
Timmons (1989) found that the portfolio company’s assessment o f the venture capital firm’s
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involvement depended on various factors like the stage of development attained by the business, 
experience o f the entrepreneur and the stake of the venture capital firm  in the portfolio company. 
The follow-up study (Sapeinza, 1992), based on a survey of 51 pairs o f venture capital firms and 
portfolio companies and using personal interviews, confirmed that the value attributed to venture 
capital firm 's involvement varied with circumstances. The study concluded that since venture 
capital firms do add value, choosing the right venture capital firm  for the portfolio company at 
the outset was important. Gomez-M ejia et al. (1990) used a qualitative research approach and 
conducted interviews o f 20 venture capitalists and entrepreneurs in the United States. They 
expressed mixed views regarding the value o f the managerial involvement o f venture capital 
firms.
A  few  studies o f European venture capital firms parallel the studies undertaken in the United 
States and provide insights into the roles that venture capital firms play. Using the MacMillan et 
aL (1988) framework, Harrison and M ason (1992) found that entrepreneurs in the United 
Kingdom  rated acting as a sounding board and strategic activities as the two most important 
contributions o f venture capital firms. They also admitted that they depended more on the 
assistance o f the venture capital firm  than they did on other types o f investors. A  British Venture 
Capital Association Survey (1992) concluded that, prior to investment, entrepreneurs expressed a 
preference fo r passive financial assistance only, but, post investment they rated active non­
financial assistance as providing the highest value added. According to Van Wakeren et a l (1989), 
who have done their research in the Netherlands, about 60% o f entrepreneurs admitted receiving 
important strategic assistance from  venture capital firms and about 20% received useful 
networking assistance. Exploring six successfully exited portfolio companies in the United 46
46 Rosenstein him self had been studying the venture capital board (Rosenstein, 1988) and he, along with others, specifically applied 
value added questions to  board m em bers representing venture capital firm s.
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Kingdom , Murray (1996) found that, with one exception, all the portfolio companies questioned 
perceived appropriate and timely intervention by the venture capital investor as a critical element 
of success. Frederiksen et al. (1997) found a significant positive correlation between the level o f 
influence held by the venture capital firm and the non-economic development47 o f the portfolio 
company. In a survey of entrepreneurs who have used venture capital finance in the United 
Kingdom , Colville (1991) found a high degree o f satisfaction, with 95% of respondents prepared 
to recommend venture capital to a friend and alm ost two thirds subscribed to the belief that 
venture capital fund directors did add value to the company. However, there were concerns 
about the value o f the post investment relationship. Only half the respondents considered fees to 
be good value and less than one third believed that venture capital fund directors contributed 
more than non-executive directors did. The promise o f advice and ongoing support was ranked 
fifth by users as a choice criterion for the selection o f venture capital firms. However, venture 
capitalists generally believe that they do add value. “A  venture capitalist must be able to provide 
more than just financing. We tell our clients and encourage them to see other VCs [venture 
capitalists]... to see what they have to offer. All V Cs [venture capitalists] offer $ [money]... But 
what else sets them apart from  others?”48. However, so  far, there is mixed evidence in the United 
States and Europe that entrepreneurs see venture capitalist as adding value. Research results also 
seem  to vary across different countries.
little  research, explaining the value added question, has been conducted in Asia. In Asia, because 
o f the fam ily oriented nature o f the businesses, entrepreneurs may be averse to the interference 
o f the venture capitalist and m ay even see the absence o f value added where it does exist. The 
American style o f institutionalised venture capital industry and consequent value added incentives
47 In  the area o f m otivation, job  satisfaction and networking as opposed to  turnover, profitability, liquidity etc.
48 Personal correspondence: G odw in Pon, Investm ent M anager, A gri-Food Equity Fund, Canada, April 4 ,2001.
97
5: Propositions
for venture capital firms may not sit well, fo r now, with Asian entrepreneurs simply because they 
are not used to this level o f institutionalisation or m ay not appreciate the goals of venture capital 
firms as such. Another reason why venture capital firms m ay not be able to add value to their 
portfolio companies is the comparative lack of experience in venture capital and the consequent 
comparative deficiency of resources that it can pass on to its portfolio company.
Despite their recent development many o f the venture capitalists operating in Asian venture 
capital firm s either have experience o f the Am erican/European market or learned the ropes in 
these markets. Asian businesses can learn from  these venture capital firms and are likely to see 
them as adding more value to the business. Correspondence with venture capitalists revealed that 
venture capitalists, at least, do believe in value added involvement. “If the V C  [venture capitalists] 
does not add value, why does it ex p ea  itself to make money?”49
P roposition  4 : V enture cap ital firm s in  Singapore an d H ong Kong see them selves a s adding 
vakte to the business thrm çfi th eir involvement.
5.2.4 Addition of value in the context of resource exchange
As already argued, it is difficult to identify any resource singly or in combination, which accounts 
for a firm ’s success. Hindsight or ex-post examination o f faao rs contributing to success biases 
the conclusions (Foss et a l, 1995). In order to avoid ex-post explanations, those resources 
(activities) in which venture capital firms have been known to participate are the only faaors 
examined in this thesis.
The next proposition is derived from  the research model (Figure 4.3) presented in Chapter 4. As 
argued, the primary requirement o f a value-added relationship is the willingness (intentionalit)) of




both the parties to interact and agree to a resource exchange relationship. In order to test the 
importance o f willingness o f both the parties in a value-added m odel it is important to analyse 
factors which can affect willingness o f both the parties to  interact.
As noted in chapter 4, MacMillan et al. (1988) found that the degree o f involvement of a venture 
capital firm  in the affairs o f a portfolio company was a matter o f choice, which in turn is 
governed primarily by the firm ’s policy. Conversely, Lem er (1995) found that a venture capital 
firm is more likely to be involved where it perceives a need for oversight. Thus, beside choice, 
there are other factors that can influence levels o f involvement that are governed by 
circumstances other than choice.
A  venture capital firm  has to manage many projects and the venture capitalist has to learn to 
divide time between investments. M oreover, time needs to be allocated to the search for new 
projects and to evaluate investment proposals. A ny involvement in portfolio companies, 
therefore, is also dependent on the demand that other activities put on the time available. The 
degree o f involvement may also depend on the venture capital culture o f the subject 
country/region (Hofstede, 1984; Jeng and Wells, 2000). It has also been found that venture 
capital firm s are more involved in portfolio companies in which they have a relatively higher 
equity stake (Gomez-M ejia et a l, 1990); whether in terms o f their ownership proportion, the size 
of their investment or the proportion o f their capital under management invested in that 
portfolio company. Finally, the investment role is a factor in venture capital involvement since it 
has been determined that lead venture capital firms are more involved with their portfolio 
companies (Gorm an and Sahlman, 1986).
It is argued that the willingness o f the venture capital firm  to interact with the portfolio company 
must be m atched with an independent consent by  the portfolio company. This consent is
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important because a portfolio company’s unwillingness to interact will not only hinder 
involvement but can damage the whole relationship (Williamson, 1975). Gomez-Meija et al. 
(1990) show ed that entrepreneurs’ reactions differ regarding the managerial involvement of 
venture capital firms in portfolio companies and many C E O s view it as counterproductive.
The overwhelming consideration for the entrepreneur is the loss o f authority and control within 
the portfolio company. The entrepreneur will tend to avoid venture capital firms’ involvement 
unless factors exist which constrain his or her choice. Depending upon the availability of a 
particular resource from  a venture capital firm, the entrepreneur will be less hostile about 
involvement if that particular resource is o f critical importance to the success o f the venture. 
Similarly if the required resource is available from  other sources the entrepreneur will have less 
incentive to  interact with the venture capital firm. Moreover, like the venture capital firm, the 
portfolio com pany will be affected by the region’s venture capital culture50.
P roposition  5 : The w nture cap italists perception their ab ility  to ad d  w hte w ill depend on the 
facto rs, which affect the w illingiess o f both the p arties to interact.
P reposition  5 (a ): The Tenture cap italist's perception c f th eir ab ility  to ad d  wdue w ill also  depend 
on th drpolicy  torn rd  imdwmenL
P roposition  5 (b ): The w nture cap ita lists perception c f th eir ab ility  to ad d  'tak e  w ill also  depend 
on the extent o fth eirfim n d al am ritm en t to the portfolio com panies.
P roposition  5 (c): The w nture cap ita lists perception c f their ab ility  to ad d  w ine will also  depend 
on w nture capital industry culture in which a  w iture cap italfrmoperaXes.
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According to the resource exchange model (Figure 4.3) the second primary requirement of an 
exchange relationship is the resource configuration of both the parties. The resource pool o f a 
venture capital firm  should have the right mix to  be able to provide a valuable contribution to 
the portfolio companies. Conversely the resource com position o f the portfolio companies should 
be such as to absorb the contribution by the venture capital firms. As explained in Chapter 4, 
resource com position (need vs availability) is only a matter o f perception. The following two sets 
o f proposition analyses possible factors which m ay affect the way venture capitalists see the 
configuration o f portfolio companies' resources and their own. Akin to the idea of 
need/availability is the right match between them as explained in Chapter 4.
The way venture capitalists will look at the resource configuration of a portfolio company 
depends on several factors. Almost all o f these factors have been linked to value added in 
previous research studies. The business growth literature in general divides businesses, including 
those involving venture capital investment, in terms of sequential stages (Miller and Frieser, 1983; 
Churchill and Lewis, 1983; Garvin, 1983; Ruhunka and Young, 1987). Each stage has different 
financial needs and risk-reward options (Porter, 1986; Rubel, 1977; Henderson, 1986; Mashman 
and Schlank, 1987). N ew  businesses are subject to higher risks (Porter, 1980; Tobias, 1982; 
Bygrave, 1989) and the greatest risk is associated with the least developed venture (Callinan and 
Dim ovski, 1985; Robinson, 1987; Ruhnka and Young, 1991). Bygrave (1987) has noted that co­
investing am ong venture capital firms is greater fo r the earlier stages o f development because of 
higher risks. M oreover Ruhnka and Young (1991) found that venture capital firm s’ demand for 
rate o f return on investments was 73% and 55% at the seed and start-up stages and declined to 
35% for late stage investments. The risk in the early stage stems from  the fact that the venture is 
new and requires a wide array of resources, including: information (data, technical knowledge, 50
50 Since this study only exam ines perception o f venture capital firm s, the propositions have been restricted to venture capital firm s.
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political intelligence and expertise); physical and capital resources (funds, material, space and 
time) and symbolic support (endorsement, political backing, approval and legitimacy) (Kanter, 
1983). There is thus serious need for the accumulation o f resources for a new venture.
It is com m on for technology-oriented new ventures to  attempt to use the development of 
products to get a foothold in the market (Timmons and Bygrave, 1986). Fast changing 
technology places heavy demands on the resources o f new ventures (Sapienza and Amason 1993; 
Pisano 1993). M oreover, while the new venture team  m ay be competent technologists they may 
lack in other skills (Gomez-M ejia et a l, 1990). As the management team tries to grapple with 
commercial viability, they m ay find themselves lagging behind the operational demands of the 
business (Timmons and Bygrave, 1990). Gonsequendy, the venture’s need for resources is also 
greater when it is pursuing high technology.
Although Barney et aL (1996) found that venture capital performance was not related, ultimately, 
to the value added by venture capital firms, the presence of other factors like the nature and 
importance o f the value-added activity needs to be discounted to arrive at a definite conclusion 
regarding a relationship between value-added and venture performance. They stated that their 
study was cross sectional and involved only one measure of performance51. Seemingly, there are 
good reasons why resource strength o f a portfolio company should be rated on the basis o f 
performance. M intzberg (1973) observed that managers typically engage in varied and 
fragmented activities in part because interruptions occur frequendy. The fact that others initiate 
many interruptions points to the fact that a manager's job  is more reactive than pro-active. Since 
there are always more problems than the manager can handle, he/she is more likely to respond to 
a problem  if there is pressure for immediate action (Yuki, 1989). Assuming that a venture
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capitalist's role is similar, he/she is also more likely to concentrate on troublesome companies. As 
the perform ance of a portfolio company will depend ultimately on the resources that it is able to 
muster (Dierickx and Cool, 1989; Rumelt, 1984), if a firm  is not performing well, it is more likely 
to be rated as short o f resources by a venture capital f in a
Other factors likely to  effect resource evaluation could be reputation and competency of the 
management team. According to the resource based theory a positive reputation is a valuable 
intangible asset that m ay allow a firm  to establish a sustainable competitive advantage (Barney, 
1991; H all, 1992). Reputation also allows firms better access to scarce resources. Because firms 
also seek to reduce informational asymmetry and opportunism in exchange o f resources, 
reputation is also likely to effect repeated inter-firm exchange relations (Granovetter, 1995; 
'Williamson, 1991). Reputation can reflect on an alliance partner's characteristics (chapter 4, 
section 4.5.1) in the areas o f management, product/service quality and financial position 
(Dollinger, Golden and Saxton, 1997). An entrepreneurial team  with a positive reputation is 
assured to have a high level o f self-sufficiency in resources (Saxton, 1997). Since competence has 
been found to relate to performance (Chandler, 1992), it follows that the perceived competency 
of the management team should also impart an impression o f resource adequacy. Reputation 
here m eans a favourable track record of the management o f the portfolio company (Vergin and 
Qoronfleh, 1998; Gom pers and Lem er, 1999; Herbig et al., 1994) while competency means the 
ability to  optimise resource usage.
P reposition  6  (a ): A t any p jw i tim e the venture cap ita lists perception c f the resource needs c f
portfolio  com panies w lldepend upon the risk in ess c f the venture 51
51 Financial perform ance as m easured b y  dividing the ventures total incom e by  the num ber o f em ployees at the tim e o f first round 
financing.
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Prcpostàm6 (b):Atany&witinvthewmœQtptî tspenE^^ 
portfolio œnpmies wttckpendupon thepetfcmurKBcflhwTüim
P roposition  6  (<ÿ: A t any g w i tim e the venture cap italist's perception c f the resource rm k c f
P ro p o sitio n 6 (d ): A to n y  g w itim e th e w m œ c a p i^ lion  c f the resowœ needs fth e
The same factors, which are likely to affect the venture capital film s’ assessment of the resource 
strength o f the portfolio company, can also affect the assessm ent o f their own resource strength. 
However, meaningful measurements o f some of these factors, in the case of a venture capital 
firm, require som e adjustments. The basic problem arises while measuring risk. Since a venture 
capital film s risk is primarily based on the composition o f its portfolio, which in turn depends on 
the risk profile o f the individual portfolio member, the overall riskiness o f a venture capital firm 
is much more difficult to measure. Moreover, while venture capital firm may provide information 
on the risk profile o f any o f its individual ventures, it is unlikely to do so for the whole portfolio. 
Therefore, the risk factor o f the venture capital firms has not been considered.
The reputation o f venture capital firms also affects the value-added perception of portfolio 
companies (Rosenstein et al., 1993). Since this thesis is restricted to the perceptions of venture 
capital firms only, a question to  venture capital firms on how they assess their own competency 
and reputation would have carried litde validity. However, since the reputation o f the venture 
capital firm  is an important factor to be considered, it has been measured indirectly, as explained 
in chapter 7. The performance o f a venture capital firm has been taken as a contributory factor in
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overall reputation (Vergin and Qoronfleh, 1998). The performance of a venture capital firm is 
much more likely to  attract new capital as well as quality proposals for funding which can result 
in an increase in the size of the venture capital firm  (Gom pers and Lemer, 1998). A  larger size is 
more likely to  result in a larger variety of the resource pooL H ie size o f a venture capital firm, 
therefore, is also more likely to translate into the confidence with which a venture capital firm 
evaluates its own resources.
Competency has been replaced with experience since more experience tends to impart a feeling 
of professionalism  and competency (Levinthal and March, 1993). Experience is especially 
important in the case of venture capital investment as “ (n)ot only is it difficult to raise a new 
venture capital fund without a track record, but the skills needed for successful venture capital 
investing are difficult and time-consuming to acquire” (Gom pers and Lemer, 1999, p.4). As a 
result o f the venture capital firm s’ previous investments in specific information about particular 
industries, industry experience is an important resource that can be useful to portfolio companies 
(Fiet, 1995).
P roposition  7  (a ): The venture cap italist’s perception o f h is/h er resource p od  m il depend upon 
the reputation  c f the venture cap italfirm
P roposition  7  (b ): The venture cap italist3s perception c f h is/h er resource p o d  w ll depend upon 
the siz e  c f the venture cap ital firm
P roposition  7  (c ): The venture cap italist's perception c f h is/h er resource pod  w ll depend upon 
the experience cfth e venture cap itd  firm
There are good reasons for venture capital firms to add resources to the resource pool o f their 
portfolio com panies. Gom ez and Meijia (1990) have argued that venture capital firms are
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involved in their portfolio companies to the extent o f their assessm ent of the chances for the 
success o f the venture. As a venture’s success, in large part, is dependent upon its resources, the 
contribution o f resources by a venture capital firm  will depend on its assessm ent of the resources 
possessed by  the portfolio companies.
Venture capitalists believe that providing advice/support is a way o f increasing the likelihood that 
the venture will succeed (Rock, 1991; Peny, 1988), thus their advice/support may ultimately 
affect the perform ance o f the firm (Rock, 1991; Sapeinza et al., 1995). The nature and extent of 
the venture capital firm s’ contribution is based on the needs of the new venture including gaps in 
managerial competence, the skills available from  the investor and the relevance o f specific advice 
and support (W ame, 1988). I f  venture capitalists believe that the resources possessed by portfolio 
companies are insufficient, they will make efforts to provide these from  their own resource pool 
or assist portfolio companies in obtaining them from  outside sources (Stier and Greenwood, 
2000).
According to social exchange theory, the larger the amount of a resource possessed, the more 
likely it is to be passed on to others (Foa and Foa, 1980). Thus venture capital firms with larger 
resource pools are more likely to transfer resources to portfolio companies. Sapienza et al. (1995) 
have also noted that involvement will be more when venture capital firms appear to offer a 
significant resource for the venture.
While there seem s to be sufficient incentive fo r venture capital firms to support their portfolio 
companies by  adding to their resource pool, Sapienza (1994) has speculated that venture capital 
firms may put in greater efforts on portfolio companies that already have abundant resources and 
consequently a greater probability o f success. This means that venture capital firms will be less 
inclined to add to the resource pool o f a portfolio company which is not likely to succeed and
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m ay start looking fo r a quick exit instead (Ruhnka et aL, 1992). There has been, however, little 
research evidence to  support this speculation.
Portfolio companies are in a position to accept or resist resource intake from  venture capital 
firms. It is debatable whether portfolio companies will always welcome resource input by venture 
capital firms and there is some justification for the portfolio company not to acquire resources 
from  the venture capital firm. As already stated, some entrepreneurs do believe that venture 
capital firms get in the way o f a venture (Gomez-Meija et aL, 1990; Stier and Greenwood, 1995). 
Venture capitalists themselves believe that potential clients perceive venture capital firms to be 
greedy, grasping o r avaricious (Murray, 1991). Venture capital firms also concede that they 
sometimes provide incorrect advice (MacMillan et al., 1989). Moreover, entrepreneurs value then- 
control over the portfolio company. Thus, despite a high regard for the resource strength o f the 
venture capital firm, a portfolio company may systematically undervalue a venture capital firm’s 
assistance because o f a lack of trust, the possibility o f a loss of control or reservations about the 
usefulness o f a resource.
Gonversely, there are also compelling reasons for portfolio companies to  welcome resource 
transfer from  the venture capital firm. Past studies on the success of high potential ventures have 
identified resources such as effective marketing, technological expertise (Maidique 1986), prior 
experience o f the management team  (Hmmons et al., 1977), strategic decision making (Van de 
Ven et aL, 1984) and strategic focus (Meyers and Roberts, 1986) as related to the success o f the 
high potential ventures. It follows that portfolio company management, will be looking for a 
quick and optimal attainment o f resources by building network exchange structures with 
outsiders that are identified as critical resource suppliers (Scherer, 1980; Larson, 1992). The 
smaller the firm’s pool o f resources, the more likely they are to be sought from  resource
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suppliers, including venture capital firms (Foa and Foa, 1989)52. Barney et al.’s (1996) finding can 
also be cited as a case in point whereby a less experienced venture team, of a new technology 
venture, assessed a venture capital firm's operational assistance higher than did the more 
experienced venture team. Lastly, it has also been aigued that less able entrepreneurs (low 
resource pool) will choose to involve venture capital firms, whereas the more able entrepreneur 
(higher resource pool) will develop the venture without external participation (Amit et a l 1990). 
Research indicates that the venture capital firm 's input is sometimes welcomed by portfolio 
companies (Bygrave, 1992; MacMillan et al., 1989; Rock, 1991) and there are even instances 
where portfolio companies have complained that their venture capital firms do not allocate 
enough time to the portfolio companies (Fried and Hisrish, 1994).
Bygrave and Timmons (1992) have indicated that sociological factors, like lack of personal 
chemistry and lack o f open communication between the venture capitalist and the CEO s of the 
portfolio companies, may limit resource exchange. However, given the desire to succeed and a 
reasonable level o f goal oriented behaviour, as would be expected from  an entrepreneur (Weber, 
1947), the resources possessed by the venture capital firm, despite poor personal relationships, 
may still be requisitioned and used by the portfolio company. More so because, this can be a 
critical leveraging opportunity whereby resources can be gained, and competitive advantage 
realised, without incurring direct capital investment (Larson, 1992).
There seem  to be sufficient reasons why venture capital firms should transfer resources when 
they perceive the need and availability.
52 This argum ent is com patible with inform ation processing; theory (Galbraith, 1973) which implies that when information is 
potentially im portant to a com pany and it lacks inform ation, o r the resources to  collect that inform ation or an information 
processing capacity, it will seek and value greater interaction with other com panies.
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P roposition  8 : V enture cap ital firms who rate the resources ( f  the portfolio company lower m il 
rate w ine added oorrparathdy h itte r
P roposition  9 : V enture cap ital firm s vho rate th eir cm  resources h itte r w ll rate w ine added a s 
H$er.
Researchers have emphasised compatibility between a venture capital firm  and the portfolio 
com pany fo r a fruitful relationship. “ The right match (between entrepreneur and the venture 
capitalist)53 can yield a synergistic relationship that propels the firm to higher levels o f excellence” 
(Ehrilch et a l, 1994: p 81). This argument has been extended to the matching o f resources and it 
is argued that the resource m ost likely to be exchanged will be the one that matches the 
requirements o f the portfolio company.
It has been argued that the nearer the resources are to a similar specification as to requirement, 
the more likely they are to be exchanged (Foa and Foa, 1980). Knowledge specificity assumes an 
important dimension in the co-operative activity o f entrepreneurs and venture capitalists (Cable 
and Shane, 1997). Sapienza et al. (1986) have also found that greater experience of a venture 
capital firm  in the venture capital industry was not necessarily accompanied by greater 
interaction; but in cases where a venture capital firm was relatively more experienced in the 
portfolio com pany's industry, interaction was greater. Jeng and Wells (2000) also asserted that 
venture capital firms can greatly add to the success o f the venture by providing a matching 
function as needed by the portfolio company.
There is, however, an interesting argument against resource matching and value maximisation. 
W emfelt (1984) has referred to the close analogy of resource-based theory with product portfolio
53 M y parenthesis
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theory. He argues that since strong products in a firm’s growth-share matrix supply weak ones 
with cash, resources also support each other. This means that matching the needs o f the portfolio 
company with the resource availability from  the venture capital firm  may not result in resource 
transfer because a portfolio com pany that does not want to interact may cover up weaknesses 
where the resources are needed by drawing on the extra resources it has in areas where it is 
resource rich. A lso, for a resource needy portfolio company, the matching may not matter as it 
may help itself to  whatever resource it can get from  the venture capital firm
It is proposed, on the basis o f previous arguments, that such a matching is more likely to generate 
maximum value added. Thus a venture capital firm will try and add more to the resources where 
a gap is perceived and will participate less if no gap is perceived.
P roposition  1 0 (a): H igher p articipation  occm  in  activ ities where, in  term  c f pen ciled resam e 
strength, doe venture cap ital firm  is in  a  superw r position  com pared to  d ie portfolio company
P reposition  10(h ): Low er participation  a rm  in  activities where, in  term  cfp en ciled  resotm e 
stren gh , th epcn fdk) company is in  a  superiorpositkn cm paredtodoew n tm
In the light o f resource exchange theory and the existence of a network dyad relationship 
between the venture capital firm  and the portfolio company, it is argued that value added is the 
result o f resource exchange. Thus, resource perceptions play a very important role in building up 
a value added relationship. However, it has been demonstrated that value addition, as vague as 
this concept is, is also complicated by the existence o f many factors that can significantly alter the 
benefits that can be derived from  a fruitful relationship.
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In the next chapter the methodology that has been adopted to collect data for the examination of 
the validity o f the research propositions is discussed An analysis o f the characteristics of the 
participants who have chosen to respond to the research questionnaire is also undertaken.
I l l
6: Research Methodology
6 Chapter 6: Research M ethodology
6.1 Introduction
In this chapter the research plan, the actual research process and a justification of important 
parameters that are used in this thesis are presented. It also includes a discussion on the problem 
o f the response rate in view o f the closed nature o f the venture capital business. In the last part o f 
this chapter, the characteristics o f venture capital firms that have responded to the questionnaire 
and the characteristics o f portfolio companies that venture capital firms have chosen to report 
on, are presented with reference to the possibility o f a response bias.
6.2 Research D esign
A  self-administered survey was utilised in this study. Surveys and interview techniques have been 
found to be feasible and productive here and in past studies relating to venture capital research 
(Brophy, 1986). This approach has been adopted because very little public data is available 
relating to  the internal working of venture capital firms. Because o f the very private nature of this 
business, it is rather difficult to gain access into venture capital firms. Because o f the fact that 
venture capitalists, as highly specialised professionals, are extremely busy, it is equally difficult to 
gain a fixed interview time. Theoretically, venture capitalists should be much more willing to 
contribute time and effort to  questionnaire based methods, which offer them flexibility in regard 
to time.
Another reason for using survey-based research in this study is that this work was carried out 
from  Australia with subjects geographically dispersed around Asia. It would have been 
impractical to  visit each potential respondent or to conduct lengthy interviews on the telephone. 
One advantage o f a mail survey is that the survey instrument can be administered to a large
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number o f potential respondents in a short period o f time in a relatively affordable manner. 
M oreover, since one o f the objectives in undertaking this study is to make it comparable with the 
existing body o f literature, the technique used by previous researchers was adopted The survey 
was supported by e-mail exchanges with a number o f venture capitalists inside and outside Asia. 
Selected comm ents from  som e of the venture capitalists, received via e-mails, are drawn upon 
wherever relevant in this thesis. Investor involvement activities at the post investment stage are 
examined in this study by focusing on the network dyad relationship that exists between the 
entrepreneur and the venture capital investor.
6.3 Survey Instrument
To ensure quality o f the survey instrument a three-part approach was adopted First, previous 
venture capital value added survey studies were reviewed in the light o f resource exchange theory. 
The questionnaire was intentionally designed to be compatible with those used in the previous 
research studies, o f similar nature, in order to facilitate comparison. Faculty members at the 
University o f W ollongong, who had either experience in survey research or venture capital 
research were asked to examine the instruments and some modifications were made by 
incorporating their comments. Thirdly, the improved instrument was mailed to four friendly 
venture capital firms and then revised further, based on their observations.
The questionnaire was divided into three parts. The first part obtained basic information only. In 
the second part information was sought on the involvement question and followed a similar 
pattern to previous research. Lastly, information regarding resource exchange was sought. 
Appendix m  is a copy of the actual survey instrument. The same survey instrument was sent to 
all countries. However, monetary values were expressed in terms o f the local currency.
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6.3.1 M ain Issues in Survey Instrum ent
Investm ent funds were split according to type based on the A V Q ’s The G uide to V enture C ap ital 
in  A sia  1999. The A V Q  has been publishing the G uide fo r many years and its classification was 
found to be broad and close to the realities in Asian countries where multiple views of venture 
capital and different industry structures have to be taken into account. F or the purpose of this 
research, the classification according to types is closely associated with the number of people 
working fo r the firm s/com panies and their experience. Som e previous research studies (Gorman 
and Sahlman, 1989) refer to the number of partners and make further distinctions between 
different partners. Such an approach assumes the existence only o f partnerships in the venture 
capital arena, which is not the case in Singapore and Hong K ong (Guan and Cheong, 1989).
Determining the experience that a firm /com pany has available as a resource is complicated by 
many different kinds of experiences that employees at all levels bring with them. Therefore, the 
questions were focused on senior management personnel only. "While searching fo r the right 
terms to use, the approach o f the A V Q  appeared to be pragmatic, in the Asian context, where it 
refers to the term  “professionals” working for venture capital firm s/com panies. Although the 
A V Q  guide does not explain what it means by a professional, this term when applied to a 
venture capital market, broadly conveys the impression o f someone with experience in venture 
capital working at a relatively senior level. The data on partners/senior management 
personnel/professionals gathered fo r this research study compares well with the A V Q  data on 
the num ber o f professionals working for the firm s/com panies.
Companies who receive venture capital have been classified differently according to 
developmental stages. The European Venture Capital Association (E V C A  Y earbook, 1998) does 
not classify “ turnaround” as a separate development stage, unlike the Asian Venture Capital
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Journal (Guide to Venture Capital in Asia, 1999). Similarly, P ratt's G uide to V enture C ap ital Sources 
published in the United States (V enture Eoononics, 1989) mentions rounds of financing in its 
company classification. Researchers have adopted numerous different classifications for portfolio 
company stages o f development (Elango et aL, 1995). The classification followed by Cornelius 
(1986) was found to be useful as it not only provides a comprehensive list o f possible 
developmental stages but also explains the meanings o f the terminology used54. D ata contained 
in The G uide to  V enture C ap ital in  A sia  published by A V Q  was analysed. The respondents in each 
country were sent questionnaires expressed in their own currencies based on the exchange rates 
prevailing on January 25,1999.
6.3.1.1 Involvement
As mentioned in Chapter 3, the extent o f venture capitalist’s involvement in a portfolio company 
has multiple dimensions. To confirm  the results, the extent o f involvement is taken in this thesis 
to include an investigation o f the number o f activities that the venture capital firm is involved in 
with its portfolio company, the frequency o f interaction and the amount o f time spent by the 
venture capital firm  managing the affairs o f its portfolio company (measured in hours per 
month). Follow ing previous research, only the role of the lead investor has been considered. In 
order to make the study comparable (Macmillan et aL, 1988, Rosenstein et al., 1989, Ehrlich et aL, 
1994), the venture capital firm ’s participation has been measured on a Likert scale. The research 
process began with a list o f 20 activities already identified by MacMillan et al. (1998). To make 
the list more comprehensive, some of the activities were rephrased and then re-classified in the 
light o f previous research regarding the involvement o f venture capital firms in their portfolio 
companies (Rosenstein et aL, 1989; Sapienza and Timmons, 1989; Stier and Greenwood, 1995).
54 Seed is the research and planning stage, start-up m eans the market entry stage, early expansion is the market developm ent stage, 
late expansion is where a venture is ready to  exploit the market and mezzanine funding is taken to mean the stage at which a 
venture is ready to  go public. Public com pany, leveraged buyouts and turnarounds are self-explanatory classifications.
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Representation as a board member has not been included in the final list of activities because the 
contribution by the venture capital firm ’s representative on the Board of Directors can be 
identified from  other activities. A fter this exercise, a list o f 15 activities remained The same 
approach as Gorm an et al. (1986) and Elango et al. (1995), regarding the determination of time 
spent by the venture capitalist with the portfolio company, was adopted
Respondents were asked to report on the time that they had spent in direct contact with their 
portfolio company. Direct contact includes three factors; the time the venture capitalists spent on 
the telephone in conversation with representatives o f the portfolio company, attending formal 
meetings; and attending informal meetings. In order to arrive at the total direct contact time the 
number o f meetings in a year was multiplied by the average hours spent. This was added to the 
number o f telephone calls multiplied by the time per call. It should be noted that this measure 
does not include the time that venture capitalists spend on work that is not in direct contact (e.g. 
reading reports, devising strategies privately, contacting others on behalf o f portfolio company 
etc). The final result, therefore, is indicative and should not be construed as the total time spent 
on managing a typical portfolio company
6.3.1.2 Resources
As mentioned earlier, there are number of ways to classify resources. The researcher has relied 
upon previous studies as the starting point to determine resources to be used. As mentioned in 
Chapter 3, the resource-based theory has been criticised for being tautological in the sense that 
resources are labelled as useful only after they have been identified as contributing to the firm s 
success. In  order to avoid the determination of the usefulness of resources after the fact, the 
involvement activities already identified in previous research studies (MacMillan et al., 1988; 
Gorman and Sahlman, 1989; Rosenstein et aL, 1989; Ehrlich et al., 1994) were converted into
116
6: Research Methodology
identifiable resources. Activities, in som e cases, could be identified as a resource. For example, 
crisis management as an activity is also a resource. In  cases where the activities were too narrowly 
defined, a broader term  used in the above mentioned research studies were used to identify that 
activity. F or example, the ability to contribute by negotiating a contract with a prospective 
employment candidate, for its portfolio company, primarily stems from  the expertise in the area 
o f personnel management. The resource and activity classifications, as shown in Table 6.1, agree 
with the factor analysis performed by Macmillan et a l (1988) to classify these activities. Some of 
the activities, however, do overlap and originate from  multiple resources. In this case, the 
resource has been split into primary and secondary resource. Since experience and industry 
knowledge affect all activities, they have been measured but not included. A  detailed link between 
resource based capabilities and the identified activity has been considered as follows: As 
mentioned in Chapter 3, there is little consensus among researchers regarding the value-added 
contribution o f venture capital firms. Value-added seems to be a complex issue because 
numerous factors in multiple combinations affect the ultimate value added in varying degrees. 
The list o f possible factors can be very long. It was believed that any attempt to measure all these 
factors m ay result in a serious shortfall in the response rate, which already has a dismal record as 
evidenced by past research in venture capital in general and in Asia in particular. Factors, which 
are related to venture capital firm /portfolio company characteristics and the research exchange 
paradigm were identified since partner characteristics and resources form  the basis of the 
resource exchange model. To narrow down the list, only those factors were selected which have 
been identified with value-added in previous research studies.
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6.4 P lan  o f the Study
The Australian venture capital market started out as the favourite for this study. However, the 
idea was later dropped for many reasons. The Australian venture capital market is not only 
smaller in size, but is also not as well developed as the venture capital markets in some 
neighbouring countries. With a record of a low response rate from venture capital firms, an 
empirical research project in Australia would have rendered the research result untenable. Some 
venture capital firms in Australia were contacted but the lukewarm response made clear the 
futility o f this exercise. Singapore appeared to be a good choice for this study. Singapore not only 
has a fairly well developed venture capital market but, because of its open market policy houses a  
variety o f venture capital firms from  all over the world. The proximity to Australia, as compared 
to other Asian countries, was also an advantage making this exercise less expensive.
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After som e preliminary investigation, it was decided to expand the focus of research to more 
Asian countries. Since the Japanese venture capital market is unique (Clark, 1987), the next four 
largest Asian venture capital markets were selected fo r this study. These included Hong Kong, 
Singapore, South K orea and Taiwan. The first point o f contact was the respective Venture 
Capital Associations in Asia. N o  response was received from  any of these after one letter 
followed by two reminders. The reason, it was realised later, is not difficult to understand. [“ 
M ost o f these very VC(venture capital) associations have acted as nothing more than lunch clubs 
and have not really done any research to my knowledge. M ost of them don't even have 
permanent offices and the current chairman's secretary is in m ost cases the administrator. I think 
the best way is to have a well-funded pan-Asian venture capital association in the mould of 
EVCA . Who will do that remains up there.”]55. An Internet search for Asian venture capital firms 
did not produce the desired results either because in early 1999, not many Asian venture capital 
firms had a website or information about themselves available on the web.
The A V Q  publishes a very useful listing of venture capital firms operating in Asia. It also 
includes very useful data. The information contained in The G uide to V enture C ap ital in  A sia  with 
particular focus on venture capital firms was the primary reason an Asian based research was 
selected.
6.5 Response rate problem
The response rate in this kind o f study poses the biggest threat to the validity of the research. The 
response to  questionnaire-based research depends primarily on the willingness of people to 
respond to the questionnaires. While a 100% response rate is unlikely, it is entirely up to 
respondents to  decide whether or not to respond. The response rate (KR) assumes enormous
55 Personal correspondence: Allen Lee, A ssociate Editor, Asian Venture Capital Journal, Septem ber 1,1999.
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importance here since a result based on a high response rate from  a wide representation of the 
whole population under study is generally perceived as dependable, valid, and reliable. It is 
unclear, however, how high the response rate needs to be (Baruch, 1999). While studies have 
been done on the variables that affect the level o f response (Heberiein &  Baumgartner, 1978; 
Kelsall, Poole, &  Kuhn, 1972), there is no agreed norm as to what is or what may be considered 
an acceptable and reasonable response rate. Henderson (1990) has argued that a response rate of 
20-30% is fairly typical for mail-out surveys to a large sample o f firms. Organisational 
representatives m ay decline to respond due to a variety o f reasons. Fenton-O'Creevy (1996) 
examined reasons for non-response in a study that had yielded a 33% response rate at the 
organisational level. A  random sample of non-respondents reported various reasons for not 
responding. F o r example, too busy (28%), not considered relevant (14%), address unavailable to 
return the questionnaire (12%), and cases where it was com pany policy not to complete surveys 
(22%). The remaining 24% did not state clear reasons for not responding. Even in the case of 
questionnaires returned, the issue o f difference between returned and useable questionnaires 
needs to be ironed out. Baruch (1999) argues that there should be a distinction between studies 
directed tow ard top management (Œ O /M D  etc.) or official representatives o f organisations, 
and others such as mid-level managers. For the former the norm may then be 36 + /- 13 
responses out o f 100 whereas for m ost other populations it may be about 60 + /- 20 responses 
out o f 100 (Baruch, 1999).
Em pirical evidence about venture capital is not easy to develop because o f the 
private/confidential nature o f venture capital firms and their investments (Barry, 1994). The 
primary source o f empirical evidence in venture capital has been the use of survey instruments, in 
which case, response rate turns into a m ajor issue. To determine the past levels of response rate 
from  venture capital firms, 24 research studies that used a mailed questionnaire and targeted
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either the venture capital firms or their portfolio companies were exam ined The response rate 
from  venture capital firms in the United States presents a wide variation from  30% or less 
(MacMillan et a l, 1988; Bm ton et aL, 1997; Carter et aL, 1994; Elango et al., 1995; Barney et al., 
1996; Sapienza et al., 1996) to 50% or more (Gorman and Sahlman, 1986; Ehrlich et al., 1994; 
Fiet, 1995; Sapienza, 1992). Interestingly, MacMillan et al. (1988) and Sapeinza (1992) explored a 
similar question, o f the nature of venture capital firm s’ involvement with their portfolio 
companies, with a considerably different response rate. Sapienza’s (1992) study, however, with a 
response rate o f 80% for the venture capital firms and 85% for the portfolio companies, was an 
exception. The usual response rate o f portfolio companies in such studies present a more 
consistent pattern o f 20-30% (Barney et a l, 1989; Rosenstein, 1989). Unfortunately, many studies 
do not cite the reasons for the wide variations in return rate. Only two studies have specifically 
acknowledged using Dillman’s (1978)56 approach and both have ended with a comparatively 
modest response rate of below 30% (Bruton et al., 1997, Barney et al., 1996). The response rate 
of venture capital firms does not seem  to follow any particular pattern over time in the United 
States.
No one appears to have conducted research on venture capital firm /portfolio company 
relationship in Asia. O f the two studies o f venture capital in Singapore, that were accessible, the 
response rate was abysmal (Ray, 1991; Ray 1994). In the later study, where this information was 
provided, it took  the intervention o f a powerful government official to lift the response rate from 
2% to 7% (Ray, 1994). The same researcher, in collaboration with others, had earlier obtained a 
much better response from  Japan o f 25.7% (Ray et al., 1993) as have others in other parts o f Asia 
(Giotigeat et al., 1994; Rah et al., 1994; Pandey and Jung, 1996). Despite the fact that Hong
56 H illman (1978) has outlined the procedure to increase response rates in his book  “M ail and Telephone Surveys: The Total 
D esign  M ethod” . D illm an's approach is prim arily based on a series o f specifically tim ed mailings including an initial mailing
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K ong is one o f the largest venture capital markets in Asia, there is a serious dearth of research 
studies there and previous response rates could not be assessed.
It was expected that the response rate o f this study would be governed by the following factors;
1) Traditionally, venture capital firms have been found to be reluctant to disseminate 
inform ation even for academic purposes (Boylan, 1982; Bygrave, 1989);
2) Businesses in the targeted countries, especially in Singapore are inundated with 
questionnaires commissioned by governments and local academics. After a while this 
creates a jaded reaction to the nth questionnaire (Ray, 1994);
3) Absence from  the workplace due to an overseas assignment, a long holiday, or other 
long-term absence could prevent otherwise willing respondents from  participating in this 
study;
4) Venture capital firm ’s offices may have changed, personnel being replaced or the 
respondents m ay not have received the questionnaire; and
5) Potential respondents may have permanently or temporarily ceased involvement in 
venture capital.
6.6 The Survey
Since the response rate was considered to be particularly sensitive, the survey approach 
recommended byD illm an (1978) was adopted The survey instrument was dispatched at the end 
of June 1999. A  total o f 334 questionnaires were sent to four different countries.




Singapore Hong Kong Taiwan S. Korea Total
No. of Questionnaires Sent 83 150 43 58 334
Not Involved at the Moment 1 0 0 0 1
Returned Undelivered 7 11 4 7 29
Same Company as Other 1 0 0 0 1
Not a VC Company 0 6 1 2 9
Not Interested 1 2 0 0 3
No Response 49 116 38 49 252
Response Received 24 15 0 0 39
The addresses o f the venture capital firms were taken from  the A V Q  and The G uide to Venture 
C ap ital in  A sia , 1999. The letters were sent to the venture capital firms during late June and the 
early part o f Ju ly  1999. A  reminder, enclosing the questionnaire again, in the middle of July 1999 
followed this. Later, two fax reminders were sent at the end of July with a one-week gap between 
each reminder. A s expected and despite all precautions, the response rate in all cases was low. 
Unfortunately, in many cases, the venture capital firms did not even acknowledge the receipt of 
correspondence and fax reminders. The m ost responses came from  Singapore, numbering 24 and 
a response rate o f approximately 33%, followed by Hong Kong, with 15 and a response rate of 
11%. N o response was received from  either S. K orea or Taiwan. It was decided to drop S. Korea 
and Taiwan and proceed with the responses received. Putting together both Singapore and Hong 
Kong yields a response rate o f approximately 20% which, considering past research in venture 
capital, was considered acceptable.
Interestingly, the m ajority o f venture capitalists who responded to the questionnaire actually filled 
up the survey instrument. As a large number o f respondents did not respond to the questionnaire 
or even acknowledged receipt o f the questionnaire, despite reminders, it was not possible to find
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out the reasons fo r non-response. Thus not enough data was available to perform  a non­
response analysis
6.7 Sample Characteristics &  Response Bias
6.7.1 Respondent Profile
The responding firms represent a broad cross section o f industries by preference57 and provide
little evidence o f response bias toward any industry.
6.3 Average Amount of Capital Under Management
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent
Less than US$30 Million 7 17.9 17.9 17.9
Between US$30 m-60 m 10 25.6 25.6 43.6
Between US$60 m-90m 4 10.3 10.3 53.8
Between US$90m-120m 4 10.3 10.3 64.1
More than US$150m 14 35.9 35.9 100.0
Total 39 100.0 100.0
The data from  Singapore and H ong K ong indicated considerable diversity regarding size. The 
A V Q  study had the same result with a similar average capital under management of USD 94 
million (A V Q , 1999). There is an indication that there are fewer mid-sized venture capital firms 
with venture capital under management of USD60 million to U SD  120 million. The size spread 
does not indicate an optimum size for the firms.
6.4 Type of Investment Fund
Singapore___________________Hong Kong
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
Government Sponsored 3 12.5
Corporate Subsidiary 3 12.5 3 20.0
Subsidiary of a Financial Institution 6 25.0 4 26.7
Subsidiaryof a Securities Firm 1 42
Independent Company/Partnersbip 9 37.5 8 53.3
A Joint Venture Company 2 8.3
Total 24 100.0 15 100.0
57 This inform ation was not a part o f the research questionnaire. However, A V Q  provides sim ilar inform ation about all venture 
capital firm s operating in A sia. The inform ation relating to venture capital firm s who have responded to this survey was 
com piled from  A V Q  data.
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The respondents involved alm ost all types o f funds. However, in both countries, more responses 
came from  Independent firm s/com panies and subsidiaries o f financial institutions and 
corporations.
A  com parison o f the A V Q  data according to types o f firms in Singapore and Hong Kong 
compares well with the research data.
6.5 Venture Capital Firms by Types
Singapore(AVQ, 1999) Hong Kong (AVQ, Singapore &Hong Research Data
1999) Kong(AVq, 1999) (Singapore &Hong 
Kong)
Bank Subsidiary
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
10 16.67% 16 2025% 26 18.71% 10 25.64%




2 3.33% 9 11.39% 11 7.91% 1 2.56%
Others 5 833% 3 3.80% 8 5.76% 2 5.13%
Government
Owned
6 10.00% 0 0.00% 6 4.32% 3 7.69%
Independent 26 43.33% 40 50.63% 66 47.48% 17 43.59%
Merchant Bank 3 5.00% 0 0.00% 3 2.16% 0 0.00%
Total 60 100.00% 79 100.00% 139 100.00
%
39 100.00%
In both these countries more than 40% o f the firms are captives and an equal percentage are 
independent firms. The importance of the captive and semi captive structure of venture capital 
firms, as in Europe (EVGA, 1998), points toward a possibility o f influence of a corporate- 
venture-capital-type governance structure in these countries. Government owned companies 
comprise 7% , which though more than 4% reported in Europe, is not exceedingly different. 
Since Governm ents in these countries have played an active part in promoting venture capital, 




6.6 Experience (Both Countries)
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std . D eviation
Years Firm has been in Venture Capital 39 1.00 29.00 6.6154 5 3095
Number of Professionals 39 2 25 6.36 5.24
Avg. -years of Experience-VC Industry 39 3.00 15.50 7.3667 2.7623
Avg. Experience Other Industries 39 .00 16.00 8.9231 3.7407
Valid N  (listwise) 39
Singapore
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation
Years Firm has been in Venture Capital 24 1.00 18.00 6.6667 4.3003
Business
Number of Professionals 24 2 25 6.75 6.19
Avg. years of Experience-VC Industry 24 3.00 15.50 7.4083 2.8087
Avg. Experience Other Industries 24 2.00 16.00 9.4167 3.8634
Valid N  (listwise) 24
Hong Kong
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation
Years Firm has been in Venture Capital 15 1.00 29.00 6.5333 6.7915
Business
Number of Professionals 15 2 14 5.73 3.31
Avg. years of Experience-VC Industry 15 4.50 12.00 7.3000 2.7826
Avg. Experience Other Industries 15 .00 13.00 8.1333 3.5176
Valid N  (listwise) 15
The A V Q  has provided information relating to the age of 163 venture capital firms in Singapore 
and H ong K ong. A  two tailed z test (z=1.35) was performed to compare the mean age of venture 
capital firms at a 95% confidence level without discovering a significant difference between the 
AVCf data and the data collected by this study. The mean age of the venture capital 
firm s/com panies in the sample was 6.5 years which compares well with the average age of all 
venture capital firm /com panies as reported by A V Q  of 4.8 years in Singapore and Hong Kong. 
The oldest firm  in the respondent sample claimed 29 years o f operation and only 4 
com panies/firm s were less than three years old.
The average num ber o f professionals working in respondent com panies/firm s was 6.36 with a 
high o f 25. A bout 80% o f the respondents had less than 7 professionals working for them. The 
average num ber o f professionals in responding com panies/firm s is slightly more than the average 
of 5 professionals fo r all Asia (A V Q , 1999) but compares well with the overall average of slightly
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more than 5 fo r H ong K ong and a little more than 6 for Singapore reported by the A V Q  (1999). 
The average experience in venture capital, o f the professionals working for respondent 
com panies/firm s is 7 years, which is one year greater than their experience in other industries. It 
is interesting to note that the average reported experience o f the professionals in the venture 
capital industry was more than the average age of the venture capital firm s/com panies. This is in 
contrast to Gorm an and Sahlman’s (1989) research study in the United States where the average 
experience o f the venture capitalists was almost half the age o f the firm/company. I f this data is 
considered indicative o f the industry in general, it points toward a possibility that m ost of the 
venture capitalists working in Singapore and H ong K ong have gained their experience elsewhere. 
In terms o f statistics regarding experience, there is not much difference between Hong Kong and 
Singapore.
6.7 Number o f Professionals
Number of Investments at Present Mean Std. Deviation
Less than 5 4.13 2.47
Between 6-10 4.75 2.75
Between 11-15 4.67 1.75
Between 16-20 6.63 6.91
More than 25 
Total
10.33 7.81
About 80% o f the firms among sample respondents had less than 5 professionals working for 
them. Although the average number o f professionals working with the venture capital 
firm s/com panies, as expected, increased with size58, this increase is not accompanied by a 
proportional increase in the number o f investments. This seems to suggest the existence of 
venture capital firms with larger number o f professionals managing sets of a smaller number of
58 A s m easured b y  funds being m anaged
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investments. This also indicates that the number o f professionals managing investments depends
on other factors e.g. size o f investment, rather than number of investments.
6.7.2 Investm ent Profile
6.8 Number of Investments Since Inception
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent
Less than 10 15 38.5 38.5 38.5
Between 11-20 8 20.5 20.5 59.0
Between 21-30 3 7.7 7.7 66.7
Between 31-40 4 10.3 10 3 76.9
Between 41-50 1 2.6 2.6 79.5
More Than 51 8 20.5 20.5 100.0
Total 39 100.0 100.0
6.9 Number of Investments at present
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent
Less than 5 15 38.5 38.5 38.5
Between 6-10 4 10.3 10.3 48.7
Between 11-15 6 15.4 15.4 64.1
Between 16-20 8 20.5 20.5 84.6
More than 25 6 15.4 15.4 100.0
Total 39 100.0 100.0
The average number o f investments per responding venture capital firm  compares well with the 
average of 10 for Singapore and H ong K ong reported by A V Q  (1999). Roughly, 65% of the 
responding venture capital firms have invested in less than 30 investments each since they began. 
In contrast, a  similar percentage of responding venture capital firms reported existing portfolio as 
less than 15 companies. This would suggest that almost half of the portfolio companies have 
been exited since the inception o f the funds. The fact that the average age of the venture capital 
firms, am ong sample respondents, is 6.6 years would indicate that the holding period for the 
investment is between 3-4 years. Thus, there is some evidence that the holding period of 




Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent
Less than 5 20 51.3 51.3 51.3
Between 6-10 3 7.7 7.7 59.0
Between 11-15 6 15.4 15.4 74.4
Between 16-20 2 5.1 5.1 79.5
Between 21-25 1 2.6 2.6 82.1
More than 25 7 17.9 17.9 100.0
Total 39 100.0 100.0
65% o f the responding companies reported less than 15 companies in their portfolio and about 
75% reported that they have board representation in less than 15 companies. Thus, though board 
representation is clearly not practiced by all venture capital firms in these countries, it is a popular 
choice.
6.11 Stage Preference_________________________






















% .0% .0% 3.0% .0% .0% .0% .0% 182% 78.8%
Startup Count 1 0 2 2 1 1 5 0 21
% 3.0% .0% 6.1% 6.1% 3.0% 3.0% 152% .0% 63.6%
Early Count 2 3 6 2 5 3 0 0 12
Expansion
% 6.1% 9.1% 18.2% 6.1% 15.2% 9.1% .0% .0% 36.4%
Late Count 10 12 6 4 1 0 0 0 0
Expansion
% 30.3% 36.4% 18.2% 12.1% 3.0% .0% .0% .0% .0%
Mezzanine Count 11 8 5 2 0 0 0 0 7
% 33.3% 242% 152% 6.1% .0% .0% .0% .0% 212%
Public Go Count 0 3 7 6 3 2 0 0 12
% .0% 9.1% 212% 18.2% 9.1% 6.1% .0% .0% 36.4%
Buyins- Count 8 6 5 3 1 0 0 0 10
Buyouts
% 24.2% 18.2% 15.2% 9.1% 3.0% .0% .0% .0% 30.3%
Turnaround Count 1 1 1 0 4 5 1 0 20
% 3.0% 3.0% 3.0% .0% 12.1% 15.2% 3.0% .0% 60.6%
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6.12 Ranking by Preference
Financing
Stage
Both Countries Singapore Hong Kong
Mean Std. Deviation Banking by 
Preference
Mean Ranking by 
Preference
Mean Ranking by 
Preference
Seed 7.2857 1.8898 8 7.2857 8 0
Startup 5.0833 2.0652 7 5.4000 7 3.5000 5
Early Expansion 3.6667 1.5916 4 3.6429 4 3.7143 6
Late Expansion 2.2121 1.1112 2 2.1429 2 2.3333 3
Mezzanine 1.9231 .9767 1 2.0526 1 1.5714 1
Public Go 3.7143 1.1892 5 3.8667 5 3.3333 4
Buyins-Buyouts 22609 1.2142 3 2.6000 3 1.6250 2
Turnaround 4.8462 1.7723 6 5.3750 6 4.0000 7
The collected data suggests that, irrespective o f age, venture capital firms in both these countries 
are fairly clear about the stage o f investment they would prefer. The Asian venture capitalists’
inclination to  prefer late expansion or investment in mature companies, as evidenced by the data 
on total investment by financing stage provided by the AVQ (1999), is also depicted by the
survey data as shown in Table 6.11. More than 78% o f venture capital firms in both these
countries are not interested in seed stage financing. M oreover, more than 60% do not invest in 
startups and turnarounds. A  large majority of venture capital firms are involved or would like to 
be involved in late stage and mezzanine financing. While the stage preference for less 
experienced59 and more experienced firms display similar overall patterns, it seems that firms 
with more experience in the venture capital industry tend to have some preference for 
buyouts/buy-in deals. Less experienced firms tend to prefer mezzanine financing.
A  com parison o f the data accumulated by preference for stage of portfolio company 
development and the total investment by stage o f portfolio company development provided by 
the A V Q  brings forth some interesting points regarding both these countries. As per the A V Q , 
the largest chunk (44.4%) o f venture capital finance in Singapore goes to the expansion stage. 
The A V Q  data does not make any distinction between late stage and early stage and hence it is 
not possible to corroborate this information. The second largest investment according to the
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A V Q  is startup financing. However, according to sample research data, startup financing is 
ranked far below  i.e. 7th on the preference scale o f the venture capital firms. The contradiction 
can be explained. The Singapore Government is biased toward high-tech start-ups and has 
geared its tax and legislative concessions accordingly. Thus, even though, seed and startup 
financing m ay not be to the liking o f the venture capital firm, the investment is governed by 
other considerations. Another noticeable difference has been the buyout/buyin investments. 
According to the A V Q  buyouts/buyins constitute only 1.6% o f the investment portfolio in 
Singapore. However, venture capital firms in Singapore rank buyouts/buyins as third on the 
preference scale. Thus, either there are not enough buyout/buy-in opportunities in the market or 
government regulations have considerably influenced the pattern o f venture capital investment in 
Singapore.
As fo r H ong K ong, the most noticeable difference between preference and investment has been 
in relation to mezzanine financing. While it is only 2.4% o f the investment, according to the 
A V Q , venture capital firms among respondents accord it 1st preference. In the Singaporean and 
overall Asian context, mezzanine financing is o f considerable importance in terms of investment. 59
6.13 Returns on Investment ________________________________________________
Existing Returns Projected Returns
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Less Than 20% 17 43.6 51.5 12 30.8 36.4
Between 21-40% 13 33.3 39.4 18 46.2 54.5
Between 41-60% 3 7.7 9.1 3 7.7 9.1
Total 33 84.6 100.0 33 84.6 100.0
Missing 6 15.4 6 15.4
Total 39 100.0 39 100.0
59 L ess than an overall average o f 6.6 years o f operation.
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For over half o f the venture capital firms studied, the existing rate o f return was below the 20% 
m ark Less thanl0%  said that they were earning more than a 41%  return on investment. Judging 
by the targeted return, the majority of the venture capital firms (54%) in these markets are 
anticipating better returns (Between 21% to 40%). 58% o f Singaporean venture capital firms 
contacted reported earning less than 20% returns whereas more than half o f venture capital firms 
in Hong K ong reported earnings between 21-40%. In both these countries, the expectation 
seems to outstrip the reality although this disparity is greater in Singapore. The claim of high 
return remains unproven.
6.8 Characteristics o f Portfolio Companies
The average age o f the portfolio companies considered in this study is 7.8 years, which is more 
than the average age o f the respondent venture capital firms. O n average, it has been just under
2.5 years since the portfolio companies have received venture capital.
6.14 Age of Portfolio Companies
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation
Years since venture capital received first 38 .00 7.00 2.4474 1.5369
Years in operation 38 1.00 34.00 7.8421 7.5821
Valid N (listwise) 37
The research data seems to suggest that companies in Singapore and Hong Kong would generally 
receive venture capital, on average, in their sixth year or later. Analysis based on countries, reveal 
that the com panies in H ong K ong have to wait longer (on average 2 years) than companies in 
Singapore fo r venture capital.
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6.15 Stage of Development
Stage o f D evelopm ent A t P resen t Stage o f D evelopm ent when Venture 
________________________________ _____________C apital F irst Received_______
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
Seed 2 5.1 7 17.9
Stait-up 2 5.1
Early Expansion 5 12.8 19 48.7
Late Expansion 16 41.0 4 10.3
Mezzanine 4 10.3 4 10.3
Public Company 1 2.6
Leveraged Buyouts 4 10.3
Turnarounds 1 2.6 1 26
Others 8 20.5
Total 39 100.0 39 100.0
About half o f the companies, about which venture capital firms have provided information, were 
at an early expansion stage when the venture capital was first received Seed stage companies 
constitute approxim ately 18% o f recipients and the rest are evenly divided between late 
expansion, mezzanine and buy-ins/ buyouts. At present 40% of the companies are at a late 
expansion stage. It is interesting to note that only one company has moved to the public 
companies stage while eight others have moved to an “ other” stage. The data corroborates the 
point made in chapter 3 that the initial public offering is not a frequently used path for exit by the 
venture capital firm s in these countries.
6.16 Total Assets of Portfolio Companies 6.17 Technology
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
Between LJS$1.2-2.4 2 5.1 Very High 5 12.8
Between US$2.4-3.6 3 7.7 High 8 20.5
Between LJS$3.6-4.8 1 2.6 Medium 3 7.7
Between US$4.8-5 2 5.1 Low Tech 14 35.9
More than US$ 5 Million 31 79.5 Veiy low Tech 9 23.1
Total 39 100.0 Total 39 100.0
The size o f the portfolio companies reported by the venture capital firms, as summarised in 
Table 6.16, has been a surprise. The average investment per company in Asia, in general, is 
around U SD  lm illion (A V Q , 1999). While designing the questionnaire on a 5-point Likert scale,
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the total assets classification for the investee companies with U SD  1.2 million gap in each scale 
with a maximum o f over U SD  5 million seemed like a good  However, from  the data collected 
approximately 80% of the investee companies have total assets o f more than U SD  5 million. In 
terms o f technology, 59 /o o f the companies arc low  tech or very low tech. High tech and very 
high companies constitute 33.3%.
6.18 Board Membership
Minimum Maximum Mean %Age
Independent Board Members 0 1 .027 .36%
Board members-Nominated by Financial Institutions 0 2 .30 3.93%
Board Members-Nominated by Others 1 1 .054 .71%
Board Members-Nominated by Venture capital firms 
other than respondents
0 3 1.14 15.00%
Board Members- Nominated by Private Investors 1.00 3.00 .76 10.00%
Board Members-Nominated by Respondents 1 4 1.59 21.07%
Board Members- Owner/Management 2.00 6.00 3.70 48.93%
Total Board Membership 2 12 7.57 100.00
On the average, each com pany in the sample had 7.57 board members, which is slightly more 
than the United States average board size reported by Rosenstien et aL (1989) o f 5.62. Sixty seven 
percent o f the portfolio companies have an average board size between 7-9 members. The 
majority o f the board members (48.9%) are owners/management. Second are venture capital 
firms with 36% . The current study differs from  the research study by Rosenstein et al. (1989), 
which reported an average 60% representation by owners/managers and 19% by venture capital 
firms in the United States. The fact that 80% of the respondents had representation on the board 
of portfolio companies, points toward widespread use of this practice in these countries.
The primary data was collected using the research methodology outlined in this chapter. The next 
chapter tests the validity o f research hypotheses set forth in Chapter 5 through a statistical 
analysis o f this primary data.
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7 Chapter 7: Res earch Findings
7.1 Introduction
The fundamental validity of the resource exchange model when applied to the venture capital 
value-added question is examined in this Chapter. The data compiled through questionnaires is 
analysed and compared with results from  previous research.
7.2 Allocation o f Tim e
Previously, two research studies (Gorman and Sahlman, 1989; Elango et al., 1995), based on 
United States data, have been used to assess the time that venture capitalists actually spend with 
their portfolio companies. In both studies the methodology used was similar to the one used in 
this study. In both studies the role o f the lead venture capital firm  was considered separately from 
other investors. The summary o f data collected by Gorm an and Sahlman (1989) relating to the 
role o f lead venture capital firms60 only, is presented below:-
7.1 Gorman and Sahlman (1989, p 245)
Mean Standard
Deviation
High Low No. of 
Respondents
Visit per Year 18.7 12.9 80.0 0.0 47
Visit Duration (Hours) 4.9 2.7 15.0 0.0 47
Phone Conversation (per Month) 7.5 5.0 25.0 0.0 47
Conversation Length (min) 21.9 15.4 90.0 0.0 47
Annual Hours on site 80.5 44.0 262.5 0.0 47
Annual Hours on Telephone 35.4 37.9 225.0 0.0 47
Total Annual Hours (Direct Contact) 115 N.A N.A N.A 47
Elango et a l (1995) only considered the total time spent by  the lead venture capital firms instead
of dividing it among different m odes o f contact. Their data is presented below.
60 A  lead venture capital firm  finds the investm ent opportunity, negotiates the term s o f the deal, and finds the other co-investors, 
■ which collectively form  the syndicate.
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7.2 Data: Elango et al. (1995, p 175-176)— --------:— ------ v---- ’ r  ~ ___________________
Assistance Provided 
by a VC (High)
Assistance Provided 
by a VC (Medium)
Assistance Provided 
by a VC(Lov)
Average Time Spent when a lead investor 36.65 12.75 6.76
(hrs/month)
Percentage of Lead Investments 59.08% 50.16% 57.38%
Average Time Spent when a lead (hrs/year) 439.80 153.0 81.0
Both studies were conducted in the United States where lead venture capital firms have played an 
active role in their portfolio companies. Since these studies were not limited to venture capital 
firms in any particular area within the United States or to any particular technology, the only 
significant difference between the two is the time period. While standard deviations of total time 
spent by venture capital firms with their portfolio companies, in both cases, were not available, it 
was evident that Gorman and Sahlman (1989) reported considerably less time (115 hours/year) 
spent with the portfolio company compared to the time (153 hours/year) reported byElango et 
al (1995).
Presented below' is the data collected, for this study, which details the involvement o f venture 
capital firms with their portfolio companies in Hong K ong and Singapore using three different 
modes o f involvement. The data includes information on frequency of involvement and the time 
spent with the portfolio companies. The total time using all three modes of involvement have 












Number of Formal meetings (Per Year) 4.73 5.07 4.86 3.77
Hours of Formal Meetings (Per Meeting) 2.64 3.00 2.78 .95
Times Informal Meetings (Hours Per Year) 6.09 8.00 6.83 6.94
Flours of Informal Meetings (Per Meeting) 2.59 3.21 2.83 1.66
Total Number of Meetings 10.8 13.36 11.81 7.82
Hours per meeting 2.74 3.05 2.86 .804
Total Meetings (Hours Per Year) 30.73 41.64 34.97 23.37
Number of Telephone Calls (Per Month) 6.96 6.27 6.68 5.85
Minutes of Telephone Calls (per Call) 15.43 19.67 17.11 9.27
Annual Hours on Telephone 23.30 21.73 22.68 23.42
Total Direct Contact Time (Hours per54.95 64.0 58.67 34.42
Year)
A  z test61 was performed to compare the means of samples collected by this study and Gorman 
and Sahlman (1989) and to find out if any significant difference existed between the two. Table
7.4 contains a statistical com parison o f Gorman and Sahlman’s (1989) data with the data gathered 
by this study.
7.4 Comparative Statistics
Standard Error of 
Differences in Means
Z value
Visit per Year & Number of Meeting per Year 230 3.00
Visit Duration (Hours/ meeting) & Average Hours per Meeting 
(Formal and Informal)
.42 4.90
Phone Conversation (per Month)/Number of Telephone Calls (Per 
Month)
133 0.67
Conversation Length (Converted into annual hours) & Annual Hours 
on Telephone
2.74 1.75
Annual Hours on site & Annual Hours in Meetings 7.54 6.04
Annual Flours on Telephone & Annual Hours on Telephone 6.80 1.87
In the case o f telephone contact (number o f calls and the duration), there was no significant
difference between the two sam ples62. However the differences on meetings (number and
duration) are significant, indicating, that venture capitalists in the United States hold more
61 The z  test here m easures the difference betw een means o f the two sam ples. A  two-sam ple z  test has been perform ed because 
standard deviation in the case o f both the sam ples is known and the sam ple size is large (Le. n>30).
62 The z  value has been com pared with test statistics ±1.96(95%  Confidence)
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frequent meetings and allocate more time to conducting these meetings than venture capitalists in 
Hong K ong and Singapore
In order to compare the Asian responses with the United States ones further, a comparison was 
also made with the data collected by Elango et aL (1995). That study only considered information 
about the total time that venture capitalists spent with their portfolio companies. In the absence 
of exact information about standard deviation in the case o f Elango et a l (1995), a t test63 
comparing 153 hours64 with the data collected for this study was performed. Significant 
differences between the two averages are clearly depicted (p<01).
7.5 Test Value = 153
T df Sig. (2-tailed) Mean
Difference
95% Confidence Interval of 
the Difference
Lower Upper
Total Direct Contact lime-16.445 
per Year
35 .000 -94.3333 -105.9789 -82.6878
The possibility that venture capitalists in the United States, Singapore and Hong Kong maintain 
the same level o f telephone contact cannot be ruled out. However, there is sufficient evidence to 
suggest that the total time allocated to involvement activities by venture capitalists in the United 
States is significantly more than that allocated by venture capitalists in Hong K ong and 
Singapore.
The proposition (1) that V enture cap ital firm  allocate less m e to m anagng p orfo lio  com panies in  H ong 
Kong an d Singapore than  in  the U ntied S ta te s is strongly supported Thus, venture capitalists in Hong 
Kong and Singapore visit their portfolio companies less often and spend less time with them
63 "Student" (real name: W. S. Gossett [1876-1937]) developed statistical methods (t test) to solve problems stemming from his 
employment in a brewery. The t-test assesses whether the means of two groups are statistically different from each other. This 
analysis is appropriate whenever the objective is to compare the means of two groups. A  T  test has been used here because 
standard deviation in the case of data by Elango at aL (1995) is not available.
64 Average time venture capitalists spend with their portfolio companies in direct contact in a year.
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than do venture capitalists in the United States. There is, however, nothing to suggest that the 
contact through telephone is any different.
It is relevant to note that the mean difference between time spent by venture capitalists in 
Singapore and H ong K ong is not significant. Unlike Elango et al. (1995) the research data is 
much more easily divided into two categories with the active venture capitalists spending around 
100 hours per year in direct contact with the portfolio company and the less active spending 
around 40 hours per year.
7.3 N um ber and Importance of Activities
Venture capital firms were asked to indicate the extent of their involvement with their portfolio 
companies. Table 7.6, which follows, summarises their responses. The question on involvement 
was designed to cover the contribution o f the venture capital firms, in different activities, 
compared to their portfolio companies. These activities were based on a list o f 15 activities 
(Table 6.1) that have been extracted from  previous research studies relating to venture capital 
(MacMillan et aL, 1988; Gorm an and Sahlman, 1989; Rosenstien et a l, 1989; Ehrlich et al., 1994; 
Elango et a l, 1995). Involvement was rated on a 5 point Likert scale vis-a-vis contribution o f the 
portfolio companies. A  score o f 3 indicated as much contribution by a venture capital firm in an 
activity as a portfolio company. A  score o f 1 meant that a venture capital firm has never been 
involved in that activity.
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7.6 Involvement Activities of Venture Capital Firms65
Both Countries Singapoine Hong Kong
Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std.
Deviation Deviation Deviation
Monitoring Performance 3.37 0.91 3.22 0.90 3.60 0.91
Obtaining Alternative Sources of Equity 3.29 1.27 3.04 1.40 3.67 0.98
Finance
Interfacing with Investor Groups 3.00 1.36 2.87 1.52 3.20 1.08
Ongoing Strategy Development 2.74 1.29 2.39 1.31 3.27 1.10
Obtaining Alternative Sources of Debt 2.71 1.14 2.52 1.24 3.00 0.93
Finance
Formulation of Initial Business Strategy 2.63 1.24 2.48 1.38 2.87 0.99
Management of Crisis 226 1.20 2.04 1.11 2.60 1.30
Development of Professional Support 1.79 1.14 1.43 0.95 2.33 1.23
Groups
Personnel Motivation 1.76 0.85 1.61 0.72 2.00 1.00
Interview and Selection 1.76 0.79 1.65 0.78 1.93 0.80
Personnel Search 1.63 0.82 1.39 0.72 2.00 0.85
Negotiation of Terms with Prospective 1.53 0.51 1.52 0.51 1.53 0.52
Candidates65 6
Personnel Replacement 1.37 0.49 1.39 0.50 1.33 0.49
Development of Production Techniques 1.37 0.54 1.30 0.47 1.47 0.64
Selection of Vendors and Equipment 129 0.46 1.22 0.42 1.40 0.51
Table 7.6 indicates that venture capital firms in both countries are involved in all the identified 
activities, to a lesser or greater extent. The following activities scored least based on the criteria 
that 50% o f the venture capital firms claim that they had never been involved in these or in cases 
where venture capital firms were involved, their involvement in these activities had never been 
more than that o f the portfolio company;
1) Selection o f vendors and equipment;
2) Developm ent o f production techniques;
65 The list o f these activities has been derived from  previous research studies regarding involvement activities o f venture capital 
firm s as discussed  in Chapter 5.




4) N egotiation of terms with prospective candidates for employment;
5) Personnel search;
6) Interview and selection;
7) Personnel motivation; and
8) Developm ent of professional support groups.
Except fo r 3 activities, out o f a total o f 15, the venture capital firm ’s involvement averaged more 
than 1.50, which is halfway between no involvement and less involvement than the portfolio 
company. This means that venture capital firms are involved in 12 out o f 15 activities in which 
venture capital firms from  United States are known to be involved. N o venture capitalists, among 
respondents, have added to the list o f 15 involvement activities. Thus, proposition (2) that venture 
cap ital firm s in  Stngtpore an d  H ong Kong are inedw d in  sim ilar aam ties w th their portfolio com panies as 
venture cap ital firm  in  the U nited S tates, is supported
To identify the areas of activities where venture capital firms in these countries believe they have 
made the greatest contribution, the five point Likert scale was averaged for each activity and 
ranked accordingly67. The statistical comparison o f this research with the research studies 
conducted in the United States proved to be a difficult task because of the different scales 
(MacMillan et al., 1988; Ehrlich et a l, 1994) and methodologies (Gorman and Sahlman, 1989; 
Rosenstein et a l, 1989) used by these researchers to rank the activities in which venture capital
67 N one o f the respondent reported a  score o f 5 in any activity, which represented m ore contribution than the portfolio company.
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firms are involved, in order of importance. Therefore, ranking o f activities by two studies were 
com piled Ehrlich et al. (1994) was selected for comparison purposes since it was the most recent 
comparable study. Rosenstien et al. (1989) was selected from  earlier studies because the list of 
activities, contained in that study, compared well with the list used in Rosenstien et aL’s study. 
The results and a comparison o f the findings are shown in Table 7.7.











Monitoring Performance 2 1 3 1
Obtaining Alternative Sources of Equity 5 2 2 2
Finance
Interfacing with Investor Groups 1 3 1 3
Ongoing Strategy Development 3 4 4 4
Obtaining Alternative Sources of Debt 4 5
Finance
Formulation of Initial Business Strategy 7 6 4 5
Development of Professional Support 8 6
Groups
Interview and Selection 6 7
Negotiation of Terms with Prospective 8 8
Candidates
Personnel Replacement 6 9 7 7
Development of Production Techniques 6 8
Selection of Vendors and Equipment 5 9
It should be noted that some o f the activities that do not appear in the selected research studies 
were not com pared with activities in this study. Additionally, some of the activities that do not 
appear in this research study, but appeared in the selected studies, have been placed against the 
nearest relating activity. In order to find out whether the ranking assigned in this study is any 
different from  the ranking assigned by the two selected authors, a Wilcoxon signed-rank test68 
was perform ed.
68 The W ilcoxon signed rank test can be considered a  non-parametric equivalent o f the m atched paired t-test It  is used to  test the 
proposition  that tw o paired sam ples based on ranks have com e from  die sam e population. Because it is non-parametric, it makes 
no assum ptions about the distribution o f the data. It  is preferred over sim ple m atched pair sign test, in cases where the extent o f 
difference (in ranking), as in  this case, needs to  be incorporated.
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7.8 T est Statistics
Ehrlich et aL(1994) - This study Rosenstein et aL(1989)-This study
Z -.755a -.647a
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .450 .518
a Based on negative ranks.
There is little indication in the test that the ranking assigned to activities based on the previous 
research studies is any different from  the ranking assigned in this study. The proposition (3) th at 
the im portance c f value added activities attribu ted  to venture cap ital farm  display sim ilar patterns in  Singapore, 
H ong K ong an d  the U nited States is also supported
7.3.1 Value addition
Since this study covers only the venture capital firms’ perspective, it does not include a direct 
question regarding the assessment o f value addition because such a question is likely to be self­
testing, tautological and leading. This aspect, therefore, needed to be assessed from a different 
angle. If venture capital firms do add value, it stands to reason that the time spent should be 
accompanied by  what venture capital firms perceive to be their participation in the value added 
activities. Although the time spent by the venture capital firms with their portfolio companies 
provides a measure of involvement, it does not necessarily explain whether this time is used for 
value adding activities or reducing information asymmetry.
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7.9 Correlation69 Direct Contact Time and Average of Activities
Total Direct Contact Time perTotal Direct Contact Time per 
Year- Singapore Year- Hong Kong
Average of Activity Pearson .538 
Correlation
217
Sig. (2-tailed) .010 .455
N 22 15
As expected, significant correlation was found between the involvement activity level and the 
time venture capitalists spend with their portfolio companies in Singapore, as indicated in Table 
7.9. However, the correlation in Hong Kong although positive, was not significant and hence the 
result inconclusive. Overall, the result implies that venture capitalists use the time that they 
allocate to the companies for actual participation and value addition. The proposition (4) th at 
venture cap ital firm  in  Singapore an d H ong Kong see them ehes as adding w ine to the business th rou fi their 
im dw ren t is thus partly supported.
7.3.2 Value added and intention of venture capital firm to interact
The actual participation o f the venture capital firms was taken to be their intention to participate
since the difference between venture capital firm s’ actual participation and their expected 
participation has not been found to be significant (MacMillan et al., 1988). As explained in 
chapter 4, out o f many possible factors that affect involvement levels, firm  policy, venture capital 
culture and the extent of commitment were measured herein. The average score of the 
importance, on  a scale o f 1-5 that venture capitalists assigned to their activities has been 
calculated and used for comparison purposes. 69
69 A  correlation test has been perform ed because there has been no assum ption o f any causal relationship between the time spent 
by venture capitalists with their portfolio com panies and the num ber o f activities that venture capitalists are involved in their 
portfolio com panies. Sim ple (Spearm an’s) correlation has been used, in this thesis, in cases o f correlation between parametric 
data o r correlation between param etric and non-parametric data.
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H ie tables (7.10-7.12) show correlations and a regression model o f the effect o f three factors, 
which were expected to affect the willingness to be involved, on the level of involvement.
7.10 Value added and intention of venture capital firm to interact
Correlations
Total DirectAverage 





in the IndustryShare in 
Equity
Total Direct GontactPearson 1.000 .467 .303 .105 .021
Time per Year Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed). .004 .073 .543 .902
N  36 36 36 36 36
Average of Activity Pearson .467 1.000 .636 .010 .390
Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed) .004 .000 .951 .016
N  36 38 38 38 38
Your Company Policy Pearson .303 .636 1.000 .171 .305
Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed) .073 .000 .304 .062
N 36 38 38 38 38
General Trend in thePearson .105 .010 .171 1.000 -.155
Industry Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed) .543 .951 .304 . .353
N  36 38 38 38 38
Percentage Share inPearson .021 .390 .305 -.155 1.000
Equity Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed) .902 .016 .062 .353 .
N  36 38 38 38 39
7.11 Model Summary
R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate
.671 .450 .401 .4894







B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) .786 .363 2.164 .038
Your Gompany.328 
Policy
.077 .584 4.254 .000*
General Trend in-3.81 IE-02 
the Industry
.086 -.058 -.441 .662
Percentage Share7.995E-02 
in Equity
.054 .202 1.478 .149
Dependent Variable: Average of Activity
*p<01
The findings are mixed. It seems that the venture capital firm’s understanding o f the trends in
their industry (their culture) does not affect their decision to get involved in value added
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activities. However, the venture capital firm’s policy, regarding involvement, is not only related 
both to the extent o f participation in activities and the time venture capitalists spend with their 
portfolio com panies, but significantly affects the level o f activity (p <01), as shown in the last 
column o f table 7.12). The extent o f commitment, as measured by the percentage of equity in the 
portfolio company, was also found to be related to the activity level but not associated with time 
spent. The proposition (5) that the m læ added penoeption c f venture cap ital firm  m il also  depend on the 
factors, which effect the w illingness c f both the parties to interact is supported in the case of firm policy, 
partly supported in case o f the equity share and not supported in the case of venture capital 
culture.
7.4 Perception of Resource N eed o f the Portfolio Company
The affect o f four factors i.e. riskiness of the venture, performance of the portfolio companies, 
reputation o f the management team  of the portfolio companies and competency of the 
management team  o f the portfolio companies, on the resource needs/demands of portfolio 
companies was measured. The results are presented in Table 7.15. As explained in Chapter 5, risk 
has been m easured in terms o f level o f technology (low to high) and the stage of development of 
the portfolio company. Inform ation from  the venture capital firms was sought on the reputation, 
competency and performance of the portfolio company. The resource demand as a function of 
the technological nature o f the project was not significant, although the relationship between the 
stage o f development o f the portfolio company and the resource perception of the portfolio 
company was significant at the 10% level (proposition 6a). The performance of the portfolio 
company seem s to play a significant role in what venture capital firms perceive as the resource 
needs/dem ands o f the portfolio com pany so proposition (6b) is supported. The proposition (6c) 
that the assessm ent o f the resource strength of portfolio companies depends on the perceived
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reputation o f the portfolio com pany was also supported. The competency o f the management of 
the portfolio com pany as an indicator o f resource need was not supported (proposition 6d).
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7.13 Portfolio company assessment - Correlations
Portfolio CompanyGeneral Competency General Reputation ofStage of Development AtTechnology Performance of the 
Assessment___________________________ the PC/Mgt________ Present_______________________________PC_______________
Portfolio Company Assessment Pearson Correlation 1.000 .348 .563 .211 -.012 .506
Sig. (2-tailed) .035 .000 .203 .943 .001
N 38 37 37 38 38 37
General Competency Pearson Correlation .348 1.000 .784 .128 .072 .507
Sig. (2-tailed) .035 .000 .444 .669 .001
N 37 38 38 38 38 38
General Reputation of the PC/Mgt Pearson Correlation .563 .784 1.000 .000 -.001 .568
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 1.000 .997 .000
N 37 38 38 38 38 38
Stage of Development At Present Pearson Correlation .211 .128 .000 1.000 .017 -.090
Sig. (2-tailed) .203 .444 1.000 .919 .590
N 38 38 38 39 39 38
Technology Pearson Correlation -.012 .072 -.001 .017 1.000 .146
Sig. (2-tailed) .943 .669 .997 .919 .381
N 38 38 38 39 39 38
Performance of the PC Pearson Correlation .506 .507 .568 -.090 .146 1.000
Sig. (2-tailed) .001 .001 .000 .590 .381
N 37 38 38 38 38 38
Model Summary
Model R RSquare Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate
1 .685 .470 .384 4.6812
Coefficients
Unstandardized Coefficients Standardised Coefficients t Sig.
B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) 23.607 4.102 5.755 .000
Stage of Development At Present .682 .338 .274 2.021 .052
Technology -.137 .608 -.030 -.226 .823
Performance of the PC 2.045 .959 .349 2.133 .041
General Reputation of the PC/Mgt 4.366 1.482 .664 2.946 .006
General Competency -2.535 1.442 -.383 -1.758 .089
a Dependent Variable: Portfolio Company Assessment
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7.4.1 Perception o f Resource Availability with Venture capital firms
The average am ount of capital under management and number o f professionals working for the
venture capital firm  were taken as a measure o f the size o f the venture capital firm  To determine 
the impact o f experience, two factors directly affecting the accumulated experience of the venture 
capital firm  were used, which included the average experience o f professionals working for the 
firm in the area o f venture capital and the average experience o f professionals working for the 
firm in other industries. Assessing reputation is a complex process. The factors that go into the 
evaluation o f reputation are not only numerous but frequently a subject o f debate Jaco b , 1995). 
In order to evaluate reputation three factors were relied upon. These could be obtained 
objectively from  the venture capital firm  and are known to affect the reputation o f a business. 
These factors include financial performance (Vergin and Qoronfleh, 1998), age o f venture capital 
firm (Gom pers and Lem er, 1999) and the number o f credibility transactions70 (Herbig et al., 
1994). The returns generated by the venture capital firm were taken as an indicator o f financial 
performance. T o  represent credibility transactions, the number of investments financed by the 
venture capital firm s since inception were considered
The proposition 7(a) regarding reputation affecting resource perception received mixed support. 
There was a significant correlation between the number o f investments and the existing returns 
being generated by venture capital firms and both these factors seem  to affect resource 
perception71. The results indicate that venture capital firms consider the returns generated by 
their investments a better indicator o f their resource pool, rather than the number o f investments
70 The number o f sim ilar transactions that a person has completed in the past
71 In  cases where there is a  high degree o f correlation between independent variables, it is not advisable to test both variables 
against the dependent variable at the sam e tim e since it can cause the problem  o f muki-collinearhy. However, in this case, the 
correlation betw een the tw o is not large enough fo r them  to  pose a problem .
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that they have been able to handle. A  link between the age o f a venture capital firm  and resource 
perception is not indicated.
The proposition 7(b) that venture capital firm s’ assessm ent o f their resource strength depends on 
their size was not supported. The size of the venture capital firm, as measured by capital under 
management and the number o f professionals working for the firm, does not significantly alter 
the assessm ent o f their firm ’s resources. The proposition 7(c) relating higher resource strength 
with more experience was also not supported. Apparently, some venture capital firms do not 
believe that more years in the venture capital business increases the pool o f those resources that 
they can pass on to their portfolio companies. Similarly, the experience o f professionals, in the 
venture capital industry, working for the venture capital firms also does not alter the perception 
of venture capital firms regarding their resource strength. However, venture capital firms with 




7.14 Venture capital firm’s Assessment- Pearson Correlation___________________________________________________________________
Venture capital firmsNumber ofYears Firm has been inAvg years ofAvg. Experience OtherAverage Amount ofNumber
Assessment Professionals Venture CapitalExperience- VC Industries Capital Underinvestments
Business Industry Management Inception
Number of Professionals .345’*' 
Years Firm has been in Venture Capital-.297 .104
Business
Avg years of Experience-VC Industry -.021 -.018 .489**
Avg. Experience Other Industries .211 -.125 -.255 -.418**
Average Amount of Capital Under.357* .561** -.158 -.130 .034
Management
Number of Investments Since Inception .386* .557** .131 .126 -.046 .626**
Existing Returns .589** .469** -.201 -.080 -.048 .434* .665**
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
* *  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
Model Summary
R RSquare Adjusted R Square Std Error of the Estimate




Unstandandized Coefficients Standardised Coefficients t Sig.
B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) 25.818 2.804 9.208 .000
Years Firm has been in Venture Capital Business -.110 .106 -.178 -1.034 .311
Avg. years of Experience-VC Industry .283 .199 .234 1.424 .167
Avg. Experience Other Industries .407 .137 .428 2.969 .007
Average Amount of Capital Under Management .301 .375 .174 .803 .429
Existing Returns 2.511 1.116 .452 2.250 .033
Number of Investments Since Inception -6.409E-02 .455 -.037 -.141 .889
Number of Professionals .113 .107 .182 1.055 .302
a Dependent Variable: Venture capital firms Assessment
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7.4.2 Venture capital film/Portfolio Company Resource perception and value added
The possibility o f a relationship, between the resource assessment of the portfolio
com pany/venture capital firm, time spent with the portfolio company by the venture capital firm 
and the level o f involvement in activities by the venture capital firm, has been measured. In order 
to obtain another indicator o f value added, the total time that venture capital firms spent with 
their portfolio companies and the sum  of the activities in which venture capital firms were 
involved, was divided into 5 categories (dummy variables). The resultant dummy variables were 
multiplied to  obtain a figure, which represented high involvement as a combination of time and 
activities. In  order to discover a relationship Spearman’s measure of correlation was used.













Total Direct ContactCoirelation Coefficient -.124 -.222
Time per Year
Sig. (2-tailed) .480 .200
N 35 35
Average of Activity Correlation Coefficient -.384* -.337* .460**
Sig. (2-tailed) .019 .041 .005
N 37 37 36
Product (ActivitiesGorrelation Coefficient -207 -.231 .859** .810**
and Time)
Sig. (2-tailed) .233 .183 .000 .000
N 35 35 36 36
* Gomelation is significant at the .05 level (2-tailed). 
** Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed).
N o significant relationship was found between the venture capital firm’s assessment o f their own 
resources and the time they spent with their portfolio companies. The relationship o f resource 
assessment o f venture capital firms with the number of activities in which they participate 
produced a negative correlation. A  significant negative relationship was found between venture 72




capitalist’s assessm ent o f portfolio companies’ resources and the number of activities that venture 
capital firms are involved in their portfolio companies.
Based on an overall measure of involvement, both the propositions (8 &  9 respectively that 
venture capital firms who rate the resources c f the portfolio company lo iter w ill rate tak e  added corrparadtdy 
U § xr and that venture cap ital firm s who rate th eir am  resources h i§ x r w ill rate ta k e  added as h i$ er are not 
supported Apparently, for venture capital firms, their resource strength does not encourage 
involvement in their portfolio companies.
7.4.3 Value added and activities.
Venture capital firms generally assess their resource strength in the following areas as highest:
1) Project/Idea Evaluation;
2) M onitoring Performance;
3) N um ber o f contacts-Financial Institutions;
4) Crises Management;
5) Strategy Planning; and
6) Financial Expertise;
Venture capital firms assess and rank the resources o f portfolio companies highest in:





4) Personnel Management; and
5) N um ber o f Gontacts-PC Industry;
Apparently, when a venture capital firm  perceives itself as being strong in particular resource 
areas it will perceive the portfolio company as weak in those areas.
The average scores o f individual strengths fo r both venture capital firms and their portfolio 
companies in an activity were matched and the differences calculated to indicate a resource gap. 
A  high positive figure represented a higher resource gap with venture capital firms in superior 
position whereas a high negative figure represented a resource gap with portfolio companies in a 
superior position in terms o f that resource. The resultant figures were then ranked according to 
the perceived gap. The resource gap ranking was matched with the actual participation results of 
this study based on classifications discussed in the chapter on research methodology (Table 6.1).
7.16 Resource Gap_____________________________________________________ '________________________
Venture capital firm- Portfolio Resource Gap Resource Ranking Based on
Resource Company -
_ ______________________Availability_______ Resource Need___________________________________
Mean Score Mean Score Resource Actual
___________________________________________Gap______ Participation
Number of Contacts- Other ~ 0, 0A~. 
Industries 2'868421
4 -1.131579 10 9
Operational Planning 3.105263 3.921053 -0.81579 9 7
Personnel Management 3 3.789474 -0.789474 8 8
Number of Contacts PC on_,/f>. 
Industry Z973684
3.710526 -0.736842 7 6
Project/Idea Evaluation 3.184211 3.526316 -0342105 6 5
Number of contacts Financial - C70Q .7 
Institution 3.378947
3.526316 0.052631 5 2
Monitoring Performance 3.605263 3.5 0.105263 4 1
Crises Management 3.710526 3.552632 0.157894 3 6
Strategy Planning 3.736842 3.447368 0.289474 2 4
Financial Expertise 3.815789 3.421053 0.394736 1 3
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Since it was postulated that resource gap and actual participation go together, a positive 
correlation between the two should exist. In order to determine the correlation between the two 
Spearman’s rank correlation was conducted between the final rankings.
7.17 Correlation (Spearman's rfao)
Resource Gap
Actual Participation Correlation Coefficient .748*
Sig. (2-tailed) .013
N 10
* Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2-tailed).
The results show  significant correlations between the two rankings. Thus, the proposition that 
higher participation is rated in activities where perception of resource need and resource 
availability (resource gap) is greater is generally supported.
Although the overall result seems to support the gap/parricipation proposition (10), there are 
clearly two sides to the issue. Instances where a gap is perceived with venture capital firms in 
superior position (positive) and instances where the gap exists with portfolio companies in 
superior position (negative). The basic premise does not follow from  all individual resources. For 
example, though monitoring is rated as the primary participation activity it stands at number 4 in 
the resource gap scale. The splitting of rankings according to positive and negative resource gaps 
sheds som e light on the final analysis. While, for lack of significant results, the evidence remains 
inconclusive as regard the justification for areas o f higher involvement (positive resource gap), 
the verdict regarding areas o f least involvement seemed to be supported (p <05). This means that 
venture capital firm ’s involvement pattern does take into account resources where portfolio 
companies are perceived to be w eak
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N ot all propositions set forth in Chapter 5 were supported by the primary data. The next chapter 
is used to discuss the results in relation to the propositions and to explore alternative explanations 
in cases where these propositions were not supported. Other aspects o f the venture capital 
firm /portfolio com pany relationship that can be extracted from  further analysis o f the primary 
data are also explored.
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8 Chapter 8: Discussion
8.1 Introduction .
The analysis in this chapter is intended to shed more light on the research findings. The results 
produced by the last chapter is studied in greater detail and with the help of available data, further 
analysis is perform ed to look at all possible aspects o f the propositions put forward in Chapter 4. 
The results have also been compared with past research studies which have produced similar 
data. In the light o f this and past research, plausible reasons for results that were contrary to 
expectations have been offered.
8.2 Discussion
8.2.1 The Extent o f Involvement-Time Allocation
The data produced by testing of proposition 1 produced interesting results. The survey indicated 
that venture capitalists spent on average about 58 hours in a year in direct contact with a 
portfolio company. Venture capitalists in Hong K ong tend to spend slightly more time (64 
hours) than venture capitalists in Singapore (55 Hours). M ost of this time (39%) is spent on 
interaction through the telephone. Pandey and Jang (1996) found a similar trend in the Taiwanese 
market. The second m ost important means of interaction between venture capital firms and 
portfolio companies was the informal meeting, which accounted for about 35% o f direct contact 
time. H ie rest o f the direct contact was through formal meetings. On average, the time venture 
capitalists spent in direct contact with their portfolio companies worked out to be just over an 
hour per w eek This contact was further divided into a number o f modes of involvement. The 
results supported Gorm an and Sahlman’s (1989) findings, conducted in the United States, that 
venture capital firms tend to spend their time with companies in small increments. Typical 
venture capital firms in Singapore and Hong Kong engaged in a formal meeting with the 
portfolio com pany just over once a quarter and spent around three hours per formal meeting.
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The frequency o f informal meetings was greater but the duration of the informal meetings was 
similar to  that o f form al meetings. As expected, the time spent in informal meetings varied more 
than that in form al meetings. All in all, venture capitalists, in general, met face to face with their 
portfolio com panies’ management just under once a month. Venture capitalists in these countries 
talked to their portfolio company's management on average about 6.8 times in a month with each 
call lasting for about 17 minutes.










Total Time of Formal Meetings12.8636 
(hours)
15.6667 14.0000 23.86% 12.2020
Total Time of Informal Meetingsl7.8636 
(Hours)
25.0000 20.6389 35.17% 18.4331
Total Telephone Time per Year 23.3043 21.7333 22.6842 38.67% 23.4211
Total Direct Contact Time per54.9545 
Year
64.5000 58.6667 34.4184
Total Number of Reports 3.1053 2.5000 2.8485 2.1812
The overall results show  that venture capitalists spent less time with their portfolio companies in 
Singapore than in H ong Kong. H ong K ong venture capitalists spent about ten hours more per 
year in conducting meetings than their counterparts in Singapore. While in both countries similar 
time is spent on the telephone; venture capitalists in H ong K ong are likely to put significantly 
more efforts into informal meetings, as indicated by the frequency and time allocated. The later 
result is unexpected because Singapore is smaller in size (637 sq  km) compared to Hong Kong 
(1092 sq  km) making travelling easier and thus personal meetings more convenient. Moreover, a 
large am ount o f venture capital in H ong K ong is invested in Mainland China (A V Q , 1999) 
making personal contact more difficult. One possible reason for this unexpected finding, as 
mentioned in Chapter 2, m ay well be that the venture capital investment per project in Hong
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Kong (approx. U SD  7 million) is much larger than that in Singapore (approx. U SD  2 million) 
making a personal visit a feasible73 option.
There is a clear indication that informal contact like telephone calls and informal meetings 
occupied a prominent place (74%) in the venture capital firm /portfolio company’s direct 
interaction. This may be because small businesses, more likely to be a portfolio company, usually 
conduct business more informally than large businesses (Chow et al., 1997), and this influences 
the mode o f their interaction with the venture capital firm. The informality in the relationship is 
probably greater than in western venture capital firm /portfolio company dyads because these 
countries boast a Chinese business philosophy with an emphasis on relationship rather than 
systems (Whitley, 1992; Jam es, 1995).
The fact that venture capitalists spent only just over an hour per week in direct contact does not 
support the view  that venture capital firms, in anyway, are involved in the day-to-day affairs o f 
the portfolio companies in these countries. As the A V Q  (1999) data demonstrated, venture 
capitalists in H ong Kong and Singapore manage about 2 projects each. Thus, direct contact with 
their portfolio companies account for, at the most, about 5% o f their working time74.
8.2 Correlations: Modes of Involvement
Total Time of FormalTotal Time of Informal 
Meetings (Hours) Meetings (Hours)




Total Telephone lime per Year Pearson Correlation .061 .063
Sig. (2-tailed) .719 .717
N 37 36
73 M ore regular m onitoring pntails more expenses. H ie costs o f monitoring a project m ust justify the amount o f investment to be 
financially viable.
74 Based on 300 woriring days in a  year and 8 hours per day.
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Table 8.2 shows the results o f a simple correlation between modes o f direct contact. N o 
significant correlation existed between the total time spent in informal meetings and the total 
telephone contact time per year. This means that venture capital firms are not likely to use these 
modes of interaction as a substitute for each other.
Table 8.3 shows data on direct contact classified according to the type of ownership o f the
venture capital firm.
8.3 Type of Venture capital firm and Modes of Involvement
Corporate
Subsidiary
Subsidiary of a Financiallndependent 
Institution Company/ Partnership
N Mean N Mean N Mean
Times Formal Meetings 6 3.83 10 5 16 4.56
Hours of Formal Meetings 6 3.33 10 2.80 16 2.62
Times Informal Meetings 6 8.67 10 5.10 15 7.53
Hours of Informal Meetings 6 3.00 10 2.60 15 3.07
Number of Telephone 6 6.67 10 7.90 17 535
Minutes of Telephone Calls 6 12.50 10 21.50 17 17.65
Total Time of Formal Meetings (hours) 6 12.1667 10 15.6000 16 12.0625
Total Time of Informal Meetings (Hours) 6 23.6667 10 13.1000 15 25.6667
Total Telephone Time per Year 6 16.0000 10 38.4000 17 15.1765
Total Direct Contact Time per Year 6 51.8333 10 67.1000 15 55.0000
Total Number of Reports 6 2.3333 8 3.5000 15 3.0667
As Table 8.3 shows, corporate subsidiaries are involved in a comparatively smaller number of 
formal meetings compared to the number o f their informal meetings with the portfolio
companies. M oreover, the number o f formal reports is also higher in the case of corporate
subsidianes than in subsidiaries o f financial institutions or independent venture capital 
firm s/com panies. This result is rather unexpected since corporate subsidiaries usually borrow 
formalised structures from  the parent company and tend to rely more on formal procedures, like 
a predetermined decision making process (Chesbrough, 2000). Table 8.3 highlighted the fact that 
subsidiaries o f financial institutions spent comparatively more time in involvement activities 
compared to corporate subsidiaries or independent venture capital firms. M ost of this time is 
spent on the telephone rather than in face-to-face meetings. Independent venture capital firms
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and corporate subsidiaries spent more time on informal meetings than other modes of 
interaction.
Reports are infrequent and the number of reports required to be filed by the portfolio companies 
does not exceed 4 at one time. These research findings tend to side with Gompers (1995), who 
has argued that the role o f reports is relatively insignificant in portfolio company monitoring, 
rather than with Robbie et al. (1992) and Sweeting (1991).
Since entrepreneurs in Asia are unaccustomed to third party involvement, the lack of time 
allocated by venture capitalists to portfolio companies may be due to entrepreneurs resisting the 
venture capital firm ’s involvement. This argument was also a basis for the proposition that 
venture capital firms in Singapore and Hong Kong allocate less time to their portfolio companies 
than venture capitalists in the United States. The results of the survey provide an alternative 
explanation fo r the low level o f a venture capital firm’s involvement in its portfolio company. 
About 46%  o f venture capital firms cited time constraints as the major reason for less 
involvement. To further investigate why venture capitalists allocate less time to their portfolio 
companies in Singapore and Hong Kong, several possibilities were explored. The possibility that 
the venture capital firm’s time allocation has decreased over time, as a worldwide trend, is not 
supported when research surveys conducted in the United States by Gorman and Sahlman (1989) 
are com pared to Elango et al. (1995). The later study reports more time allocated to portfolio 
companies rather than less. The explanation that venture capital firms in Hong Kong and 
Singapore are managing more portfolio companies per professional or managing more funds per 
professional, com pared to the United States, was also not supported by secondary data. The 
number o f investments managed per professional in Hong Kong was 1.6 whereas it was 2.5 in 
Singapore. The investment per professional is U SD  llm illion in Hong K ong and U SD  4.6
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million in Singapore75. In the United States, the number of investments per professional is 
around 2 and the amount o f investment per professional is close to U SD  20 million (Elango et 
al., 1995). Another plausible explanation steins from the general belief that venture capital deals 
are fairly hard to find in A sk  because company transparency is a general problem (Lee-Young, 
2000). Put together, this information points toward the likelihood that venture capital firms in 
Hong K ong and Singapore may spend more time than their counterparts in the United States, in 
finding the right deal. There is also a possibility that venture capitalists may have to spend more 
time screening proposals although these propositions have not been tested herein
Table 8.4 below shows correlations between experience and the use o f different modes of 
financing.







Time ofTotal Telephone Time 
Meetingsper Year
Years Firm has been inPearson Correlation .145 .060 .346*
Venture Capital Business
Sig. (2-tailed) .391 .730 .033
Avg. years of Experience-VCPearson Correlation .329* -.089 .338*
Industry
Sig. (2-tailed) .047 .606 .038
Avg. Experience OtherPearson Correlation -.185 -.062 -.476**
Industries
Sig. (2-tailed) .272 .717 .003
Total Time of FormalPearson Correlation .128 .061
Meetings (hours)
Sig. (2-tailed) .458 .719
Total 'lime of InformalPearson Correlation .128 .063
Meetings (Hours)
Sig. (2-tailed) .458 .717
Total Telephone Time perPearson Correlation .061 .063
Year
Sig. (2-tailed) .719 .717
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).  ̂ .
It is quite clear that venture capital firms, with more experience in venture capital make much
more use o f telephone contact with portfolio company management than venture capital firms
75 A V Q , 1999 (F or detail calculations see appendix I and II).
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with comparatively less experience o f venture capital. Moreover, they are also much more likely 
to spend more time in formal meetings. The striking point in the above analysis is a strong 
negative correlation between a venture capital firm ’s experience in the portfolio company’s 
industry and the use of telephonic contact. Why this happens is a difficult question to answer. It 
may be that since venture capital firms with industry experience know practical industry 
environments, they are in a much better position to assess the developments in a portfolio 
company in person. They may, thus, prefer personal visits to telephonic conversations.
Table 8.5 shows different modes o f involvement against the level of technology being pursued by 
the portfolio company.
8.5 Technology and modes of Involvement____________________________________________________
Technology Total lime ofTotal lime ofTotal TelephoneTotal DirectTotal Number of
Formal Meetingsinformal MeetingsTime per Year Contact TimeReports Provided
(Hours) (Hours) per Year to Venture Capital 
Finns
Very low Tech N 7 7 7 7 6
Mean 24.7143 20.5714 202857 65.5714 2.0000
Low Tech N 13 12 14 12 13
Mean 11.2308 18.9167 212143 54.9167 3.3077
Medium N 4 4 4 4 4
Mean 8.7500 212500 13.7500 43.7500 3.5000
Higk N 9 9 9 9 6
Mean 13.5556 22.0000 26.0000 61.5556 2.8333
Very High N 4 4 4 4 4
Mean 10.5000 222500 33.5000 662500 2.0000
There is little evidence that venture capital firms in Singapore and Hong Kong allocate more time 
to higher technology businesses. However, a noticeable pattern, shown in Table 8.5, is of venture 
capital firms allocating less time to medium technology companies and more time to companies 
at both ends o f technology spectrum. Linked to that is comparatively more reliance on formal 
reporting in the case of medium technology companies. There is also little indication of any
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significant relationship between stage o f portfolio company development and the allocation of 
time to it by  the venture capital firm
8.2.2 The Extent of Involvement- Activities
The data gathered for the purpose o f testing proposition 2 and 3 provides detailed information 
about the extent and focus of involvement activities of venture capital firms in Singapore and 
H ong K ong. O n a five point Likert intensity scale, where a score of 1 represented no 
involvement and a score of 5 represented 100% of the activity being undertaken by the venture 
capital firm , the average level o f intensity for all activities was 1.8, indicating low levels of 
involvement. M ore than 90% of venture capital firms have reported average activity levels of less 
than 3, a score representing as much contribution as the portfolio company.
The cluster analysis reported in Table 8.6 reveals three clusters o f venture firms grouped by time 
and activities. The clusters were not as clear as the division determined by Macmillan et al. (1989), 
on either tim e or activities alone but became more obvious when the variables were com bined
8.6 O uster Analysis: Time allocation and activities 
Initial O uster Centres
Ouster 1 Ouster 2 Ouster3
Total Direct Contact Time per Year 112.00 60.00 8.00
Average of Activity 1.87 3.27 1.13
Iteration History




OusterChange in Ouster 
Centres 3
1 11259 2.998 14.562
2 3254 4.988 4.580
3 .000 2.515 .875
4 .000 .000 .000
a Convergence achieved due to no or small distance change. The maximum distance by which 




Final O uster Centres
Ouster 1 Ouster 2 Ouster 3
Total Direct Contact Time per Year 97.50 64.63 28.00
Average of Activity 2.48 2.62 1.86
Number of Cases in each Ouster 10.000 8.000 17.000
Although the cluster analysis o f time spent and average of activities exhibits a direct 
corresponding relationship between these two variables, it also highlights the heterogeneity of 
venture capital firms in terms o f the time spent and levels o f involvement in activities with the 
portfolio companies. Table 8.6 shows three clear clusters o f venture capital firms. One apparent 
class o f venture capital firms operates within a limited time allocation. This group includes 
venture capital firms whose average participation in any activities is rather limited. These can be 
termed hands-off venture capital firms and can be compared to Macmillan et aL’s (1988) laissez- 
faire group. The second cluster’s comparative low time allocation is accompanied by high 
involvement and they can be identified with Macmillan et a l ’s (1988) close-tracker group. The 
third cluster o f venture capital firms is more difficult to define. This cluster shows a stronger 
relationship between time allocation and level o f involvement in activities (averaged). Thus, they 
seem to adjust the time according to their participation in different activities. It is highly probable 
that this group is involved in the portfolio company on a case-bycase basis.
It is interesting to note that none o f the venture capital firms in the survey added to the list of 15 
activities that they were being asked to rate. This means that either venture capital firms are not 
involved in other activities or their involvement in other activities is minimal or they prefer to 
keep their other activities confidential There is a marked similarity in the kind of activities in 
which venture capital firms are involved in Singapore and H ong Kong. Typically the venture 
capital firm s’ m ost important area o f activity in these countries, besides monitoring, relates to 
their com m on area o f expertise le . equity financing. It is obvious from  the study of comparative
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ranking, that although some research studies (Gorman and Sahlman, 1989; Elango et aL, 1995) 
have treated obtaining finance as a single activity, venture capital firms continue to attach more 
importance to  assisting portfolio companies in obtaining equity rather than debt finance. Apart 
from  obtaining equity finance, a very important contribution from  venture capital firms is crisis 
management. M ost previous research studies did not rank this activity. The activities with the 
least reported involvement are in personnel management and operations. A  comparison of this 
research with other studies shows that venture capital firms in Singapore and Hong Kong attach 
more importance to the function o f monitoring than any other activity.
A  Wilcoxon-Mann-Whiney rank sum test76, as shown in Table 8.7, was performed to find out 
any significant difference between the means o f the score that indicate venture capital firms’ 
involvement between H ong K ong and Singapore.
76 This test is u sed to  determ ine the difference in raking between tw o independent sam ples drawn from  two populations. In  this 




Mann-Whiney U Wîlcoxon W Z Asymp. Sig. 
tailed)_____
(2-Exact Sig. [2*(1- 
tailed Sig.)l
Personnel Search 94.500 370.500 -2.597
Interview and Selection 138.000 414.000 -1.110












Formulation of Initial Business Strategyl39.500 
Ongoing Strategy Development 102.000 
Management of Crisis 128.500
Development of Production152.500 
Techniques
Selection of Vendors and Equipment 141.000 
Interfacing with Investor Groups 153.500 
Obtaining Alternative Sources of Debtl32.000 
Finance
Obtaining Alternative Sources of 131.500 
Equity Finance
Monitoring Performance___________143.500
a Not corrected for ties.
371.500 -2.617 .009 .020
412.000 -1.178 239 .286
282.500 -.357 .721 .768
415.500 -1.017 .309 .329
378.000 -2.163 .031 .035
404.500 -1.368 .171 .191
428.500 -.722 .470 .555
417.000 -1.197 .231 .359
429.500 -.584 .560 .575
408.000 -1.258 208 .235
407.500 -1284 .199 .224
419.500 -.920 .358 .391
b Grouping Variable: Country
The results do not show a significant difference in involvement in most o f the activities in Hong 
Kong and Singapore. However, venture capital firms in these countries differ significantly in their 
involvement in personnel search, development of professional support groups and ongoing 
strategy development.
Pandey and Jang (1996) found that venture capital firms in the Taiwanese market indicated 
involvement in hands-on activities, such as the internal management o f the firm and product 
development. This finding is in marked contrast to the overall results herein. Since venture 
capital in Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong developed along similar lines in a similar period, 
why do the Taiwanese venture capital firms operate differently? The venture capital market in 
Taiwan derives a larger share o f venture capital from  corporations (A V Q , 1999) than the venture 
capital market in Singapore or H ong Kong. Corporations tend to have more investee specific 
resources than independent venture capital firms (Chesbrough, 2000). Thus, corporations, which
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provide funds to venture capital firms can become part o f a network passing on resources to 
investees indirectly in unconventional areas.
The usefulness o f activities that venture capital firms are involved in with their portfolio 
companies can be confirm ed by determining whether these activities create any advantages for 
the portfolio companies. In  order fo r their involvement or provision of resources to be useful, 
the activities need to qualify resource characteristics as specified in the resource-exchange model 
(Barney, 1991; G iant, 1991; Amit and Shoemaker 1993; Collis and Motgomery, 1995). However, 
the characteristics applicable to any particular resource depend primarily on the required 
resource-configuration o f a business. This in turn depends on the industry in which a firm is 
operating and the event milestones77 (Liechtenstein, 1997). Thus, the experience of the venture 
capital firm  in the portfolio company's particular industry, as a resource, may not be equally 
valuable to  venture capital firms operating across several industries. In Hong Kong and 
Singapore especially, the industries, in which venture capital firms invest are far more diverse 
than those in the United States78. This diversity makes it more difficult for the venture capital 
firm to provide industry specific resources to all their portfolio companies.
77 This m aybe the point o f eligibility fo r the next financing round.
78 In  the U nited States, over 70%  o f venture capital is invested in only 3 basic industries. In  Singapore about 70% o f the venture 
capital is distributed between 6 industries and in H ong K ong between 4. (F or detailed calculations see appendix II)
168
8: Discussion
8.8 G assification of Activities: Principal Axis Factoring Rotated Matrix (Varimax with Kaiser 
Normalisation)____________________________________________
1 2 3 4
Financial/ Strategic Activities
Obtaining Alternative Sources of Equity.803 .242 .244 .130
Finance
Interfacing with Investor Groups .789 .168 .167
Monitoring Performance .628 .189 .364
Obtaining Alternative Sources of Debt Finance .595 .288 .403 .238
Ongoing Strategy Development .550 32 6 .247 .520
Formulation of Initial Business Strategy .476 .647 .330
Operations
Personnel Motivation .898 .255 .156
Development of Production Techniques .163 .666 -291
Management of Crisis .248 .538 .290 .422
Selection of Vendors and Equipment .499 .124
Personnel firing Decisions Artivities
Interview and Selection .324 .869 .104
Negotiation of Terms with Prospective.359 .137 .644
Candidates
Team Building Activities (Internal and External!
Personnel Search .201 .107 .370 .832
Development of Professional Support Groups .260 .113 .473 .503
Personnel Replacement .112 -.142 265
Eigenvalues 2.988 2.508 2.152 1.854
^Absolute values less than .10 suppressed
In order to  confirm  the results o f the data collected for this study a rotated varimax analysis was 
conducted, as shown in Table 8.8. This was done in order to determine any clear pattern of 
involvement so  that the results could be compared to MacMillan et aL’s (1988) findings. The 
same m ethod o f analysis has been used as used by MacMillan et al. (1988).
The first factor, financial/strategic activities, is similar to the patterns o f involvement found by 
MacMillan et al/s (1988). Since venture capital firms specialise in raising finance, channelling it 
toward strategically placed high return businesses and guiding these businesses through profitable 
operations, they are more likely to possess more complementary resources compared to other 
businesses. The second factor, operations, involved activities that are commonly associated with 
the operations o f a business. Formulation of initial business strategy can be identified with both 
these categories given a high loading associated with both factors. Operational activities, except
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for the selection o f vendors and equipment, recorded the second highest involvement of the 
venture capital firm s in their own rankings. The third factor involved management selection 
decisions like the interview o f and negotiations with prospective candidates. The last factor 
represents the team  building activities o f their venture capital firms within their portfolio 
companies. This m ay involve eliminating non-performing personnel and searching for new 
members fo r the portfolio company’s team. This factor supports the assertion by some 
researchers that venture capital firms play a vital role in assembling and developing a competent 
management team  (Ehrlich, 1994; Stewart, 1989). Team  building activities also involve cultivating 
relationships with outside organisations. While not matching all modes of involvement 
considered by MacMillan et al.’s (1988), is study of activities undertaken by Asian venture capital 
firms produced similar results in regard to financial activities and management selection activities. 
The noticeable differences occurred in what MacMillan et al. (1988) classify as 
developm ent/operations activities and personnel management activities. It seems that venture 
capital firms in H ong K ong/Singapore are not involved with their portfolio companies in the 
same way as those in the United States, at least in regard to these activities.
Table 8.9 shows the results of correlations based on the four factors found previously using 
principal axis factor analysis classifications o f activities and the time allocated by venture capital 
firms to their portfolio companies. Table 8.9 makes it clear that a venture capital firm’s greatest 
involvement is related to finance/strategy. A  high correlation between financial/strategic 
activities and the time allocated by venture capital firms confirms then to any other. The 
correlation between need based activities and time allocated to portfolio companies is also 
significant although less so.
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Mean 3.0211 1.8632 1.6447 1.5965
Std. Deviation .9938 .6772 .6030 .6445
Pearson Correlation Total.501** .367* .107 257
Direct Contact Time per Year 
Sig. (2-tailed) .002 .027 .535 .130
N  36 36 36 36
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
Table 8.10 shows the results o f allocation of tune to then* portfolio companies by venture capital 
firms and the average score o f involvement in activities, placed against the stage of development 
of the portfolio company.
8.10 Time Allocation, Activities and Stage of Development of Portfolio Companies
Stage of Development At Present Average of Activity Total Direct Contact Time
______ _ ______________________________ ___________(Hours per Year)_______
Seed 2.27 86
Start-up 1.63 56
Early Expansion 2.44 56
Late Expansion 2.31 63
Mezzanine 2.12 100




It seems that venture capital firms allocate m ost of their time to portfolio companies that are at a 
mezzanine79 financing stage. The nature of mezzanine financing suggests that the holding period 
for this mode o f venture capital would be short. There is, thus, a possibility that venture capital 
firms are choosing to follow  a “ home run” strategy (Sapienza, 1994) in the case of mezzanine 
financing and consequendy, allocate more time to companies at the mezzanine financing stage. 
A  balanced combination o f time and involvement activities seems to occur at the seed stage of 
financing. Venture capitalists are more involved with companies at the early expansion stage
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rather than at start-up, although, time allocation is similar. Despite a lower commitment of the 
venture capitalists’ time, the venture capitalists feel that their participation in the activities of 
public companies is considerable compared to other stages.
8.2.3 E x te n t o f Involvem ent- T im e A llocation , A ctivities and V alue A dded
In order to  verify proposition 4 a question was included in the research questionnaire which
asked venture capital firms about the usefulness o f their interaction with their portfolio 
companies. Almost all venture capitalists believed that the interaction was useful. These results 
were also checked with measures o f involvement. A  strong positive correlation existed between 
the value o f interaction, as perceived by venture capitalists, and their contribution as measured in 
terms o f the number o f activities and the time they spent with portfolio companies.
Past research studies in the United States have found that venture capital firms add the greatest 
value through board membership (Sapeinza and Timmons, 1989; Landstrom, 1990). The lack of 
correlation between measures o f involvement and the number of board members representing 
venture capital firms (Table 8.11) shows that quantity in this case may not mean value-added. 
This finding does not negate the previous studies but does raise a question about how board 
membership adds value to the portfolio company. Time spent in formal meetings, at least in Asia, 
was also not significantly correlated with value adding activities. The cultural differences between 
Asian venture capital firms and the United States venture capital firms offer an explanation about 
why form al meetings, although popular with the foreign-trained Asian financiers, may not sit well 
with the psychology o f Asian entrepreneurs. F or venture capital firms in Asia, the Board 
meetings would appear to be directed less at tackling issues and more at reducing information 
asymmetry. 79
79 Preparation fo r  IP O  stage
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8.11 Correlations Spearman's rho










Total Time of InformalCorreladon 
Meetings (Horns) Coefficient
-.161 .314
Sig. (2-tailed) .403 .062
N 29 36
Total Telephone TimeCorrekdon 
per Year Coefficient
-.164 .100 .388
Sig. (2-tailed) .387 .554 .020*
N 30 37 36
Average Score ofCorreladon 
Ratings of Activities Coefficient
-.130 .293 .490 .473
Sig. (2-tailed) .495 .078 .002** .003**
N 30 37 36 38
Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2-tailed).
8.2.4 What triggers Involvement?
Venture capital firms seem  to be unimpressed with local traditions and practices relating to 
involvement. This raises many questions. Is it because their reading of the venture capital culture, 
relating to  involvement, is incorrect? Is it because all venture capital firms operate differently at 
different levels o f participation? Or, is it because they would like to be seen as different from 
others? It is difficult to conceive that with the extent o f networking with competitors that goes 
on in this unique business (Bygrave, 1987), venture capital firms will be unaware of the 
involvement culture. It is also unlikely, as some convergence in the data collected by this study 
shows, that all venture capital firms operate at significantly different levels of involvement. The 
research data shows a standard deviation of .97 on a 1-5 Likert scale measuring intensity of 
involvement, which is not significant under these circumstances. One explanation of the venture 
capital firm s’ comparative difference on cultural readings can be ascribed to the comparative lack 
of contact or networking in the Asian market with local companies. This m aybe because venture 
capital in A sia is more outward looking and international in nature than in the United States.
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Findings in this study have confirmed the earlier results o f MacMillan et al. (1989) regarding the 
profound influence o f the prior policy of venture capital firms on their later involvement in a 
portfolio company. The spread o f responses regarding the venture capital firms’ policy of 
involvement makes interesting reading. More than 3 /4 ^  of the respondents reported a close or 
very close involvement in their portfolio company as a matter o f firm policy. There is a 
significant correlation (r=0.634, p < 0 1 ) between their stated policy and their assessment of 
involvement in the companies that they reported on. However, close or very close involvement 
does not seem  to translate into time actually spent with portfolio companies when compared to 
the time venture capital firms in the United States spend with their portfolio companies. In Hong 
Kong and Singapore, involvement m ay cany slighdy different connotations. Why venture capital 
firms see them selves as closely involved may have to do with cultural settings and the institutions 
that they are comparing themselves with. Venture capital is still a new concept in these markets. 
Traditionally, entrepreneurs have relied on funds from  friends, relatives and banks. In these 
modes o f financing, investors do not usually get involved. Thus when the venture capital firms in 
these markets report close involvement, they are comparing venture capital with traditional 
modes o f financing.
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8.12 Multiple Factors as predictors of Involvement
Model Summary_______________________________________
R__________________ R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate
.177 .018 1.12
.421___________________________ ______________________
a Predictors: (Constant),Number of Investments at present, Avg yeais of Experience-VC Industry, Number of Lead 
Investments, Avg. Experience Other Industries, Years Finn has been in Venture Capital Business, Average Amount 




ofdf Mean Square F Sig.
Regression 8.323 6 1.387 1.113 .378
Residual 38.651 31 1.247
Total 46.974 37
a Predictors: (Constant), Number of Investments at present, Avg. years of Experience-VC Industry, Number of Lead 
Investments, Avg. Experience Other Industries, Years Firm has been in Venture Capital Business, Average Amount 
of Capital Under Management 







B Std. Error Beta
(Constant) 4.650 .982 4.734 .000
Years Firm has been in-3.830E-02 
Venture Capital Business
.042 -.181 -.911 .369
Average years of Experience-6.520E-02 
VC Industry
.084 .162 .780 .441
Average Experience Other-3.303E-02 
Industries
.057 -.106 -.581 .565
Average Amount of Capital-8.315E-02 
Under Management
.118 -.148 -.702 .488
Number of Lead Investments 2.340E-02 .063 .066 .368 .715
Number of Investments at-. 140 
present
.126 -.228 -1.116 .273
a Dependent Variable: Your Company Involvement
Since firm  policy regarding the involvement of venture capital firms proved to be a very 
important factor in later involvement, possible links between firm policy and other parameters 
that m ay have an effect on firm policy were explored as shown in Table 8.12. Firm policy 
relating to  the extent o f involvement with portfolio companies seems to be independent o f all 
parameters o f experience that have been m easured Neither years of experience nor the size of 




Table 8.13 details the involvement policy of venture capital firms according to their type of 
ownership structure. Because o f a smaller number of responses, a conclusion cannot be drawn in 
all cases. However, the number o f responses in the case o f independent firms, corporate 
subsidiaries and subsidiaries o f financial institutions are large enough to draw a tentative 
conclusion. A  lower mean score in the case o f subsidiaries o f financial institutions indicates that 
they have a policy o f lower levels o f involvement compared to independent firms and corporate 
subsidiaries. The reason is inherent in their traditional debt-financing role, which is basically 
collateral based, and tends to be hands-off.
8.13 Involvement policy, industry reading and type of Investment Firm
Type of Investment Fund Your
Involvement
GompanyGeneral Trend in the 
Industry
Government Sponsored Mean 3.00 3.50
Std Deviation .00 .71
Corporate Subsidiary Mean 4.33 2.83
Std Deviation .52 .75
Subsidiary of a Financial Institution Mean 3.80 3.00
Std Deviation 1.14 1.05
Subsidiary of a securities firm Mean 4.00 2.00
Std Deviation
Independent Company/Partnership Mean 429 2.94
Std Deviation 1.10 1.09
A Joint Venture Company Mean 2.00 2.50
Std Deviation 1.41 .71
Total Mean 3.97 2.92
Std Deviation 1.13 .97
8.2.5 Resources Assessment, Involvement and Value-added
The information produced by testing o f basic assumptions about the Singaporean and Hong 
Kong venture capital market (propositions 1-4) when combined with the data produced by 
testing the research model propositions (5-10)80 shed more light on involvement mechanism of 
venture capital firms in these countries.
80 as explained in chapter 4 (Figure 4 3 )
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There seems to be a pattern in the areas where venture capital firms consider themselves superior 
to their portfolio companies. These include finance, strategy, monitoring performance and crisis 
management. These are the same areas identified by factor analysis. There is some evidence to 
support the view  that venture capital firms are more involved in those where they consider their 
strengths to be greater.
Venture capital firm s, because of the size o f capital under management and the services of 
professionals at their disposal, have reasons to feel confident about their resource strength. The 
lack of correlation between their perceived resource strengths and their size as measured by 
capital under management and number of professionals working for them (Table 8.14), discounts 
the impression that a larger size or more professionals means a larger pool o f resources useful to 
portfolio companies. After these findings, the results on the relation between the number of 
investments and resource strength was as expected.
It is pertinent to note that only those resources have been assessed which are usually passed on to 
the portfolio com pany by the venture capital firm  This set of resources may be special. One of 
the venture capital firms, in its correspondence, has suggested that they “ ...built an investment 
team with this [value added potential] in mind” 81. In order to find out whether firms consciously 
accumulate resources, a zero order correlation was calculated between firm policy, firm 





Venture Gapitalists’Avge. ExperienceAvge years of Experience­
__________ .___________________________ Assessment______ Other Industries VC Industry_______




Avge years of Experience- Correlation Coefficient -.035 -.368
VC Industry
Sig. (2-tailed) .833 .021
N 38 39
Your CompanyCorrelation Coefficient .008 -.183 .125
Involvement
Sig. (2-tailed) .961 271 .454
N 37 38 38
The lack o f relationship results in the case of experience may indicate that this set o f resources 
are not consciously accumulated or do not automatically get accumulated over a period of time 
within a venture capital firm.
Venture capital firms that possess more resources logically should be more involved with their 
portfolio companies. If perceived resource strength is related to experience in other industries, it 
should also be related to involvement. However, the statistical results do not favour this premise. 
In fact the relationship between experience in other industries is negatively related to the time 
that venture capital firms spend with their portfolio companies(r=~0.368, p < 0 5 ) and negatively 
related to the intensity of involvement in different activities (r=^0.304, p <  10).
Venture capital firms in Singapore and Hong Kong do not rate portfolio company resources 
lower when they are pursuing high technology, for good reason. Technology in Asia has a 
different connotation than in the United States. In the United States, the technology being 
adopted by the portfolio com pany may be completely new or untried, adding to the risk factor. 
As opposed to  this, m ost o f Asian high technology is an adaptation, and hence carries far less 81
81 Com m ents by a  venture capitalist (Identity: Confidential). A ugust 2 3 ,2000J?ersonal correspondence record
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risk. Why venture capital firms perceive reputation as an indicator o f the resource strength of the 
portfolio com pany is also evident Reputation is embedded in the past as opposed to 
competency. It represents the accumulation of resources backed by a successful track record in 
using these resources. Although managerial competency m ay provide confidence to the venture 
capital firm s in terms o f the future o f the portfolio company, venture capitalists have reason to be 
more comfortable if entrepreneurs have prior standing in the industry A  zero order correlation 
between perceived reputation and all resources shows that venture capital firms associate it with 
almost all resources, but more so to those resources which relate specifically to the industry of 
the portfolio company. These include operational planing, industry knowledge and number of 
contacts in the portfolio com pany industry. This result is worth comparing to an earlier finding, 
which was that the venture capital firms are more confident about their resources when they have 
experience in the portfolio com pany industry. Thus relevant industry experience is much more 
important than other resources for venture capital firms in H ong Kong and Singapore.
It is interesting to note that venture capital firms in Asia rate portfolio companies much higher in 
terms o f their resource strength, fo r their contacts with companies in other industries. As 
explained in Chapter 2, business in H ong Kong and Singapore is dominated by Chinese family 
businesses. The Chinese fam ily business network, which taps social network based on kinship, 
common dialect, trade associations, education etc, is more pervasive and venture capital firms are 
unlikely to match them in number o f contacts.
The relationship between resource gap and higher participation in an activity is difficult to define. 
Part of the problem  stems from  the fact that although venture capital firms participate in areas of 
high resource strength they do not see themselves significantly better off than the portfolio 
companies in these areas (except in the case o f financial expertise). An indication of why that
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happens is the low  ranking venture capital firms ascribe to their industry knowledge vis-a-vis the 
portfolio com pany and the impact this has on their perception of the usefulness o f almost all 
resources. This fact has been corroborated by a venture capitalist who stated “ There is no way 
that a V C  can understand the business as well as the C EO . Otherwise, if we have this situation, 
the V C shouldn’t have invested in the com pany anyway” .82
There are resources in which venture capital firms perceive themselves to be better equipped 
than their portfolio companies and resources in which they perceive the strengths of portfolio 
companies to  be stronger than those o f the venture capital firms. Thus a resource “gap” can be 
two sided. It is quite clear that venture capital firms' high participation activities are not the result 
of a resource gap or need/availability match. It seems that venture capital firms, at least in Asia, 
are less prone to involvement in activities/resource areas in which they perceive portfolio 
companies to  be strong. Thus perceived inadequacy in the portfolio company does not always 
result in higher participation although adequacy (or strength) diminishes venture capital firm’s 
involvement. The venture capital firms seem  to be very conscious o f the fact that their area of 
expertise is finance and they will be more useful to portfolio companies by advising them on 
financial m atters. It seems, understandably, that the venture capital firms are also well aware that 
their industry knowledge is never a match for the knowledge o f the portfolio company. However, 
they feel more resourceful if they have more relevant industry experience. This is reflected in the 
tendency o f venture capital firms, as pointed out earlier, to specialise in industries and 
technologies.
82 Mr. G odw in P on, Investm ent M anager, A gri-food E quity F u n d . April 4 ,2001 : Personal correspondence record
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8.3 Summary o f Findings
As hypothesised, it was found that venture capitalists in Singapore and H ong Kong allocate less 
time to portfolio companies than do venture capitalists in the United States. However, the 
overwhelming reason for this is not resistance by the entrepreneur, as hypothesised, but time 
restrictions on the part o f the venture capital firms. Although the results are not significantly 
different, venture capitalists in H ong K ong spend more time with their portfolio companies than 
venture capitalists in Singapore. Venture capitalists in both these countries spend about 60% of 
their direct contact time with the portfolio com pany management in face-to-face contact and the 
rest through the telephone. It was also found that informal methods, like telephone calls and 
informal m eetings, constitute more than three quarters of the direct contact time. Formal 
reporting occupies the least prominent role in venture capital involvement. Overall, Asian 
venture capitalists do not allocate more than 5% o f their time to involvement activities. It was 
found that venture capital firms do not use m odes o f involvement as a substitute for each other. 
It seems, from  the research data, that venture capitalists with more experience in venture capital 
rely more on telephonic contact whereas venture capitalists with experience in the industry of the 
portfolio com pany prefer face-to-face contact. It was also found that direct contact is greater in 
the case o f com panies pursuing medium technology rather than high or low technology.
The second proposition, where it was suggested that venture capital firms are involved in similar 
activities with their portfolio companies regardless o f country, found support The fact that no 
venture capital firm  has added to the list o f activities in the questionnaire would indicate that 
other activities, not already identified through previous research, are not important. Unlike most 
o f the previous research studies, crisis management was added to the list o f involvement activities 
in this study and it was found that venture capital firms in Hong K ong attach high importance to
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this activity. Overall, it seems that the involvement activities have not been significantly affected 
by differences in cultures.
It was found that venture capital firms in Singapore and Hong Kong rank the importance of 
involvement activities similarly to the ranking provided by venture capital firms in the United 
States. The notable difference is that, unlike venture capital firms in the United States, monitoring 
performance is the highest priority area o f involvement. Unlike other research studies, little 
indication was found o f any cluster formation regarding direct contact time. However, the data 
shows cluster formation within these countries if it is analysed on a two dimensional (time 
allocation and involvement in activities) basis (Table 8.6). Apparently, there are Asian venture 
capitalists with a clear and relatively firm idea o f how much time to allocate to portfolio 
companies.
It was found, through principal axis factoring analysis, that some involvement activities are 
related to each other and can be classified accordingly. These are finance and strategy, team 
building, personnel hiring and other general activities, which are related more to the operational 
side of the business. It was found that venture capital firms are most involved in activities related 
to finance and strategy. This is followed by their involvement on the operational side of the 
business. Their participation in team  building and personnel hiring activities seems to be of lesser 
importance. It was found that venture capital firms in Singapore and Hong Kong allocate more 
time to portfolio companies at the mezzanine stage o f financing. However, their involvement in 
activities is greater in portfolio companies at earlier stages o f financing.
It was found that venture capital firms see themselves as adding value to their portfolio company
through interaction. It was found that the number o f venture capitalists on the board of directors
of the portfolio com pany has no relation to their involvement activities. Form al meetings occupy
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only one quarter the time that the venture capital firm s spend in direct contact with their 
portfolio companies.
It was found that the intention of the venture capital firms to participate in the portfolio 
company is not affected by the practices o f their counterparts in the venture capital industry. 
Similarly higher comparative stakes in a portfolio com pany do not necessarily mean that the 
venture capital firm  will be more actively involved. Venture capital firm policy was the only factor 
which was correlated (positively to a willingness to interact with portfolio companies. Although 
this result does not affect the fundamental validity o f the proposition that involvement depends, 
to some extent on willingness to be involved, it narrows down the possible factors. While testing 
this proposition, it was found that m ost o f the venture capital firms in Hong K ong and Singapore 
see them selves as closely or very closely involved with their portfolio companies and that this is a 
matter o f policy. They are also very likely to abide by their stated policy. Firm  policy shows little 
relation to  experience or size o f the venture capital firm, as measured by number o f professionals 
and capital under management. Since it was not the focus o f the research, the question about 
what guides firm  policy cannot not be pursued. However, it was found that subsidiaries of 
financial institutions have a policy o f lower levels o f involvement compared to independent 
venture capital firms and corporate subsidiaries.
While exploring the resource need/availability premise, it was found that the resource assessment 
of venture capital firms, o f their own resources, shows far less variation than their assessment of 
portfolio companies. Venture capital firms assess their own resources differently from  the 
resources o f their portfolio companies. However, resources like expertise in crisis management, 
performance monitoring, project/idea evaluation and strategy planning show similar assessments.
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A  noticeable characteristic o f these resources is their non-specific and general nature, within the 
context o f venture capital/portfolio com pany relations.
It was found that from  the perspective of the venture capitalist, the portfolio company's need for 
particular resources does not depend entirely on risk factors. Thus, risk relating to the complexity 
of technology is not affected by resource strengths in these areas. There is sufficient evidence that 
competency o f the portfolio com pany management, in the eyes o f venture capital firms, also does 
not affect the venture capitalists’ perception of the portfolio company's resource strength. Thus, 
resources and the capacity to use them competently are perceived to be different. However, 
venture capital firms are more likely see resource weakness if the portfolio company is new, the 
management team  is not reputed or if the company is not performing well
It was found that the venture capitalists’ perception o f their own resource strength does not 
depend on either the size or experience of venture capital firms in the venture capital industry but 
is impacted by their experience in other industries. Where this experience exists the venture 
capital firm  is perceived to have greater resource strength. It is hard to avoid the impression that 
venture capital firms are in the best position to add value if they have professionals with 
experience in industries other than venture capital. However, little relation was found between 
higher resource assessment and measures o f value added. Thus, resource transfer from the 
venture capital firms to the portfolio company does not depend on the perceived resource 
strength o f venture capital firms.
Although the validity of the proposed resource-exchange model was only partly supported, this 
research has highlighted many aspects o f a value-added relationship between venture capital 
firms and their portfolio companies. The next chapter concludes this thesis. Areas in the existing
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literature in which a contribution has been made are described Possible directions that any 
further research on this topic m ay take are also suggested
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9 Chapter 9: Conclusion and Further Research
9.1 Conclusion
Through this study insight has been provided into how the resource exchange relationship affects 
the involvement o f venture capital firms in their portfolio companies. Prior work has been 
extended in at least three directions:
1) B y  choosing to conduct this study in Asian markets, the nature and effect o f venture 
capital firm s’ involvement across a largely unexplored territory has been described This 
research has added to a very limited literature on Asian venture capital.
2) Previous studies have examined the effect o f isolated factors on the value-adding role of 
venture capital firms. Throughout this study an attempt has been made to classify, 
integrate and develop a model that not only accommodates previous findings but also 
sets up a logical relationship between findings.
3) Resource exchange theory has been identified as a potential vehicle to explain the value- 
added relationship. In order to tackle the question of whether venture capital firms add 
value to their portfolio companies a three-dimensional model was put forward in this 
thesis. These three dimensions include the characteristics o f venture capital 
firm s/portfolio companies, the characteristics o f relationships and the characteristics of 
resources. The focus o f this research has been on the characteristics of venture capital 
firm s/portfolio companies in terms of their interrelationships and resources.
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While it is true that little dragon economies are diverse, a review of the venture capital subset of 
the market suggests that there are certain common features. The view expressed by Hbfstede 
(1984) that cultural factors significantly affect the conduct o f business has been supported by the 
research undertaken for this thesis. The common features o f Asian venture markets may be the 
result o f shared cultural norms. Geographical proximity may also have explained similarities in 
the venture capital markets in Asia. Another reason is that Asian markets, in general, began to 
develop institutionalised venture capital markets later than the United States and Europe and 
consequently, still have the common features o f a developing venture capital market. Venture 
capital, in almost all little dragon economies, has been taken up as a development tool. 
Governments have played a large role in developing these markets and, during the process, 
influenced the direction, composition and structure o f the industry. There are unique features to 
these venture capital markets due to their environments. Because of the initial active role of the 
government in the development of the industry in Asia, venture capital definition is closely linked 
to the government’s perception and sometimes even defined by it. Most of the venture capital 
funds within little dragon economies are derived from  different sources than those relied upon in 
the west. There are still large untapped sources o f venture capital funds in Asia such as banks (as 
in Europe) and pension funds (as in the United States). Another salient feature of venture capital 
in most o f these countries is the focus on infrastructure for development rather than high-tech 
innovations, as in the United States, and consumer goods, as in Europe (Rausch, 1998; EVCA, 
1998). Because of the higher risk generally associated with the Asian environment,83 venture 
capital firms are inclined to exit their investments quickly. Another feature of these markets that 
was found particularly important is the expertise available to venture capital firms. It appears that
83 As the Asian crisis displayed
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venture capital firms, in most o f Asia, are in the process of acquiring skills in related areas like 
leveraged buy-outs.
As for venture capital governance, venture capital firms in Hong Kong and Singapore clearly rely 
much more on informal methods of communication such as telephonic and informal meetings 
rather than formal meeting and reports. The exceptionally small role of formal reporting in 
venture governance by venture capital firms in Hong Kong and Singapore was also highlighted in 
this thesis. A  reason generally put forward for less reliance on formal reporting is that accounting 
reports tend to tie down early stage businesses, which is in contrast to what is required (Hayes 
and Abernathy, 1981). The fact that accounting practices in Singapore and Hong Kong are still 
developing, may also have added to this tendency.
The research has corroborated the fact that venture capitalists in Singapore and Hong Kong 
spend less time with their portfolio companies, compared to venture capitalists in United States. 
Many theoretical reasons were offered for the justification of development of this hypothesis. 
The result o f the survey has disproved some of the assumptions. For example, the findings that 
portfolio company resistance for lesser involvement o f venture capitalists rules out the possibility 
of cultural factors or the importance of family owned business and dilution. This leaves very few 
explanations and reinforces the point that low involvement of venture capitalists maybe because 
venture capitalists in these markets are not ready or equipped for more involvement. While there 
has been no longitudinal study which compare venture capitalists’ involvement, in the light of 
these results it is probable that venture capitalists involvement in portfolio companies increases as 
the venture capital industry matures.
Previous researchers in the United States have made it clear (MacMillan et al., 1989), and this 
researcher has also found it true in the Asian context, that venture capital firms vary in the extent
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of their involvement with portfolio companies. If the decision to be involved is pre-set in the 
company's policy, it is more likely to be adhered to. Although the reasons fo r policy differentials 
were not pursued, it seems highly improbable given the lack o f correlation between perceived 
industry practices and firm  policy, that it is influenced by general trends in the venture capital 
industry. R ock (1991) stated that venture capital firms who adopted a hands-on approach 
believed that in order to maximize the chances o f portfolio company's success and consequent 
high returns on their investment, involvement was necessary.
It has been highlighted in this thesis that there is a marked similarity, at international levels, 
regarding the areas in which venture capital firms are involved The importance that venture 
capital firms attach to involvement activities also shows a similar pattern as revealed in research 
conducted in other countries.
Past research has been less than convincing regarding the effect of business risk, as expressed by 
the complexity o f technology and stage of portfolio company development, on the ability of 
venture capital firms to add value to portfolio companies. From  the resource-based viewpoint, 
technology and stage of portfolio company development seem  to have little impact on the 
venture capitalist’s perception o f the resource-pool o f the portfolio company. However, the 
reputation o f the portfolio com pany does bear a significant weight in the resource perception of 
the venture capitalist Because the perception o f greater resource strength increases the 
expectations fo r successful results, reputation m ay well be associated with less risk among 
venture capitalist's in H ong K ong and Singapore.
This study has demonstrated that there are differences between the resource pools of firms. The 
resource pools o f firms within an industry are likely to exhibit a similar composition and pattern. 
The difference in resource com position can provide a useful theoretical basis to capture the
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relationship dynamic between businesses. As firms strive to increase their pool o f resources they 
set-up network links with potential sources of supply. The nature of subsequent relationships will 
be affected by resource com position, the intensity of need and the willingness o f the concerned 
parties to  share the resources.
On the basis o f the arguments put forward in Chapter 4, it seemed improbable that venture 
capital firms with adequate resources would not get involved with their portfolio companies. 
Some venture capitalists indicated that value-added was a question of resource strength. “V G  
(venture capitalists) add value in many ways depending on their team competencies and on the 
contract between V C  (venture capitalists) and the investee.” 84 Contrary to expectations, the 
findings o f this project indicate that the competency or resource strength of the venture capital 
firms has little to do with their involvement in different activities. This finding is linked with 
another result; that is that venture capital firms do not consciously accumulate these resources for 
the purpose o f involvement. Thus, even those venture capital firms with an overall larger 
resource pool, m ay not be anymore inclined to get actively involved in their portfolio companies. 
Even where venture capital firms believe their portfolio companies to be inadequate in a 
particular resource85 they do not necessarily pick up that activity. B y default, finance remains the 
most likely area in which venture capital firms will participate in their portfolio company and be 
of use to  the portfolio company. Bygrave and Timmons (1992) reported that a venture capital 
firm indicated that venture capitalists spend greater energies on making the good great rather 
than making a dismal poor. The above findings seem to be indicating that venture capitalists’ 
involvement are influenced more by characteristics o f the portfolio company rather than their 
own
84 Com m ents b y jan e  Craw ford, M anaging D irector, 31 pic South E ast A sia, Singapore via E m ail
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The pattern o f venture capital firm s’ involvement in their portfolio companies in Hong Kong 
and Singapore is fairly similar. It seem s likely that this pattern extends to m ost of the Asia-pacific, 
if not the whole o f Asia. The time allocated to involvement activities in these countries is much 
smaller com pared to a successful venture capital market like the United States. Since it was 
concluded, from  this research, that the resistance from  entrepreneurs is not a likely reason for 
low levels o f involvement; the constraints must be im posed by venture capital firms. There is a 
lot o f room  fo r expanding frequency o f interaction and time allocation if value-added is a desired 
objective, because some researchers believe that more interaction seems to result in greater value 
added (Sapienza and Gupta, 1994; Sapienza, 1992).
The implication o f this line o f reasoning is that venture capitalists in Hong Kong and Singapore 
interact less with their portfolio companies because o f reasons embedded in the environment in 
which they operate. Two of which, as indicated earlier, are the comparative novelty of this 
concept and lack o f experience in venture capital.
Researchers have suggested that portfolio companies should be careful in choosing their venture 
capital firm  (Ehrlich et al.; 1994, Sapienza, 1992) because the value o f the venture capital firm’s 
involvement can vary significantly. It has been confirmed that portfolio companies do have a 
meaningful choice in selecting venture capital firms. The potential value added service is given as 
one o f the reasons for portfolio companies to approach a particular venture capital firm (Smith, 
1999) 85 6. A n implication arising from  the resource exchange paradigm, as explained in this 
research, is that Asian portfolio companies who seek support in areas other than finance will be 
better o ff with venture capital firms that specialize in their same industry. Moreover, if a venture
85 e.g. relevant industry experience.
86 This research stu dy  has found that m ore than 71%  o f entrepreneur have adm itted receiving m ore than 1 o ffer horn a venture 
capital firm  fo r financing, while m ore than half claim  to  have received three o r m ore offers.
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already possesses a particular resource its alliance with any venture capital firm who is 
accustomed to  providing the same resource may not be useful in terms of exchange. Companies 
who do wish to obtain the involvement of venture capital firms should request information on 
the relevant involvement policy o f those firms. Lastly, portfolio companies need to understand 
that value-added largely depends on their own initiative. A  venture capital firm, which perceives 
the resource strength o f a portfolio com pany as adequate, is unlikely to get involved in that 
portfolio company. M oreover, venture capital firm ’s resource capacity does not automatically 
means that support will be offered to their portfolio companies. As with venture capital firms 
who intend to  be involved, the real issue is not only finding partner who shares a perspective on 
resource strength, but is also willing to cultivate an exchange relationship.
This research highlights a possible direction that governments in Hong Kong and Singapore 
could consider while designing policies relating to the promotion of venture capital Generally, 
Asian governments have played an active role in venture capital promotion. The involvement 
activities o f venture capital firms are one of the m ost important attributes of venture capital, 
which sets venture capital apart from  other modes of financing. It has been found that venture 
capital firms feel better equipped and more able to add value (exchange resources) when they 
have relevant industry experience. Thus existing individuals with industry experience seem to be a 
better source o f future venture capitalists than those without such experience. Governments 
should target these individuals while creating venture capital development initiatives. More value 
creating venture capital firms can also be added by encouraging greater specialization among 
firms, based on particular industries. It has been found in this research, that venture capital firms 
place minimal reliance on formal reporting by  portfolio companies. This may result in an 
information gap. Inform ation asymmetry can be minimized through the establishment and 
enforcement o f accounting standards and reporting procedures.
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It is interesting to note that the areas which past studies have identified as primary contributors to 
the success o f a high potential ventures (Maidique, 1986; Timmon, Smollen and Dingee, 1977; 
Cooper and Bruno, 1977; M eyer and Roberts, 1986) are not necessarily the ones in which venture 
capital firms in Asia report their highest activities. There are other factors, besides the 
involvement o f venture capital firms, which can affect the efficiency o f the venture (Chan, 1983; 
Berglof, 1994, Adamati and Pfleiderer, 1994). Thus, the value that venture capital firms add 
through involvement is limited both in scope and effect. “What matters is that venture capitalists 
do not substitute for good full time executives”87.
This thesis has demonstrated that the venture capital firm /portfolio company relationship can be 
seen as other than an agency relationship. Agency perspective analyses agency conflicts in 
isolation from  other realities o f the venture capital process. Information asymmetry, moral hazard 
or adverse selection does play a role in this relationship; however, agency theory takes away the 
focus from  other characteristics o f this relationship which are as important if not more so. 
Furthermore, it seem s inappropriate to ignore a large number o f venture capital practitioners who 
believe this relationship to be more than a principal/agent relation. The network dyad concept 
sees venture capital firm s/portfolio companies as equal partners rather than in confrontational 
relations as the agency theory implies. It also recognises portfolio company relations with other 
venture capitalists and venture capitalist’s relations with other portfolio companies/venture 
capitalists and the potential influences that these relationships can create on the dyadic relations. 
As suggested, the network dyad model not only captures the essence of this relationship but is 
ideally suited to  a resource exchange perspective.
rnmmpnK hy Anil Thadani, Chairman, Schroeder Capital Partners (Asia) Pte L td  via Em ail
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This thesis sheds further light on how the element of risk is perceived in relation to the resource 
adequacy o f a company. While it has been determined, as explained in Chapter 4, that the 
development stage o f a company, the intricacy of technology being pursued by a company and 
competency o f the management team  is associated with risk, it was not found to be associated 
with perceived resource strength. The fact that company performance was strongly associated 
with the strength of resources more or less sets apart risk and resource p oo l This means that at a 
practical level, perceived adequacy of resources m ay not necessarily mean that a business is more 
or less risky.
While the resource exchange paradigm  seem to be an interesting angle to look at the inter-firm 
relationship, the classification and definition o f resources can pose a serious problem to this 
process. A s discussed in Chapter 4, resources have been classified differently which can have 
some bearing on the results o f resource assessment and may produce different results. This may 
be the reason why few  attempts have been made to analyse inter-firm resource exchange relations 
compared to relations at individual level In the case of this thesis, this job was made easier by 
prior research studies which have already identified a limited set o f activities/resources which 
could be worked with. Thus, at theoretical level, any practical research on resource based theory 
may provide a better result if the resources being exchanged are pre-determined. Nevertheless 
resources when assessed appropriately can become a powerful tool to explain the dynamics of a 
relationship and can add detail to  the analysis o f risk factor.
According to the resource exchange theory, the probability that resources will be transferred to 
others depends on the amount o f resources possessed (Foa and Foa, 1980). The results of this 
research do not seem  to corroborate this assumption. The explanation of this behaviour is a 
matter o f conjecture. Foa and Foa (1980) have used this assumption in the case of individual
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relations and it m ay not be possible to extend it to inter-firm relations. Secondly, the venture 
capital firm /portfolio company relation, as has been discussed in Chapter 4, does not neatly fit 
into more popular relationship with a well developed theoretical basis.
9.2 Lim itations
Besides the general limitations associated with survey-based research, already cited in Chapter 1, 
this study has some specific limitations. Firstly, this thesis only examines the perceptions of the 
venture capitalists in terms o f resource exchange. Although researchers (Sapienza and Timmons, 
1989; Sapienza, 1992; Ehrlich et a l, 1994) have not found significant statistical differences 
between the perceptions of venture capital firms and portfolio companies, regarding the value 
added and the activities that venture capital firms are involved in, it would be interesting to see 
whether this finding is relevant in the Asian context.
Another limitation of this study is that the venture capital firm s/portfolio companies resources 
exchange relationship has been examined in a post funding state. It is quite possible that the 
portfolio com panies whose resource needs are greater and which do not match the resource 
availability o f the venture capital firm  m ay have been selected out during the screening process.
The researcher has relied on cross-sectional data and, in terms of size of sample, this study has 
some obvious limitations. Although it seems to be an uphill task in an Asian market, a larger 
sample fo r the study o f the resource-exchange paradigm could have added further validity to the 
findings.
In this kind o f research study, it is difficult to overcome self-reporting because the nature of 
many o f the variables employed precludes alternative sources.
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lik e  any research study spanning a number of years, there is also a possibility of response error 
due to the tim e lag between the time o f evaluation of data collected and the responses received
Readers are urged to exercise the following cautions when comparing this study with others 
conducted in the United States and Europe. Firstly, the difference in the time period of the 
surveys m ay have caused differences in results, which are immeasurable. Secondly, there are 
language and cultural disparities that directly impact on the definitions and concepts used These 
problems exist both in the case o f primary and secondary data. Both these limitations are usually 
present in alm ost all cross-cultural studies. Since this is the first study of this kind in the 
Singaporean and H ong K ong markets, it is suggested that any future study should try and include 
variables to control for cultural differences.
9.3 Further Research
The findings in this thesis support the view that value added in venture capital can be seen as a 
function o f resource exchange and that this can be a rich area for further research on inter-firm 
relations. This study can be extended further. Two more areas o f research pertain to factors, 
which could not be analysed, because doing so would have made the questionnaire more 
complicated adversely affecting response rates and jeopardizing credibility. One of the two areas 
of research is the study of the relationship characteristics affecting a value-added outcome. 
Secondly, an exploration could be made o f the characteristics associated with a resource/activity 
and any bearing these may have on the relationship between venture capital firms and their 
portfolio com panies. It is suggested that relationship factors should be recognized separately, 
from the dim ensions o f resources and studied further. Similarly, the characteristics o f resources 
being transferred should be considered in an industry scenano and their effect on performance 
noted. It w ould be interesting to find out differences in resource capabilities between the types of
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venture capital firm s, as assessed by portfolio companies. This issue would help us understand 
whether the type o f venture capital firm  makes any difference to value added as some suspect 
(Barney at el, 1996). Wile resource assessm ent by venture capital firms of portfolio companies 
has been examined in the context o f portfolio companies’ stage o f development, Norton and 
Tenenbaum (1993) and Sapienza and Am ason (1993) have suggested the exploration of a similar 
question to  determine whether the type of assistance varies by the financing stage. The proposed 
research will help identify any pattern in the nature of resources that are being transferred in early 
stages as com pared to later stages. Future research should also explore the resource capabilities of 
a venture capital firm  as compared to other private equity investors. D o venture capital firms 
have an advantage over other private equity investors in terms of resource availability and does 
that translate into value addition?
An additional avenue for further research in to resource exchange in the venture capital 
firm /portfolio com pany dyad would seek responses from  entrepreneurs whose venture failed. 
While it w ould be difficult to obtain such information, it will not only add further material to the 
resource exchange theory but may be helpful in isolating factors, which can result in failures. 
Further research could also explore the resource exchange dynamics within a portfolio company. 
What are the costs and benefits to a portfolio company o f utilizing resources from venture capital 
firms rather than offsetting88 these from  existing resources or obtainmg them from  outside 
sources? I f  a robust resource exchange process occurs which favorably reflects on the resource 
pool o f a portfolio company, does it in any way affect the long-term development of the 
company o r cognitive development of an entrepreneur. If a particular resource is being 
exchanged freely, would that encourage companies to explore further areas of exchange?
88 Strong resources support weak resources (W emfelt, 1984).
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Differential exchange relations could also reflect on the motivation of the entrepreneur or the 
management team.
Future research should determine to what extent the needs and the resource availability reflects 
on the selection o f portfolio companies by venture capital firms. D oes the resource need guide a 
portfolio com pany to approach a particular venture capital firm? Venture capital firms initially 
assess companies on the basis o f their resources. D oes information asymmetry on that score 
scare venture capital firms away from  portfolio companies? Can portfolio companies reveal their 
resources/capabilities without jeopardizing the possibility of a relationship? It would be 
interesting to find out how different levels of resource assessment of the portfolio companies 
impact the terms and conditions of the formal contract. Finally, it would be worthwhile to follow 
venture capital frrm s/portfolio companies longitudinally to see how their resource exchange 
relationship changes overtim e.
Future research should determine to what extent the resource exchange perspective is an issue 
during deal evaluation and the negotiation process. Unfortunately, the research data, because of 
its size, does not allow analysis on this score. It could be a very important area of research with 
profound effects on policy issues.
The fact that m ost o f the time venture capital firms co-invest (Bygrave, 1987) also makes a very 
interesting testing ground for resource exchange theory. H ow  do venture capital firms differ in 
resource assessm ent of the same company? D o all co-investors, as regards resource contribution, 
offer the same level o f support or do they differ according to their own resource perception. Are 
venture capital firms, who habitually choose to co-invest and do not assume a lead role in any 
way, mindful o f the deficiency o f their own resource pool?
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There is a growing trend am ong venture capital firms to form  what is known as “global 
networks” . It would be interesting to investigate whether cultural factors in any way effect the 
resource perceptions o f venture capital firms within these networks. Similarly, does the required 
resource pool com position differ, in any way, across countries? D o venture capital firms 
experience difficulties or a variation in resource assessm ent prior to the funding o f companies 
when they are from  different countries?
Lastly and m ost importantly, this study has found that venture capital firms’ policy toward 
involvement in their portfolio companies has a profound effect on their actual involvement. The 
factors that shape the policy o f a venture capital firm  regarding its level o f later involvement 
would make a very worthwhile research endeavor.
M ost o f the Asian venture capital markets are set to enter maturity during the first decade of this 
century. F o r Asians, it m ay be the period of realization and acceptance of venture capital as a 
viable alternative to traditional financing. The focus, thus, should also be on educating 
entrepreneurs. Asian venture capital, as has been seen, has evolved into a unique market. The US 
model o f venture capital is neither viable nor existent in Asia. Asian venture capital will benefit 
more from  further research being carried out in the Asian environment to yield a deeper 
understanding o f the forces that drive this industry.
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10 Appendix I- Secondary Data Source
1. There have been some discrepancies in the data contained in The Guide to Venture Capital 
in Asia, 1999 published by Asian Venture Capital Journal, Hong Kong. The data has been 
adjusted for these and the final results may not exactly match the data in the above guide. 
The details are.
a) A V Q  has rounded figures and therefore, the total in many cases does not exactly sum up. 
Since I have taken direct figures, all total are correct to the best of my knowledge and thus 
might differ slightly from  A V Q .
b) According to the A V Q  Directory, the seed and Mezzanine investment in Singapore is 3.6% 
and 24%  receptively whereas according to Singapore government survey available on the net, 
it is 34% and 12% respectively. Following is the A V Q  response to explain the extent of 
discrepancy. “When we are talking about Seed, we mean the stage where initial concept of 
the business is being formed. From  my knowledge, there is no way that Singapore could 
have 34%  invested in Seed stage since it is the m ost risky stage among all. If the info is from 
E D B , they may have accounted Start-up and Early stage into that 34% figure. One reason 
why the E D B  publishes the data so differendy from  ours is that they account only the funds 
that are raised in Singapore and invested in Singapore. For your information, Singapore 
firms get only about 10-20% of all fund raised locally.”89 A V Q  data has been used.
c) For reporting total venture capital pool in 1991 in Sri Lanka, A V Q  has used a currency 
conversion rate of SR79.50/U SD . Historical records do not verify this rate. A V Q  claims 
that this rate is supplied by Sri Lanka government and cannot be wrong. For the purpose of 
this study a rate of SR42.53/U 5D  has been used.
89 Personal correspondence record
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4  O n page 139 of the directory the Philippines’ total pool for 1996 is reported P 4,372 million 
and new funds raised as P 920 million. This has been reported equivalent on page 25 to 
US$166 and US$ 47 respectively. If calculated the rate amount to P26.34/US$ and 
P19.57/U S$ which are markedly different. As admitted by AVCJ this is an error and a 
conversion rate of P26.34/US$ has been used for calculating new funds raised
e) The reason why Korean venture capital investment portfolio in 1997 is more than total 
venture capital pool has been explained by A V Q  as follows:- “As most of the foreign private 
equity investments in Korea are denominated in US$ and Won had fell more than 50% 
during 1997, the accumulative portfolio become somewhat huge after converted into 
W on.”90
f) O n Page 92 of the directory the data depicted relating to investment portfolio in Japan 1991­
1996 is erroneous. Instead, data supplied later by A V Q  directly to me has been used
g) The venture capital pool reported separately in U SD  Million for China and Hong Kong for 
1997 is U SD  3,500 Million and U SD  9,632 Million respectively. The total comes to USD 
13,132 Million whereas it is reported as U SD  10,670 Million on page 28 when reported 
jointly. Similarly, new funds raised and annual investments in the separate country details 
when joined together do not produce the results indicated on page 25 for joint reporting. The 
A V Q  explains, “ PE firms treated Hong Kong and China very differently from other 
countries in A sia .... most Chinese investee compames here have businesses and investments 
in both China mainland and Hong Kong because of political and economical tie between the 
two places. To be most accurate, we have decided to run three different sets of survey - 
China (including SAR) as a whole, China mainland, and SAR. If you add China mainland 
and SA R  together, the result is much larger than China as a whole due to overlaps of how
90 Personal correspondence record
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funds and investments. In other words, it's very  difficult to break down the overall figure for 
China into two sets o f data since the percentage is hard to estimate.”91 Due to his difficulty, I 
have taken up the figures reported separately for both China and Hong Kong and thus there 
might be some overlap in the figures.
h) Unlike A V Q , because of significant cultural differences, venture capital markets of Australia 
and N ew  Zealand have not been included in Asia.
2. EV CA  has presented its private equity data in ECU. In order to make it comparable with 
other data an exchange rate E C U /U SD  existing as on D ec, 31 of respective years has been 
used. It has been taken from the historical records maintained by Board of Governors of 
Federal Reserve Systems, USA, available on the Internet.
3. The data on sources o f funds in case of Europe represent new funds raised 1997, in case of 
Asia total venture capital pool up to 1997 and in case of US sources o f capital commitments. 
This data may not be stricdy comparable but provides a good idea of sources of funds in 
respective regions.
91 Personal correspondence record
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11 A ppendix-II- R ecalculated  D ata (A V Q , 1998)
(USD Millions, unless specified otherwise)
Venture Capital Pool
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
China 184 878 1422 2384 3458 3612 3500
Hong Kong 0 0 0 0 0 8019 9632
India 93 113 149 243 281 784 1016
Indonesia 76 57 99 225 245 289 426
Japan 15352 16028 17750 17750 14851 11254 7722
Korea 1547 1629 1687 1902 2567 3224 1857
Malaysia 75 147 160 194 437 448 406
Myanmar 0 0 0 0 112 112 113
Pakistan 4 4 3 3 7 6 6
Philippines 16 26 58 85 123 166 169
Singapore 868 896 1013 1833 3164 3981 4468
Sri Lanka 8 16 20 49 64 67 71
Taiwan 412 470 508 562 696 1336 1913
Thailand 64 90 98 117 165 201 177
Vietnam 10 22 131 247 303 276 292
Total 18709 20376 23098 25594 26473 33775 31767
Calculated from AVQ, 1999
New Funds Raised
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
China 16 583 677 898 1028 294 96
Hong Kong 0 0 0 0 0 621 1920
India 23 31 13 90 51 433 263
Indonesia 52 0 31 117 29 45 146
Japan 782 870 605 1951 1633 1582 1010
Korea 207 151 97 268 895 1041 291
Malaysia 39 71 23 20 228 9 20
Myanmar 0 0 0 0 69 0 0
Pakistan 0 4 0 0 0 0 0
Philippines 0 10 3 33 41 35 25
Singapore 54 42 307 631 1058 721 1167
Sri Lanka 0 5 6 19 19 8 6
Taiwan 50 28 66 45 154 420 570
Thailand 17 25 7 14 29 33 47
Vietnam 10 12 109 115 53 22 17
Total 1251 1831 1944 4202 5287 5262 5577
Calculated from AVQ, 1999
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Sources of Venture Capital-1997
Corporations Private Pension Government Insurance Banks Reinvestments Others
Individuals Funds Agencies Companies (C Gains)
China 54.0% 0.7% 13.7% 2.5% 11.2% 12.4% 0.5% 5.0%
Hong Kong 51.9% 3.5% 12.9% 1.0% 20.4% 4.6% 0.0% 5.7%
India 49.1% 10.2% 2.8% 6.6% 2.0% 15.2% 0.0% 14.0%
Indonesia 25.3% 6.3% 7.6% 23.6% 5.9% 11.6% 0.0% 19.7%
Japan 51.8% 1.8% 5.4% 2.9% 11.9% 13.1% 0.0% 13.1%
Korea 37.0% 3.1% 1.3% 10.0% 2.3% 8.0% 3.6% 34.7%
Malaysia 28.8% 0.6% 1.3% 48.2% 2.0% 10.5% 0.0% 8.6%
Myanmar 46.3% 0.2% 0.0% 20.2% 5.7% 12.8% 0.0% 14.8%
Pakistan 60.0% 15.0% 0.0% 5.2% 0.2% 15.0% 0.0% 4.6%
Philippines 50.3% 4.8% 0.0% 7.9% 0.0% 23.8% 0.0% 13.2%
Singapore 43.9% 5.9% 3.5% 8.8% 6.4% 22.0% 0.0% 9.5%
Sri Lanka 32.0% 9.1% 1.1% 1.6% 5.1% 47.8% 0.0% 3.3%
Taiwan 66.7% 16.6% 3.0% 3.9% 4.8% 3.0% 0.0% 2.0%
Thailand 38.1% 11.6% 6.1% 0.0% 6.9% 31.4% 0.0% 5.9%
Vietnam 29.1% 0.9% 23.8% 2.4% 7.1% 24.6% 0.0% 12.1%
Calculated from AVQ, 1999
Annual Venture Capital Investments
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
China 65 242 645 678 609 550
Hong Kong NA NA NA NA 1183 778
India 29 33 55 71 101 112
Indonesia 18 11 37 99 55 62
Japan 406 322 1754 1467 1429 992
Korea 111 111 443 745 1139 920
Malaysia 11 34 63 73 58 49
Myanmar NA NA NA 15 27 0
Pakistan 0 0 0 0 0 0
Philippines 8 10 14 16 16 12
Singapore 120 186 236 240 461 388
Sri Lanka 3 6 8 5 7 5
Taiwan 61 148 132 216 429 643
Thailand 22 22 30 34 35 76
Vietnam 1 4 29 32 84 27
Total 854 1129 3446 3692 5632 4615
Calculated from AVQ, 1999
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Venture Capital Investment Portfolio
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
China 0 274 330 1071 1704 2273 2812
Hong Kong NA NA NA NA NA 4076 4691
India 49 73 100 138 183 281 357
Indonesia 8 27 37 56 152 202 245
Japan 5305 6008 6219 9688 8286 7174 6412
Korea 1211 1268 1348 1522 1989 2752 2490
Malaysia 22 46 78 125 191 249 214
Myanmar NA NA NA NA 20 47 47
Pakistan 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
Philippines 10 19 24 39 46 60 49
Singapore 399 460 720 924 1124 1530 1574
Sri Lanka 0 9 12 21 25 29 30
Taiwan 297 352 488 417 587 905 1277
Thailand 22 49 70 84 116 133 155
Vietnam 0 1 5 34 66 150 163
Total 7322 8585 9431 14121 14490 19863 20517
Calculated from AVQ, 1999
Venture Capital Investment by Stage-1997
Seed Start-up Expansion Mezzanine Turnaround Buyout Others
China 3.3% 21.8% 50.3% 4.1% 6.8% 12.3% 1.4%
Hong Kong 4.4% 34.5% 46.6% 2.4% 0.5% 10.0% 1.6%
India 9.1% 46.4% 37.8% 5.2% 0.4% 0.3% 0.8%
Indonesia 0.8% 6.3% 84.6% 5.0% 1.1% 0.9% 1.3%
Japan 2.3% 10.8% 50.7% 35.1% 1.1% 0.0% 0.0%
Korea 9.6% 19.8% 46.1% 15.0% 6.2% 3.3% 0.0%
Malaysia 0.0% 19.4% 42.3% 15.0% 0.0% 7.8% 15.5%
Myanmar 55.2% 39.9% 0.0% 4.9% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Pakistan 0.0% 95.0% 5.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Philippines 0.0% 13.3% 69.6% 5.0% 0.0% 12.1% 0.0%
Singapore 3.6% 242% 44.4% 24.1% 2.1% 1.6% 0.0%
Sri Lanka 0.9% 67.9% 22.0% 4.6% 2.8% 1.8% 0.0%
Taiwan 7.6% 16.3% 50.3% 24.2% 1.1% 0.5% 0.0%
Thailand 1.6% 21.4% 53.4% 14.9% 7.0% 0.0% 1.7%
Vietnam 0.2% 37.5% 61.2% 0.0% 1.1% 0.0% 0.0%




Consumer Computer Electronics Industrial Medical/ Communications Energy Transportation Construction Financial Other Other
Related Related Related Products Biotechnology Services Services Manufacturing
China 355 52 123 375 31 34 277 322 689 21 75 458
Hong Kong 1,004 145 99 938 145 615 202 432 647 103 127 230
India 80 72 15 86 35 13 9 8 4 0 11 25
Indonesia 73 3 5 84 1 14 2 3 5 12 10 33
Japan 1,231 398 468 795 147 212 199 135 571 526 917 814
Korea 167 261 391 628 50 252 37 79 86 40 127 374
Malaysia 19 23 23 24 2 5 3 0 6 0 44 64
Myanmar 18 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 12 11 4 0
Pakistan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Philippines 9 8 0 2 0 10 0 1 5 6 7 2
Singapore 165 201 249 178 133 182 39 26 131 73 78 119
Sri Lanka 9 0 1 2 0 3 1 2 0 3 1 7
Taiwan 20 365 495 94 13 97 8 31 8 41 20 84
Thailand 29 4 14 24 3 14 0 0 38 2 14 12
Vietnam 50 0 0 0 7 0 0 1 49 25 2 30
Total 3,228 1,532 1,884 3,232 568 1,450 778 1,039 2,251 862 1,438 2,253




Consumer Computer Electronics Industrial Medical/ Communications Energy Transportation Construction Financial Other Other
Related Related Related Products Biotech. Services Services Manufacturing
China 52 8 26 59 7 7 37 34 41 5 21 30
Hong Kong 167 48 27 154 17 41 38 38 72 14 17 41
India 122 102 41 195 78 16 19 13 9 0 41 66
Indonesia 180 21 50 204 2 9 8 13 19 18 62 114
Japan 2242 821 968 1,368 200 253 284 189 979 663 1,358 1,200
Korea 151 226 254 526 100 170 31 31 58 26 84 211
Malaysia 26 15 21 22 4 3 3 0 5 0 30 37
Myanmar 3 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 4 2 1 0
Pakistan 2 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 2 0 7
Philippines 10 3 2 3 9 3 4 4 7 6 5
Singapore 77 169 147 79 92 81 7 14 34 27 47 72
Sri Lanka 38 5 2 9 2 7 2 4 4 8 5 28
Taiwan 16 289 375 77 20 96 15 6 6 27 13 114
Thailand 35 3 11 19 3 15 3 0 24 9 14 13
Vietnam 14 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 16 9 3 8
Total 3135 1,710 1,924 2,716 527 707 453 347 1,275 817 1,702 1,946
Calculated from AVQ, 1999
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Exits/Divestments - --------------------- -----------------
China
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
-209 186 -96 45 40 11
Hong Kong Error Error Error Error 384 163
India 0 0 16 10 2 1
Indonesia -2 1 16 1 0 21
Japan 0 820 124 1286 1666 924
Korea 0 0 301 321 197 150
Malaysia -13 0 20 7 2 1
Myanmar Error Error Error 0 0 0
Pakistan 0 0 0 -1 0 0
Philippines -1 4 1 7 2 2
Singapore 64 -64 98 72 68 113
Sri Lanka -6 2 -1 0 1 2
Taiwan 0 0 203 31 112 123
Thailand -4 0 18 1 17 6
Vietnam 0 0 0 0 0 14
Total -171 948 700 1781 2491 1531
Calculated from AVQ, 1999
Capital Under Investment/ 







China 76.1 8.6 17.8 14.3
Hong Kong 105.8 7.0 22.6 11.0
India 24.2 0.5 4.6 1.6
Indonesia 9.3 0.3 2.1 1.2
Japan 32.0 0.6 4.2 3.5
Korea 14.5 1.3 4.4 5.9
Malaysia 21.4 1.3 7.7 4.0
Myanmar 37.7 4.3 11.3 4.7
Pakistan 2.0 0.1 1.0 0.2
Philippines 21.1 0.9 3.8 1.1
Singapore 75.7 1.9 13.1 4.6
Sri Lanka 7.1 0.3 3.1 1.3
Taiwan 25.8 1.2 5.9 3.9
Thailand 25.3 1.0 3.8 3.3
Vietnam 41.7 3.1 9.7 5.5
Total 40.5 1.2 7.6 4.9
Calculated from AVQ, 1999
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China 688.0 4.3 61.1 62.9%
Hong Kong 4,945.0 4.7 51.5 50.8%
India 659.5 5.3 8.5 35.8%
Indonesia 181.3 4.4 5.3 70.0%
Japan 1,309.2 7.5 26.6 63.7%
Korea -633.8 3.3 19.5 85.4%
Malaysia 191.8 2.8 11.3 55.6%
Myanmar 66.0 3.3 15.7 42.0%
Pakistan 4.9 2.0 0.4 20.0%
Philippines 119.8 5.6 6.2 36.1%
Singapore 2,894.2 5.8 26.7 38.4%
Sri Lanka 41.3 2.3 3.0 42.9%
Taiwan 635.5 4.4 173 67.8%
Thailand 21.4 6.7 222 66.2%
Vietnam 128.0 4.3 23.4 54.3%
Total 11,252.1 5.3 26.2 58.8%













China 80.3% 1.7 7.1 1.9 0.4
Hong Kong 48.7% 1.6 7.4 2.6 0.6
India 35.1% 3 2 16.7 0.6 0.1
Indonesia 57.4% 3.5 15.2 0.2 0.1
Japan 83.0% 5.8 43.7 0.8 0.1
Korea 134.1% 4.4 14.6 0.4 0.1
Malaysia 52.7% 3.1 8.7 0.5 02
Myanmar 41.6% 1.1 3.7 0.9 0.3
Pakistan 18.9% 2.3 4.7 0.1 0.0
Philippines 292% 1.2 7.0 0.5 0.1
Singapore 352% 2.5 14.3 1.9 03
Sri Lanka 41.9% 5.0 11.4 0.2 0.1
Taiwan 66.8% 3 2 14.2 0.6 0.1
Thailand 87.8% 3 2 213 0.6 0.1
Vietnam 55.8% 1.8 7.6 1.0 0.2
Average 64.6% 4.1 22.0
Calculated from AVQ, 1999
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12 Appendix III- Questionnaire
University of Wollongong












1-1. Year this fund became operational 19
1-2. H um an Resource
Number o f Partners/Senior Management Personnel: Nos.
Average Years o f Experience of Partners/Senior Management Personnel
in the Venture Capital Industry: Yrs.
Average Years o f Experience of Partners/Senior Management Personnel
in Other Industries: Yrs.
1-3. Rank by your preference for Stage(s) of development of your investees at the time of 
the initial investment (Please lick  v' and Rank)
0 Prefer Rank
Seed (Research and Planning)
Start-up (Market Entry)
Early expansion (Market 
Development)
Late expansion (Market Exploitation)
Mezzanine funding (Preparation for 
IPO)
Public Company (self explanatory)
Leveraged buyouts
Turnarounds
0 No Particular Preference
1-4. Average Amount of Capital under Management during the last one year. (Please Tick
0
0 Less than KRW10 billion 
0 Between KRW  20-30 billion 
0 Between KRW  40-50 billion
0 Between KRW 10-20 billion 
0 Between KRW 30-40 billion 
0 More Than KRW 50 billion
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1-5 Y early A verage Percentage R eturn on Investm ent (Please Tick S )
1-6. R ole as L ead  Investor(Please Tick vQ
1-7 B o ard  R epresentation  (Please Tick S )
2 4 2
A ppendix I II
Section 2
Involvement as a lead investor (Please provide the following infoimation in relation to 
any portfolio company in which you are acting as lead investor. In case vou are not acting 
as lead investor in any investment kindly provide the following information about any 
one of your portfolio company of vour choice)





2-1. Year this company became operational: 19
2-2. Total Assets (Please Tick S)
0 Less than K RW 1-2 billion 
0 Between KRW 3-4 billion 
0 Between KRW 5-6 billion
0 Between KRW 2-3 billion 
0 Between KRW 4-5 billion 
0 More Than KRW 6 billion
2-3. The percentage of your share in the total equity (Please Tick S)
0 Less than 15% 016-30% 0 31-45% 0 46-60% 0 61-75% ©More than75%
2-4. Year Venture Capital Received First 19
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2-5. C om pany stage o f developm ent (Please Tick S)
mm W ; • ire Capital was fust Received I At Present
Seed (Research and Planning)
Start-up (Market Entry}
Early expansion (Market Development)
Late expansion (Market Exploitation)
Mezzanine (Preparation for IPO)
Public Company (self explanatory}
■ I • . ,  i I -11 i
Turnarounds f
am
2-6. O n the Scale o f 1-5 where would you place this com pany in term s o f technology?
(Please Tick *S)
Very High Tech ©  ©  ©  ©  O  Low-Tech
2-7. C om position  o f B oard  o f D irectors o f the Com pany
2-8. N u m b er an d duration o f m eetings that you had with the M anagem ent/C E O  of the 
Portfolio C om pany during the la st one year :-
Num ber of Formal Meetings each lasting for________ Hours on Average
N um ber of Informal Meetings each lasting for________ Hours on Average
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2-9. Frequency o f con tact with M an agem en t/C E O  o f your portfolio com pany on 
telephone during the la st one m onth?
______ Times, each call lasting for approximately___________ minutes.
2-10. N u m b er o f reports required to be filed by  the portfolio com pany
Frequency D aily Weekly ; Fortnightly « i l t e f l y " Yearly
Numbers
2-11. H ow  usefu l do you believe has been the interaction with your Portfolio Com pany for 
you? (Please Tick v')
0 Very Useful 
0 Useful
0 N ot sure/Can’t say 
0 N ot Much 
0 N ot Useful at all
2-12. I f  you are facing any constraints preventing you from  interaction with your portfolio 
com panies p lease tick  /  a n d /o r  list
0 N o Constraints 
0 Time
0 Non-Go-operation o f the Portfolio Company 
0 Any O ther:________________________
2-13. H ow  w ould you rate the perform ance o f this portfolio com pany so far? (Please Tick
0 Outstanding 0 G ood 0 Satisfactory
0 Unsatisfactory 0 Poor
2-14. Involvem ent R atin g (Involvem ent in the affairs o f portfolio com pany by the 
venture -cap italist) (Please Tick V)
2 4 5
Appendix III
trend in Your Involvement 
i ; in the referred 
portfolio company
country
2-15. H ow  w ould you rate the general reputation o f the portfolio com pany /m anagem ent 
team  w ithin its particu lar industry ? (Please Tick S)
0 Well Above Average 0 Above Average
0 Average 0 Below Average
0 Much Below  Average
2-16. H ow  do you rate the com petency o f your portfolio com pany/m anagem ent team  
regarding the optim al u sage  o f resources available to it/th em  (Please Tick vQ
0 Well Above Average 0 Above Average
0 Average 0 Below Average
0 Much Below  Average
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2-17. State the level o f your participation  in the follow ing activities in your portfolio 
com pany. (Please Tick vQ
1 Never
2 Less Than Venture Management Team
3 As much as Venture Management Team
4 More than Venture Management Team
5 All participation by You
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R esource A ssessm en t
Section 3
3-1. H ow  w ould you rate resource strengths o f your fund m anagem ent team  and their 
ability to  a s s is t  your portfolio com pany in  the following areas:-
(Please Tick
1. Well Above Average 2. Above Average 3. Average
4. Below Average 5. Well below Average
3-2. H ow  w ould you rate the in-house resources o f your Portfolio Com pany in term s o f 
the follow ing capabilities vis-à-vis com panies in the sam e industry o f your country:-
1. Well Above Average 2. Above Average 3. Average
4. Below  Average 5. Well below Average
(Please Tick S)______________________________________________________ _
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13 A ppendix -IV  Correspondence Record
Correspondence Record: Asian Venture Capital Journal
Identity: Tom m y Yip, Editor, Asian Venture Capital Journal 
Date: Wed, 26 M ay 1999 
Country: H ong K ong
D ear Mr. Naqi,
I am replying your earlier email about some errors that you have found in the Guide to 
Venture Capital in Asia.
1. Page 28. There seem s to be a discrepancy regarding reporting of total venture capital pool in 
China and H ong K ong. The venture capital pool reported separately in U SD  Million for China 
and Hong K ong fo r 1997 is USD 3,500 Million and U SD  9,632 Million respectively. The total 
comes to U SD  13,132 Million whereas it is reported as U SD  10,670 Million on page 28. 
Similarly, new funds raised and annual investments in the separate country details when joined 
together do not produce the results indicated on page 25. Same is the case with number of 
venture capital firms.
This is N O T  a discrepancy. Since 90% of the private equity firms treat Hong Kong and China 
as one pool, we have compiled one overall figure for Hong Kong &  China. This overall figure 
is N O T  the sum  o f the figures in Hong Kong and China section. Please read Pg. 15 for more 
detail.
2. Page 151 - According to the your directory the seed and Mezzanine investment in Singapore 
is 3.6% and 24%  receptively whereas according to Singapore government survey available on 
the net it is 34%  and 12% respectively. Why so large a difference.
When we are talking about Seed, we mean the stage where initial concept of the business is 
being formed. From  m y knowledge, there is no way that Singapore could have 34% invested in 
Seed stage since it is the most risky stage among all. If the info is from ED B they may have 
accounted Start-up and Early stage into that 34% figure. One reason why the ED B publishes 
the data so differently from  ours is that they account only the funds that are raised in Singapore
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and invested in Singapore. For your information, Singapore firms get only about 10-20% of all 
fund raised locally.
3. Page 28- As per page 28 the venture capital pool in Pakistan was USD 3 M illion. The details 
provided in the Pakistan sections records Pak Rs. 250 Million and thus usage of an exchange 
rate of P akR s. 83/U SD . Similarly Sri Lanka venture capital pool on page 28 has been recorded 
at U SD  4 Million in 1991 and details in the Sri Lanka section exhibits SR 319 million indicating 
conversion rate o f SR  80/U SD . As far as 1 remember, exchange rates in these countries have 
never touched 80/U SD .
As per page 28 the venture capital pool in Pakistan was U SD  6 Million N O T USD 3 Million. If 
you use Rs. 250 million to be divided by 6, you get 41.6 N O T  83. Exchange rate for Sri Lanka 
in 1991 is provided by the Sri Lanka Government and 1 believe this rate is accurate.
Page- 126. The N ew  Zealand -Sources o f venture capital pie chart seems to be wrong since the 
total comes to 109 instead of 100.
This is an error. The percentage of Insurance Companies should be 8% instead of 17.4%. 
Thank you for your kind attention.
5. Page 105. Korean venture capital investment is more than total venture capital pool in 1997. 
Page 61. The total amount in U SD  for Hong Kong comes to USD 4687 Million and not to 
U SD  4,691 Million.
Since m ost o f the foreign private equity investments in Korea are denominated in US$ and 
Won had fell more than 50% during 1997, the accumulative portfolio become somewhat huge 
after converted into Worn Please refer to Pg. 15. The total amount in USD for Hong Kong 
comes to  U SD  4,691 Million and not to U SD  4,687 Million.
6. Page 25. There seems to be a currency conversion rate error in either the total venture capital 
pool in 1996 on page 28 for Philippines or the new funds raised.
This is N O T  an conversion rate error. As you may be aware of, the Peso had devaluated so 
much during the second half of 1997 It was around P26/US$ during 1996, and came down to 
around P 4 0 /U S $  in 1997.
250
7. Page 68- The graph relating to Indian venture capital investment portfolio is wrong as it 
depicts IR  16,528 in 1997 instead of 14,628 as on page 65.
This is an error. Please refer to 14,628 in Pg. 65 and ignore the 19,528. Thank you for your 
kind attention.
8. Page-92 The data depicted relating to investment portfolio in Japan 1991-1996 seems to be 
seriously flaw ed 1 can pick up data 1995-1997 from page 91 but will appreciate if you can 
supply the correct data from  1991-1994.
Attached please find the excel file with the figures that you need 
If you have any further questions, please send me an email. Thank you.
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ID EN T ITY : JU N G -K Y O O  YA N G , CH IEF, INTERNATIO NAL BUSINESS 
D EPA RTM EN T, K O R E A  TEC H N O LO G Y  CO RPORATIO N 
D A TE: M ARCH  18,1999
CO UNTRY: S O U IH K O R E A
Q. 1. D o you believe that there is a difference between the American and Asian 
style/definition o f venture capital? if yes, please elaborate.
Ans: Asian venture capital is not a venture capital, but a private equity capital. 1 define this way 
as Asian V C  does not take a risk o f technology or commercial feasibility. They do not invest in 
start-up or young stage. We see some American style in Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore, but 
most cases are large sized private equity investments in stabilized and proven companies for 
their growth or expansion purpose.
Q~2. Please state your opinion about the hindrances to the development of venture capital in 
Asia?
Ans: Investment exit mechanism must be well developed for venture capital growth. Without 
this, how and why do they invest?
Q.3. What is your opinion about the effect of Asian crisis on venture capital market of Asia? 
Ans: 3. In K orea, the crisis was the once in a life time opportunities for venture capital 
investments as it nosed down deal price and many good ventures were in need of working 
capital and growth capital which were financed in debt form. In addition, the crisis made them 
change their attitude on debt financing. They became to carefully listen to equity financing.
Q.4. What is your opinion about the involvement of venture capitalist in the affairs of the 
portfolio companies? Please elaborate.
Ans: As venture capitalists have observed various cases of business matters in other portfolio, 
they are in good position to give advises. In financial side, their contribution cannot be 
neglected and annoyed. Their role in bringing the portfolio to public stock market will be of 
critical significance.
Q.5. What kind o f activities do you think are best suited for the venture capitalist to be 
involved in its portfolio companies?
Ans: Advising on financial matters. Helping establishing business alliance. Assisting in IPO
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ID E N T IT Y : C O N FID E N T IA L (O N  REQ U EST)
D A T E : M A RCH  23,1999 
CO U N TRY: SIN G A PO R E
Q .l. D o  you believe that there is a difference between the American and Asian style/definition 
o f venture capital? If yes please elaborate.
Ans; Cannot comment, we are not an American VG
Q.2 Please state your opinion about the hindrances to the development of venture capital in 
Asia?
Ans: Hindrances include over-supply of cheap debt with risks mispriced Also poor treatment 
of minority shareholders, poor transparency and lack of familiarity with dealing with external 
shareholders.
Q.3. What is your opinion about the effect of Asian crisis on venture capital market of Asia? 
Ans: It has devastated portfolio returns, which were already poor. There is a short term need 
for capital, but whether the structural and altitudinal changes have taken place to make the 
market more attractive is unproven.
Q.4. What is your opinion about the involvement of venture capitalist in the >  affairs of the 
portfolio companies? Please elaborate.
Ans: VGs can add-value in many ways depending on their team competencies, and on the 
contract between V C  and investee. What matters is that VGs do not substitute for good full 
time executives.
Q.4. What kind of activities do you think are best suited for the venture capitalist to be 
involved in its portfolio companies?
Ans: Appropriate areas for VGs to contribute surround strategy, projects outside the usual 
business like acquisitions and IPOs.
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ID EN T IT Y : N O E L  SA N BO RN , PRIN CIPA L, A T .K E A R N Y  
D A TE: A PR IL 5 ,1999 
CO U NTRY: SIN G A PO R E
Q .l. Please state your opinion about the hindrances to the development of venture capital in 
Asia?
Ans:
•  There are very few experienced V C teams. Too many people in the industry are few driven 
rather than carry driven deals.
•  There is too much money chasing to few good
•  Company transparency
•  Bank bankruptcy laws are in adequate corruption and criminal with in investee companies 
and sometimes in V C  funds
Q.2. What is your opinion about the effect of Asian crisis on venture capital >  market of Asia? 
Ans: More opportunity to invest but must still be careful
Q.3. What is your opinion about the involvement of venture capitalist in the affairs of the 
portfolio companies? Please elaborate.
Ans: A  good V C  person should be able to add a lot of value and should be sought after by 
investee companies. Instead, many firms just want cheap money with minimal strings attached. 
Q.4. What kind o f activities do you think are best suited for the venture capitalist to be 
involved in its portfolio companies?
Ans: Anything in which they can add value.
ID EN T IT Y : N IC H O LA S ASHBY, M AN A G IN G  D IRECTO R, GLO BA L ALLIANCE 
CA PITAL (M ALAYSIA)
D A T E: A PR IL 5 ,1999
CO U N TRY: M A LA YSIA
Answers below, and brochure attached for your perusal. G ood luck with your project - 1 look 
forward to seeing the results of your work when complete.
Q .l. D o you believe that there is a difference between the American and Asian style/definition 
o f venture capital? if yes, please elaborate.
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Ans: Yes - in U S it means capital for start-ups or early-stage companies, whereas in Asia and 
particularly in Malaysia it refers to pre-IPO funding, across a broader range of sectors than 
would be the case in US. There is less of a pioneer spirit and more of a quick profit motive 
here
Q.2. Please state your opinion about the hindrances to the development of venture capital in 
Asia?
There are many:
•  Unrealistic price expectation
•  Opaque accounting e.g. profits depressed for tax reasons)
•  Insufficient management depth /  capability /  experience to give investors confidence to 
invest
•  Poorly prepared / ill thought-out business plans
Q.3. What is your opinion about the effect of Asian crisis on venture capital >market of Asia?
•  Reduced number of opportunities
•  Many financial projections unattainable
•  More difficult to  exit by listing
•  Therefore VC's need higher IRR  hurdle to justify investment, so inevitably the 
volum e/value o f investments has declined and will continue to do so.
Q.4. What is your opinion about the involvement of venture capitalist in the affairs of the 
portfolio companies? Please elaborate.
Ans:
•  Should restrict to board meeting attendance and inspection of monthly management 
accounts
•  N ot interfere in day-to-day business or management
•  Should be ready to help when company in trouble or when asked
•  Should not lose sight o f partnership with owner
Q.5. What: kind o f activities do you think are best suited for the venture capitalist to be 
involved in its portfolio companies?
Ans: See above. There is a trend towards greater management involvement and control, largely 
a symptom o f the Asia crisis and need for VC's to maximise their returns. However this is very
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time consuming, so they need to appoint outsiders to take on the key roles. In this way they 
become part o f a management buy-in team.
ID E N T IT Y : C O N FID E N T IA L (O N  REQ U EST)
D A TE: A PRIL, 07,1999
CO U N TRY: H O N G  K O N G  
D ear M r N aqi
M any thanks for your emails and I apologise for the delay in responding.
It is not apparent form  your email whether you know that our form  is , in fact, a law firm 
rather than a venture capital firm. While we have experience in acting on both side of the 
venture capital industry (both for investees and targets), our involvement is on legal basis rather 
than from  a str ia  commercial, venture capitalist approach.
Notwithstanding this, I attach below some responses to the questions which you raised.
It is not apparent
Q .l. D o you believe that there is a difference between the American and Asian style/definition 
of venture capital? If yes, please elaborate.
Ans: O ur experience of venture capital in Europe suggest that there is a difference between the 
style/ definition adopted in Europe and the approach in Asia. While there is generally a focus 
on seed capital and start up capital in Western economies (moving on to development capital 
and mezzanine financing), in Asia capitalists appear reluctant to encounter the greater risk 
associated with this approach. Accordingly, venture capital appears more direaed towards 
development capital, backing expanding companies with a proven track record.
Q.2 Please state your opinion about the hindrances to the development of venture capital in 
Asia?
Ans: The biggest hindrance, in my view, is the difference in valuation placed on targets by the 
owners and the investors, owners are still valuing "pre-crash" while investors are taking a 
longer term view and valuing on post crash asset values. This is one of the biggest difficulties in 
progressing venture capital activities. Another is the reluctance of targets to appreciate the goals 
o f the capitalists. Many exists for capitalists require the investees to relinquish control of what 
m ay be long standing family companies. Capitalists require a rate of return on their money that 
m ay not allow investees to continue to operate and develop the business in the way that, 
historically, they may have operated.
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Q.2. What is your opinion about the effect of Asian crisis on venture capital market of Asia? 
Ans: The crisis has thrown up opportunities for venture capitalists and focused targets minds 
on the different means o f fund raising available to them. However, the differences in valuation 
prove a hindrance.
Q.3. What is your opinion about the involvement of venture capitalist in the affairs of the 
portfolio companies? Please elaborate.
Ans: It is surprising to us, with experience of the European market, that venture capitalists in 
Asia have, historically, been willing to take minority positions without management control. 
Even post crash, this seems to be the case. This appears to us to be an historic hold over, based 
on the culture of Asia owners unwilling to relinquish any form  of control over their business. 
While capitalists work around this, it is likely, in our opinion, that greater emphasis is likely to 
be placed on obtaining management control in the future, primarily in order to protea 
investments made in these turbulent times.
Q.4. What kind o f activities do you think are best suited for the venture capitalist to be 
involved in its portfolio companies?
Ans: Venture capitalists do not want day to day involvement in portfolio companies. What they 
seek is the ability to shape development in order to secure their return. Accordingly, strategic 
involvement in business developmentis, probably, the most important area in which venture 
Capitalists would seek to be involved.
I hope that the above comments are helpful. They are given to you only for collation with 
other comments you receive and to be used in your thesis without direa quotation or 
attribution. These are my views and not necessarily those of the Firm. Please keep this 
information strictly confidential and do not reveal the source in your thesis.
I shall be delighted for an opportunity to review the information you have obtained as a result 
o f your research. I hope that my input is helpful.
ID E N T IT Y : C O N FID E N T IA L (O N  REQUEST)
D A T E : A PR IL 19,1999 
CO U N TR Y : H O N G  K O N G
Since I am  responsible for the China business, my comments only pertain to my experience 
there:
Q .l. What are different sources of potential venture capital deals?
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Ans: Sources - contacts o f all sorts, lawyers, deal brokers, investment bankers, accountants, 
govt. etc. etc.
Q.2. What investment evaluation criteria do you use to select projects for financing?
2Ans: Evaluation criteria - business sector, internal discipline, deal structure, risk evaluation, 
references, etc.
Q.3. What is the normal IR R  and the average holding period in venture capital financing?
Ans: IR R  25%  or above
Q.4. What exit routes are normally employed by venture capitalists?
Ans: Exit, put option, sale to business partner, trade sale.
Hope the above is useful
ID E N T IT Y : STA N D A R D  C H A R TER ED  ASIA D EV ELO PM EN T CAPITAL LTD. 
D A TE: A PR IL 21,1999 
CO U N TRY: H O N G  K O N G
Sony to tell you that I haven't checked my e-mail for sometime and you are not alone.
Anyway, here is a brief reply:
Q .l. What are different sources o f potential venture capital deals?
Ans: Sources o f V C  deals are mainly three for me (1) investment banks, (2) fellow VC firms, 
and (3) personal connections.
Q 2 . What investment evaluation criteria do you use to select projects for financing?
Ans: It varies but m ost would emphasize (1) track records, (2) management quaky, (3) growth 
potential, and (4) exit mechanism
Q.3. What is he normal IRR  and the average holding period in venture capital financing?
Ans: IR R  fo r m y company is 30% and holding period 1 to 5 years.
Q.4. What exit routes are normally employed by venture capitalists?
Ans: Exits are mainly through IPO. However, 3rd party sales sometimes occur and the deal 
structure always include redemption by the issuer if IPO /exit does not take place within the 
holding period.
Q.5. What do you see are the hindrance to development of venture capital in Asia
Ans: Hindrance include the low market valuation for some sectors in certain markets e.g.
industrial sector in Hong Kong. Another one is the mental resistance of giving up equity to
outside parties.
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Q.6. What do you believe will be the effect o f Asian crises on venture capital?
Ans: Asian Crisis caused many investments to fold mainly due to F X  losses and tightened 
credit. O n the other hand, it also opened doors for VC in some of the more restricted 
countries such as K orea and Taiwan with bargain hunting opportunities.
Q.7. What do you believe is the future of venture capital Asia?
Ans: Finally, the V C  industry in Asia will become more popular and sophisticated. However, 
it'll also drive up the pricing of deals as many more funds flow in.
ID E N T IT Y : C O N FID E N T IA L (O N  REQ U EST)
D A TE: A PR IL 2 ,2000  
C O U N TR Y  :H O N G  K O N G
Q. 1. Is Asian venture capital culture different form venture capital culture in the United States 
and Europe? In what respect?
Ans: 1: The main differences are:
1) In the U S and Europe the Private equity investor normally has a clear control position in the 
company. In Asia it is normally a minority interest. It is much harder in Asia to enforce a 
positive agenda on a company.
2) Given that in U S/Europe management is motivated by options and has no other significant 
interests, in Asia Management is often the dominant shareholder and often has other interests 
including. This makes it much harder to align economic incentives between Financial investors 
and management.
Q.2. D o you believe that venture capitalists in Asia are having an easier time as compared to 
their counterparts in Europe/United States?
Ans: N o, I have done M BO’s in the U SA  and Europe and the Private equity Business is harder 
in Asia. There is a much more substantial educational exercise to teach partners and managers 
what exits and shareholder value really mean.
Q.3. D o you believe that venture capitalists in Asia allocate more time and efforts toward 
involvement in portfolio companies than venture capitalists in the United States and Europe? 
W hy/W hynot?
Ans: In Asia there is too much emphasis on doing deals. Investors need to be more 
interventionary and add more value to portfolio companies. This is the main reason why the 
issues at Q1 are so vital
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Q.4. What factors have hindered you in building up an ideal value-added relationship with your 
portfolio company?
Ans: Management obsession with an imperialistic sense of "control", lack of transparency 
about use of capital and business performance and problems in aligning interests.
Q.5. D o you agree that the value-added role of venture capitalist is more hype than reality? 
Why/Why not?
Ans: In the U S and Europe there is no Hype about added value; it is being created and that is 
why high returns are made. In Asia it is the main weakness in the area where mangers need to 
walk the walk rather than talk the talk!
ID E N T IT Y  : G O D W IN  PO N , IN V E ST M EN T  M A N A G ER , AGRI-FO O D  EQ U ITY  
FU N D
D A TE .-APRIL 4 ,2001 
CO UNTRY: C A N A D A
Hello. I'd appreciate it if I could get a complete copy of your report. I would be happy to 
participate in your survey. In your analysis of the venture capital market in Asia, did you break 
the funds down m y sectors?? I'd be interested to know where some of the dollars are going 
into. Other factors such as size of investment, structure, and stage the company was at (start 
up/expanding/restructuring) would be useful as well. Here are my responses.
Q .l. H ow  do you determine whether your portfolio company needs your assistance?
Ans: As one o f our conditions with our investments we always request a seat on the company’s 
board o f directors. Sometimes depending on the company that seat/option we have will be 
just as an observer or it may be in an active capacity, ie as a full board director. Other value 
added services we provide are training sessions to our invested companies CEO s. Training 
sessions such as Corporate Governance, IPO , etc We consider this all as value added service. 
During these special outings where we get the CEO s together we encourage them to identify 
any synergies within one another and network opportunities.
Remember as a V C  you are essentially like a partner to the company. So as a partner what else 
do you have to offer (clients, referrals, services to the company.
Q 2 . What conditions are necessary for a venture capitalist to be able to add more value in his 
portfolio company?
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Ans: I think it is extremely valuable and important. A  venture capitalists must be able to 
provide more than just financing. We tell our clients and encourage them to see other vc...to 
see what they have to offer, all vcs offer $...But what else sets them apart from one another. 
Q.3. What conditions are necessary for a portfolio company to able to derive most benefits 
from  the value-added efforts of venture capitalist?
Ans: To value the feedback vcs provide. Sometimes it takes a company in crisis before they 
will start to listen to outside advice.
Q.4. D o you believe that venture capitalists that are more involved in their portfolio companies 
perform  any better? Why/W hy not?
Ans: I think this depends on the relationship between the vc and company. There is no way 
that the vc can understand the business as good as the CEO. Otherwise if we have this 
situation the vc shouldn't have invested in the company anyways. Overall I think if the 
relationship between the two is good, yes...I think that the company performs better. We do 
not take an active interests to be involved in the day to day activities... I don't want to know 
what their hours o f operations are. As an investor I trust my CEO  to take care of the day to 
day stuff..
Q.5. D o  you believe that the relation between you and the owner of your portfolio company is 
a principal/ agent relation? Why/Why not?
Ans: N ot sure I understand.
ID E N T IT Y : C O N FID E N T IA L (O N  REQ U EST)
D A T E : A PRIL 4, .2000 
CO U N TRY: TAIW AN
We are one of many V C  firms in Taiwan. M y comments only represent what we see in Taiwan. 
The above comment is just to let you know the reality in Taiwan. Please do not quote me.
Q. 1. Is Asian venture capital culture different form venture capital culture in the United States
and Europe? In what respect?
Ans: V Cs here are different among ourselves. Some of us follow the US VC practice,some 
others may choose to follow the traditional way
Q.2. D o  you believe that venture capitalists in Asia are having an easier time as compared to 
their counterparts in Europe/United States?
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Ans: I don't understand what do you mean by "easier time". It is not easier to make the right 
investment decision in Taiwan. The capital market is not as mature as we have in US. The 
valuation method is US is well developed while in Taiwan it is very different and is still 
developing.
Q.3. D o  you believe that venture capitalists in Asia allocate more time and efforts toward 
involvement in portfolio companies than venture capitalists in the United States and Europe? 
W hy/W hy not?
Ans: M ost o f the startups in US are backed by VCs only. The lead investor is the only helping 
hand besides the management. In Taiwan , there is usually a "chairman" act as the lead 
investor. The VCs are helping only. In case that the VC is the lead investor, VC usually spend a 
lot of time on the company. In U S, those co-invest "VCs" are not much involved neither.
Q.4. What factors have hindered you in building up an ideal value-added relationship with your 
portfolio company?
Ans: M ost VCs do provide value-added service to our companies. We help in business 
connections, hiring, strategy consulting... very similar with our US counter parts. In some cases, 
VCs do spend not much time in their company. These are late stage investments. For late stage 
investors, they are different with startup investors. We may have more late stage investors in 
Taiwan claim to be VCs than in US.
Q.5. D o  you agree that the value-added role of venture capitalist is more hype than reality? 
W hy/W hy not?
Ans: Value-added is the job of VCs. It is a general practice, not a hype. In Taiwan, some 
management do not have close relation with their VC investor. They sometime do not willing 
to disclose their problems with their V C investor. V C in this case are just mostly minor 
investors. There m aybe more co-invest VCs in Taiwan than in US. Those VCs that take lead in 
Taiwan, still very active in management involvement.
ID E N T IT Y : C O N FID EN TIA L (O N  REQ UEST)
D A T E : A PR IL 15,2000 
CO U N TR Y : H O N G  K O N G
Q .l. H ow  do you determine whether your portfolio company needs your assistance?
Ans: We always as a policy focus investments on few industries where we can help our 
companies. We strengthen our assistance when cash is finishing and new round of financing is
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required, when there are organisational problems (vacant positions, not right people...), when 
budget is not respected.
Q.2. What conditions are necessary for a venture capitalist to be able to add more value in his 
portfolio company?
Ans: Have network of contacts, know the industry, have management experience, have gone 2­
3 times through whole investment process
Q.3. What conditions are necessary for a portfolio company to able to derive most benefits 
from  the value-added efforts o f venture capitalist?
Ans: Right equity ownership (not too much not too little), have VC representative sitting on 
board, try to understand V C  fund portfolio and experience so that he can ask for help in 
relevant situations
Q.4. D o you believe that venture capitalists that are more involved in their portfolio companies 
perform any better? Why/Why not?
Ans: Yes if V.Capitalists have experience in the company industry
Q.5. D o you believe that the relation between you and the owner of your portfolio company is 
a principal/ agent relation with you as principal and the owner as your agent? Why/Why not? 
Ans: N o, because if it is perceived like that, people cannot collaborate in the right way. 
Sometimes it is like that because management does not have right attitude.
ID E N T IT Y : H A R JEE V  KA N D H A RI, NEW  M ED IA  SPARK 
D A T E: A PR IL 18,2000 
CO U N TRY: U N IT E D  K IN G D O M
In response to your request for some information from  NewMedia SPARK, Harjeev has put 
forward some answers for you:
Q .l. H ow  do you determine whether your portfolio company needs your assistance?
Ans: Companies can always use the assistance of their V C  Some need more help than others 
and we assess this through performance metrics and milestones met.
Q.2. What conditions arc necessary for a venture capitalist to be able to add more value in his 
portfolio company?
Ans: V C  needs expertise, contacts etc that are relevant to the company. VC needs to be on the 
Board and have regular contact with the company.
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Q.3. What conditions are necessary for a portfolio company to able to derive most benefits 
from  the value-added efforts of venture capitalist?
Ans: The com pany needs to be open to their V C adding value. Some companies resent VCs 
meddling. Personality issues are very important here. They need to understand where the VC 
is coming from. Some companies feel that the VCs interest and their interest is not aligned 
This sometimes m ay be true but VCs have only one objective and that is clear. We are after 
financial returns and will do what we have to maximise that. That usually dovetails with the 
interests o f the entrepreneurs.
Q.4. D o  you believe that venture capitalists that are more involved in their portfolio companies 
perform  any better? Why/Why not?
Ans: Y es VCs that are more involved in their portfolio companies do perform better. This is 
because they can solve problems and fight fires before they become life threatening to a 
company. Also the more knowledge they have about a company the more they can help them 
re biz dev, re networking etc. Finally the better they know their companies the better they can 
champion them internally when it comes to subsequent rounds etc.
Q.5. D o  you believe that the relation between you and the owner of your portfolio company is 
a principal/ agent relation? Why/Why not?
Yes.
We look forward to receiving a copy of your finished project, please send it to the attention of 
Harjeev Kandhari.
ID E N T IT Y : C O N FID EN T IA L (O N  REQ UEST)
D A T E : M AY, 7 ,2000  
CO U N TRY: H O N G  K O N G
Q. 1. Is Asian venture capital culture different form venture capital culture in the United States 
and Europe? In what respect?
Ans: Yes. V C  culture is probably less developed in Asia than in the US, less history of VC in 
Asia, fewer players, more limited track record
Q.2. D o  you believe that venture capitalists in Asia are having an easier time as compared to 
their counterparts in Europe/United States?
Ans: N o  reason to believe that VCs in Asia are having an easier time than VCs in the US. In 
some respects, they are having a more difficult time than their counterparts in the US because
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VGs in Asia did not make the kind o f returns that their counterparts in the US did over the last 
few years.
Q.3. D o you believe that venture capitalists in Asia allocate more time and efforts toward 
involvement in portfolio companies than venture capitalists in the United States and Europe? 
"Why/Why not?
Ans: N o, I have no reason to believe that in general VGs in Asia allocate more time to 
portfolio companies than VGs in the US do nor any reason to believe that they allocate less. 
Something like this will vary greatly from  V C  firm to VC firm and from portfolio company to 
portfolio company.
Q.4. What factors have hindered you in building up an ideal value-added relationship with 
your portfolio company?
Ans: Lack of time is probably the primary reason.
Q.5. D o you agree that the value-added role of venture capitalist is more hype than reality? 
W hy/W hynot?
Ans: N o, do not believe that. I do believe that VGs can and in many cases do add significant 
value to portfolio companies.
ID EN T ITY : C O N FID E N T IA L (O N  REQ UEST)
D A TE: A U G U ST  15,2000 
CO U NTRY: SIN G A PO R E
Q .l. How  do you determine whether your portfolio company needs your assistance?
Ans: My own knowledge and experience.
Q.2. What conditions are necessary for a venture capitalist to be able to add more value in his 
portfolio company?
Ans: Skills.
Q.3. What conditions are necessary for a portfolio company to able to denve most benefits 
from  the value-added efforts of venture capitalist?
Ans: Company m ust work as a partner with V C and needs to communicate the company’s 
need to the VC, and visa versa.
Q.4. D o you believe that venture capitalists that are more involved in their portfolio companies 
perform any better? Why/Whynot?
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Ans: Yes, because more talent and expertise in different areas that the VC brings to the table 
complement the company founders. V C also brings networks and the knowledge of growing 
multiple companies. V C’s can share industry and economic information across the portfolio of 
companies avoiding some replication of efforts. Etc.
Q.5. D o you believe that the relation between you and the owner of your portfolio company is 
a principal/agent relation? Why/Why not?
Ans: N o. It is a partnership to achieve a common goal of growing a business in order to 
achieve high shareholder value.
ID E N T IT Y : SIM O N  H O , CRO SBY A SSET  M AN AGEM ENT 
D A TE: A U G U ST  17,2000
CO U N TRY: SIN G A PO R E
Here is our response to your questions:
Q .l. Plow do you determine whether your portfolio company needs your assistance?
Ans: Our assistance is part of a long-term relation, starting with the investment and 
shareholders agreement, milestones and warrants, development of final business plan, 
participation in board meetings, regular business reviews and reporting. In addition, we arrange 
meetings and seminars for our portfolio companies on various topics, networking meetings, 
arrange contacts, discussion partner in licensing negotiations, providing scientific and industry 
business intelligence, exit planning, trade sell, IPO, etc
Q.2. What conditions are necessary for a venture capitalist to be able to add more value in his 
portfolio company?
Ans: In-depth and breadth industry know-how covering many aspects; scientific, medical, 
business management, pharmaceutical operations, financial, patents, licensing negotiations, etc 
and lots o f contacts.
Q.3. What conditions are necessary for a portfolio company to able to derive most benefits 
from  the value-added efforts of venture capitalist?
Ans: Strong operation management team with in-depth and breadth pharmaceutical industry 
know-how, covering many aspects; scientific, medical, business management, pharmaceutical 
operations, financial, patents, licensing negotiations, etc. Focused efforts on agreed business 
strategy, business plan, milestones, open and flexible mindset. And contacts.
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Q.4. D o you believe that venture capitalists that are more involved in their portfolio companies 
perform  any better? W hy/W hy not?
Ans: Both pro's and con's to have a tight involvement. Regular contact is important, not 
necessarily tight control if everyting is on track Our philosophy is not to take a board member 
seat ourselve, we often assign an external person who have the right expertice. Agreed business 
plan and milestone and good working climate is key for success.
Q.5. D o you believe that the relation between you and the owner of your portfolio company is 
a principal/ agent relation? Why/Why not?
Ans: Neither, parties should share same objectives but have different roles. Investors and 
Founders/M anagement must share the same agenda, both short-term and long-term, i.e. exit 
strategy must be clear from  the beginning.
ID EN T IT Y : C O N FID E N T IA L (O N  REQ UEST)
D A T E : A U G U ST 19,2000
CO U N TRY: SIN G A PO R E
Pis. find below some brief comments/answers.
Q .l. H ow  do you determine whether your portfolio company needs your assistance?
They always do.
Q.2. What conditions are necessary for a venture capitalist to be able to add more value in his 
portfolio company?
Ans:
•  Understand what competencies we have as VC's. Ensure that the V C is organised in a way 
that these competencies are transferred to the portfolio company (thus avoiding the partner 
promising all the things we can do and then, post-investment, send in a junior person to 
m onitor the portfolio company....
•  Thorough discussions with entrepreneur and other shareholders on what the ambition is 
for the company, our value added, how we work with a portfolio company
•  Trust
Q.3. What conditions are necessary for a portfolio company to able to derive most benefits 





Q.4. D o  you believe that venture capitalists that are more involved in their portfolio companies 
perform  any better? W hy/W hy not?
Ans:
•  Depends very much whether it is a start-up/early stage V C (yes, certainly or a leverage 
buy-out (hands-on involvement less important.
•  F or the formen It should be the case as the company needs strong support to realise the 
opportunities. In my experience, the key elements (of value-added) are: Strategic sparring 
partner, recruitment (senior management), funding and speed.
Q.5. D o you believe that the relation between you and the owner of your portfolio company is 
a principal/agent relation with you as principal and the owner as your agent? Why/Why not? 
Ans: N ot sure that I follow  you on this one as I am part owner of the portfolio company. 
Maybe I should read it as me vs. the CEO/entrepreneur (often significant shareholder, but far 
from  always).
ID E N T IT Y : C O N FID E N T IA L (O N  REQ UEST)
D A T E : A U G U ST  23,2000 
CO U N TRY: SIN G A PO R E
Q .l. H ow  do you determine whether your portfolio company needs your assistance?
Ans: B y  getting and staying close to the company, we take a board seat on every company we 
invest in and speak several times a week with the chairman or ceo. We also have an analyst 
pool who assist in business planning. We undertake regular performance reviews and attend 
every board meeting
Q.2. What conditions are necessary for a venture capitalist to be able to add more value in his 
portfolio company?
Ans: Management team open to investor input. Expertise on the part of the venture capitalist - 
we are sector specialists and the typical profile of our executives is MBA, accounting 
background.
Q.3. What conditions are necessary for a portfolio company to able to derive most benefits 
from  the value-added efforts o f venture capitalist?
Ans: A  vc who has a true value added philosophy to investment. Sector specialism  good 
relationships between company and investor
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Q.4. D o you believe that venture capitalists that are more involved in their portfolio companies 
perform any better? W hy/W hy not?
Ans: N o evidence to support, but emphatically yes, depending on the competence of the V C  
In our case, we have built an investment team with this in m ind In many cases, our input is 
about adding value, in others it is about avoiding the destruction of value. It is all about staying 
close to the company.
Q.5. D o you believe that the relation between you and the owner of your portfolio company is 
a principal/agent relation with you as principal and the owner as your agent? Why/Why not? 
Ans: N o idea
ID E N T IT Y : C O N FID E N T IA L (O N  REQ U EST)
D A TE: A U G U ST  23,2000 
CO U N TRY: IN D IA
Q. 1. Is Asian venture capital culture different form venture capital culture in the United States 
and Europe? In  what respect?
Ans: Yes -the U S is a very mature market. Entrepreneurs and vcs have far more experience 
and do not make as many mistakes.
Q.2. D o you believe that venture capitalists in Asia are having an easier time as compared to 
their counterparts in Europe/U nited States?
Ans: N o.
Q.3. D o you believe that venture capitalists in Asia allocate more time and efforts toward 
involvement in portfolio companies than venture capitalists in the United States and Europe? 
W hy/W hy not?
Ans: D epends from  vc to vc and what stage they are investing at. early stage investments 
typically require the vc to spend more time. In India, the vc may need to spend more time 
regardless as entrepreneurs often have less experience than their counterparts in the US.
Q.4. What factors have hindered you in building up an ideal value-added relationship with your
portfolio company?
Ans: O ur fund is not yet up, so we cannot comment.
Q.5. D o you agree that the value-added role of venture capitalist is more hype than reality? 
W hy/W hynot?
Ans: Depends from  vc to vc and their network and relationships.
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ID EN T IT Y : C O N FID E N T IA L (O N  REQ U EST)
D A TE: A U G U ST  23,2000 
GOUNTRY: H O N G  K O N G
Q. 1. Is Asian venture capital culture different form venture capital culture in the United States 
and Europe? In what respect?
Ans: Gould be different, but it depends on the cultures of different firms. Some Asian shops 
invest global pool o f money and they value global team work and need NY/London approval. 
Some are Asia dedicated funds and they have total autonomy but can also share ideas with the 
counterparties in Europe or US.
Q.2. D o you believe that venture capitalists in Asia are having an easier time as compared to 
their counterparts in Europe/U nited States?
Ans: N o. Acutually more difficult due to lack of very capable management in Asia and also the 
disclosure for Asian companies is not as good as in the US or Europe.
Q.3. D o you believe that venture capitalists in Asia allocate more time and efforts toward 
involvement in portfolio companies than venture capitalists in the United States and Europe? 
"Why/Why not?
Ans: N ot sure. Different firms do differently.
Q.4. What factors have hindered you in building up an ideal value-added relationship with your 
portfolio company?
Ans: Time priority.
Q.5. D o you agree that the value-added role of venture capitalist is more hype than reality? 
W hy/W hynot?
Ans: Depends. M ost of the VCs really add value, a mutually beneficial situation. If the VC 
does not add value, why does it expect itself to make money?
ID E N T IT Y : C O N FID E N T IA L (O N  REQ UEST)
D A T E : A U G U ST  29,2000 
GO UNTRY: SIN G A PO RE
Q. 1. Is Asian venture capital culture different form venture capital culture in the United States 
and Europe? In what respect?
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Ans: Smaller community (le players) to date though changing fast. The smallness has allowed 
potential investees to do more due diligence on the V C and to hold them to their word slightly 
longer.
Q.2. D o you believe that venture capitalists in Asia are having an easier time as compared to 
their counteipaits in Europe/U nited States?
Ans: N o. Fewer exists, thought that is changing, and def. fewer good AND available investee 
choices.
Q.3. D o you believe that venture capitalists in Asia allocate more time and efforts toward 
involvement in portfolio companies than venture capitalists in the United States and Europe? 
Why/Why not?
Ans: They devote more time but I believe less time adding "tough love" to getting the right 
decisions implemented
Q.4. What factors have hindered you in building up an ideal value-added relationship with your 
portfolio company?
Ans: Difficulty in recruiting /  adding senior staff assuming needed along the life cycle or from 
the beginning.
Q.5. D o you agree that the value-added role of venture capitalist is more hype than reality? 
Why/Why not?
Ans: More mismatched than hype. V C needs a return on investment in a short period of time. 
Anything else is hype. All other stakeholders with the same goal are lucky. Any others, walk a 
right rope. As returns plunge and more money is thrown to the region by the largest players, 
the competition will make for even more bad deals. This creates a cycle to push V C to 
demand even more returns and allow for fewer chances in management led decision making.
ID EN T ITY : E L D E R D  LA N D , GIM V N.V.
D A TE: A PRIL 4,2001 
CO UNTRY: B E LG IU M
Q .l. How do you determine whether your portfolio company needs your assistance?
Ans: Board meetings (12 +  per year), regular contact with mgt (e-mail, phone, diner)
Q.2. What conditions are necessary for a venture capitalist to be able to add more value in his
portfolio company?
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Ans: Market knowledge, understanding o f company/organisation, hands with approach (close 
contact with mgt and other key staff), corporate network, financial structure, costs 
Q.3. What conditions are necessary for a portfolio company to able to denve most benefits 
from  the value-added efforts o f venture capitalist?
Ans: Structuring its own demand without becoming too formal, open communication, follow­
up on contacts provided by V Q  becoming part o f VC's network.
D o you believe that venture capitalists that are more involved in their portfolio companies 
perform  any better? W hy/W hy not?
Ans: Yes, especially in the current bear market, a hands with and involved VC (value adding) 
can reduce the number o f failures and build survivors. More positive, I even believe that such a 
value adding V C  can accelerate the growth of the venture.
Q.5. D o you believe that the relation between you and the owner of your portfolio company is 
a principal/agent relation with you as principal and the owner as your agent? Why/Why not? 
Ans: N o  as the company has to execute it does not mean that it can not require something 
from  the V G  support, network etc.
ID E N T IT Y : JO H N  T. H O G A N , P H D . PRINCIPAL, BCVC ASSO CIA TES; BCVC 
PA R TN ER S
SE N T : A PR IL 06,2001
CO U N TR Y : U N IT E D  STA TES
Naqi: I am  pleased to be able to assist you in your doctoral research. I have worked with over 
350 m asters and doctoral students in the United States at Antioch University and The Union 
Institute fo r the past nine years as an Adjunct Professor. I have a Ph.D. in Business 
Administration with concentrations in Venture Capital Management, Entrepreneurship, and 
Strategic Management. I am also a practicing Venture Capitalist for five years in one of the 
leading mid-west Venture Capital firms.
In addition to the Executive Summary of the findings of your research and the chapter you 
offered to mail within two months, please mail me a completed copy of your 
thesis/dissertatioa You may share my responses with anyone and everyone.
M y responds to your research questions:
Q .l. H ow  do you determine whether your portfolio company needs your assistance?
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Ans: I decide by assessing the salient issues the Company needs to address in order to 
experience success. I coach the management team, and sometimes other Board members, on 
the strategic and tactical approaches to address those salient issues. If I am uncomfortable with 
the Company’s performance, I tell the management team and the Board that I am 
uncomfortable and request both the management team's and the other Board member's 
assistance in gaining comfort. If I continue to experience dissonance, I either leam to 
live with it or build consensus with other Board members and/or investors, who are also 
uncomfortable, to change things, whatever those things are that need to be changed. I attempt 
to make this work to everyone's benefit. If I can not do this to everyone's benefit, and if the 
change still needs to be made for the benefit of the shareholders, I will force the issue, through 
power, either legitimate or perceived power, and will either win or lose on my change initiative. 
In all cases I must exert leadership as a Board member and investor.
Q.2. "What conditions are necessary for a venture capitalist to be able to add more value in his 
portfolio company?
Ans: Conditions necessary to add more value...be in a position of power to affect change in the 
Company, have a deep understanding of the tools of general management, know how to use 
these tools, when to use these tools, and the fortitude to use them when required.
Q.3. ’What conditions are necessary for a portfolio company to able to derive most benefits 
from  the value-added efforts o f venture capitalist?
Ans: Conditions...that the management listen, evaluate, and implement the coaching given, of 
course only if the coaching will lead to the success of the company, that I can bring value to 
the Com pany that the Company is unable to access from  other sources at a lesser cost to the 
Com pany than what my involvement costs the Company, that our relationship, (among the 
management, investors, and Board) is truly built upon shared goals and shared gains.
Q.4. D o  you believe that venture capitalists that are more involved in their portfolio companies 
perform  any better? Why/Why not?
Ans: The studies I have been able to find lead me to the conclusion that the level of 
involvement of the Venture Capitalist makes no difference in the final outcome of the success 
or lack o f success o f the Company. M y experience, however, leads me to the conclusion that it 
depends on the quality level of performance that the V C and the Board delivers to the 
Com pany and that high quality performance by the V C and the Board makes a very large 
difference in the success of the Company. This, from my experience, is due primarily from the
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experiential base the VGs and Board contribute to the leadership of the Company and the 
value that is added to the management team, by the V C  and Board.
Q.5. D o you believe that the relation between you and the owner of your portfolio company is 
a principal/ agent relation? Why/Why not?
Ans: I do not understand the question in relation to principal/agent relationship; consequendy, 
I will not respond past the following thought. As a Board member I am responsible to all 
owners (shareholders), not just one, not just the majority owner, and not just my ownership 
position. I f  I am  not a Board member and just an investor, which I try never to be in this 
position because it lacks in power, then I am much more passive and I represent only my 
ownership position.
Wishing you the best of luck in your research and completion of your doctoral program
ID E N T IT Y : M IC H EL R E, EX EC U TIV E V ICE-PRESID EN T, INVESTM ENTS, 
B U SIN ESS D E V E LO PM EN T  B A N K  O F CANADA
D A TE: A PR IL 2 0 ,2 0 0 1
CO U N TRY: CA N A D A  
D ear Sir:
With reference to your request please find listed below my answers to your questions:
Q .l. H ow  do you determine whether your portfolio company needs your assistance?
Ans: Skills o f management, strength o f the Board, Monitoring Issues identified at investment 
authorization.
Q.2. What conditions are necessary for a venture capitalist to be able to add more value in his 
portfolio company?
Ans: Skilled people. Workload of the individual taking into consideration the monitoring to be 
done.
Q.3. What conditions are necessary for a portfolio company to able to derive most benefits 
from  the value-added efforts of venture capitalist?
Ans: Having a Board that is well managed. Let VC work with management in various strategic 
committees
Q.4. D o  you believe that venture capitalists that are more involved in their portfolio
companies perform  any better? Why/Why not?
Ans: Yes, Experience in growing companies. Quality o f the network
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Q.5. D o  you believe that the relation between you End the owner of your portfolio company is 
a principal/ agent relation? Why/Why not?
Ans: G ear communication is a must. Common objectives are important.
ID E N T IT Y : TO M  LAM BS, BARCLAYS CAPITAL 
D A T E : A PR IL 20,2001 
CO U N TR Y : U N IT E D  K IN G D O M
Q l. H ow  do you determine whether your portfolio company needs your assistance?
Ans: One o f our own executives will usually be a non executive director on the board of the 
investee com pany- we are already therefore actively involved each of our investee companies. 
Q.2. What conditions are necessary for a venture capitalist to be able to add more value in his 
portfolio company?
Q.3. What conditions are necessary for a portfolio company to able to derive most benefits 
from  the value-added efforts of venture capitalist?
Ans 2 &3 : O ur input is usually as a sounding board as an N E D  mainly on strategic matters - 
the exec management always run the business day-to-day. Obviously the executive 
management o f the business need to be receptive to input from the N ED  VC - usually they 
recognise that the V C  representative and the V C house is experienced at dealing with issues of 
growing companies. Where the investee company is making an acquisition or exiting then the 
V C m ay be more actively involved in appraising/negotiating/dd/legals as these are core VC 
skills. The V C  can also influence/ input by helping to select an appropriate independent 
chairm an, particularly where there is a change in culture/style/ restructuring required. The VC 
may also need to become more actively involved when a change of executive management is 
needed.
Q.4. D o  you believe that venture capitalists that are more involved in their portfolio 
companies perform  any better? Why/Why not?
Ans: A  hands on style is more likely to produce a more successful investment. Firsdy any 
problems are identified and dealt with more quickly - this is key to not losing investment value. 
Secondly a  close relationship with management is more likely to allow the VC to influence the 
exit timing - again this is important in realising returns.
Q.5. D o  you believe that the relation between you and the owner of your portfolio company is 
a principal/ agent relation? Why/Why not?
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Ans: N o. Both parties have are effectively part owners of the business and have an economic 
interest in building and realising shareholder value - they are both principals. However the VC 
is purely a financial investor whilst the managers are also employees/directors and may have 
motivations other than shareholder value (eg career aspirations, emotional attachment to the 
business, job security, ego , family succession etc) These can sometimes eventually put the VC 
and owner/driver at odds with each other - eg over the exit or strategy.
ID E N T IT Y : C O N FID E N T IA L (O N  REQ U EST)
D A T E: A PR IL 24,2001 
CO U N TRY: U N IT E D  K IN G D O M
Q l. H ow  do you determine whether your portfolio company needs your assistance?
Ans: Review of performance: is it performing to its potential, is there a clear strategy
Q.2. What conditions are necessary for a venture capitalist to be able to add more value in his
portfolio company?
Ans: A  strong working relationship with management but if management are the obstacle the 
ability to change management
Q.3. What conditions are necessary for a portfolio company to able to derive most benefits 
from  the value-added efforts of venture capitalist?
Ans: D itto, they m ust feel that the V C is contributing and see it as a partnership.
Q.4. D o you believe that venture capitalists that are more involved in their portfolio companies 
perform any better? Why/W hy not?
Ans: Depends, we back management to run companies and the level of VC input depends on 
the depth and strength of the team. V C  input may just be making sure team is right and then 
letting them get on with it. More V C  involvement is not necessarily constructive.
Q.5. D o you believe that the relation between you and the owner of your portfolio company is 
a principal/agent relation? Why/Why not?
Ans: It is more like a partnership.
276
ID E N T IT Y : K U R T  K A R LSSO N , D IR EC TO R , IN V ESTM EN T O PERATIONS 
SW ED FU N D  IN T E R N A T IO N A L AB ’
D A T E : A PR IL 24 ,2001
GO U N TRY: SW E D E N
Q l. H ow  do you determine whether your portfolio company needs your assistance?
Ans: If the management of a portfolio company does not meet the agreed goals in the business 
plan and this happens more than once, the venture capital company should act and either 
reformulate the business idea or replace the managers who underperform.
Q2. What conditions are necessary for a venture capitalist to be able to add more value to in 
his portfolio company?
Ans: I do not fully understand what you mean with "conditions”. Generally speaking the 
venture capitalist should be located close to the portfolio company (<L hour drive by car) in 
order to be able to have a close and frequent contact with the management. Ideally, the venture 
capitalist has an extensive network within the industrial sector and personal contacts with 
banks as well as with potential suppliers and customers to the portfolio company.
Q3. What conditions are necessary for a portfolio company to be able to derive most benefits 
from  the value-added efforts o f the venture capitalist?
Ans: The management of the portfolio company should have open minds and be responsive to 
suggestions from  the venture capitalist. The management should not hesitate to ask the venture 
capitalist for help. The shareholders of the portfolio company should try to find one or two 
external Board Directors to get unbiased opinions about the development potential of the 
com pany and to get feedback from the market.
Q 4. D o  you believe that venture capitalists that are more involved in their portfolio companies 
perform  any better? Why? Why not?
Ans: In general I believe that involvement of the venture capitalist up to a certain limit 
improves the performance o f the portfolio company. However, the venture capitalist must 
restrict itself to act only within its role and not try to take over the responsibilities and duties of 
the Managing Director.
Q5. D o you believe that the relation between you and the owner of the portfolio company is a 
principal/agent relation with you as the principal and the owner as your agent? Why? Why not?
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Ans: N o, the relation should be on a more equal level. I see the owner and the venture 
capitalist as two business partners working together towards a common goal, the development 
of a profitable and competitive company.
ID E N T IT Y : TIM  H A Z E LL, IN V ESTM EN T EX EC U TIV E, BA RIN G EN G LISH  
GRO W TH  FU N D
D A T E: A PR IL 24,2001
CO U N TRY: U N IT E D  K IN G D O M  
D ear Sayed
Thank you for your enquiry regarding your research on venture capital which G eoff Edge has 
passed to me for comment. We have no current interest in the Asian venture capital market, 
all our funds under management are targeted at the U K  market alone. We have no problem 
regarding confidentiality.
Q .l. H ow  do you determine whether your portfolio company needs your assistance?
Ans: We maintain a close relationship with all portfolio companies through monthly meetings, 
the regular receipt o f management accounts and various ad hoc discussions. For most of the 
time, we add value through playing the role of a professional non-executive, calling the 
executives to account for their actions and using our experience to suggest alternative 
approaches. All portfolio companies receive such assistance so no decision is required 
Occasionally, we are required to be more active, normally when there is a significant problem 
or opportunity. Such issues tend to be obvious and take priority over other work. Again, there 
is no real decision required There are a few specialist areas where we can add further value. 
These tend to be in the fields of long term strategy, corporate finance and mergers and 
acquisitions. The decision as to which portfolio company might benefit from such assistance is 
a combination o f the executives judgement as to whether he can add value and the 
performance o f the company to date against plan (under performance tends to provoke greater
assistance).
Q.2. What conditions are necessary for a venture capitalist to be able to add more value in his 
portfolio company?
Ans: Significant value is added when management recognise their own shortcomings and are 
receptive to external advice or where the venture capitalist has the means to force the issues.
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O ur cynical view is that, venture capitalists can only add significant value to weak management 
teams.
Q3. What conditions are necessary for a portfolio company to able to derive most benefits 
from  the value-added efforts o f venture capitalist?
Ans: See answer to Q2
Q.4. D o you believe that venture capitalists that are more involved in their portfolio companies 
perform  any better? W hy/W hy not?
Ans: Involvement in the portfolio gives early sight of potential problems and opportunities, 
there should be fewer surprises, which has to be positive. In addition, involvement with the 
portfolio helps build the goodwill between portfolio management and VC which can be very 
important when further negotiations are required (i.e. on exit). Some V G  have a specialist 
insight into certain sectors (i.e. technolog)) and may add additional value, we are more 
generalist and would not pretend to have such insights.
Q.5. D o you believe that the relation between you and the owner of your portfolio company is 
a principal/ agent relation with you as principal and the owner as your agent? Why/Why not? 
Ans: N o, the owner or owners, who are likely to be the executive management team, have 
more power than is implied by the classic principal/agent relationship. They tend to see 
themselves as the dominant stakeholder with the VC as a valued supplier of capital rather than 
the principal for whom they act. Obviously, it depends on the relative equity shareholdings 
and the other elements o f control possessed by the V C
ID E N T IT Y : PA N O S LIO U U A S, PARTNER, AVC VEN TURE CAPITAL.
D A T E : A PR IL 25,2001 
CO U N TRY: SW ITZERLA N D
Q. 1. Is Asian venture capital culture different form venture capital culture in the United States 
and Europe? In what respect?
Ans: D o not know the difference
Q.2. D o  you believe that venture capitalists in Asia are having an easier time as compared to
their counterparts in Europe/United States?
Ans: N o. Less competition but more hurdles and less exits.
Q.3. What is your opinion about the hindrances to the development of venture capital in the 
Asian region?
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Ans: I would guess a critical m ass o f experienced and credible Venture Capitalists.
Q.4. What factors are necessary fo r both parties. i.e. venture capitalist and portfolio company 
to build up an ideal value-added relationship?
Ans: Venture Capitalists must have the credibility that they can add values, to have operational 
experience and m ust be willing to do the real building work
Q.5. D o you agree that the value-added role o f venture capitalist is more hype than reality? 
Why/Why not?
Ans. Everybody says they are the ones that are very valuable to the company success. The 
value that is brought to the table is real not only money.
ID E N T IT Y : D A V ID  W  Q U Y SN ER , M A N A G IN G  D IRECTO R, ABINGW O RTH  
M A N A G EM EN T  LIM ITED
D A TE: A PR IL 27,2001
GOUNTRY: U N IT E D  K IN G D O M
Q .l. What factors are necessary for both parties. i.e. venture capitalist and portfolio company 
to build up an ideal value-added relationship?
Ans: As with m ost relationships, mutual respect, a congruence of goals and the ability of each 
to satisfy a need o f the other. Value added requires real and relevant skills which, because there 
is mutual confidence and trust can be effectively applied.
Q.5. D o  you agree that the value-added role of venture capitalist is more hype than reality? 
W hy/W hy not?
Ans: D efine your terms. Venture capital under the U K  definition is a very broad church 
ranging from  early stage technology investment through to large buy-outs that are 
indistinguishable from  investment banking. In many of these areas the skill sets o f the "venture 
capitalists" are predominantly financial and their own organisational structures and objectives 
are such that there is little scope to add value in any other area My own company is one of 
several in the U K  and many in the U SA  which focus on a narrow range of activity (in our case 
biotechnology). We employ scientists with business skills rather than accountants or bankers 
and our U 5P is that we can bring skills and experience which will be needed to convert 
intellectual property into commercial reality. For instance, in addition to general financial 
assistance (including the provision of locum financial management) we will commonly assist in 
patent searches; IPR  protection; inward and outward licensing; recruitment of key hires;
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provide interim management o f R&D ; make available our network of high-level contacts in 
academia, the pharmaceuticals industry and elsewhere; and generally provide the experience of 
someone (through Board representation and otherwise) who has been through large parts of 
the movie before. H ope this helps. I regret that I can not extend my comments further.
ID EN T ITY : B IL L  FR E Z Z A , G E N E R A L PARTNER, ADAMS CAPITAL 
M A N A G EM EN T
D A T E: A PRIL 27,2001
CO U NTRY: U N IT E D  STA TES
Q .l. H ow  do you determine whether your portfolio company needs your assistance?
Ans: We are early-stage investors, so they always need our assistance. We do not make late- 
stage or passive investments. If entrepreneurs did not need our assistance and all they truly 
needed was cash, the valuation of the company would likely exceed our investment threshold. 
O ur investment strategy, and means of earning above-market returns, is to invest both our 
money and our time. O ur time is usually what is in shortest supplyas we have plenty of money. 
Q.2. What conditions are necessary for a venture capitalist to be able to add more value in his 
portfolio company?
Ans: M any years o f actual operating experience and domain knowledge. In addition, a limit on 
the number of boards the V C  sits on. (We limit our partners to 6 boards maximum) A  director 
who sits on 12 boards can only add marginal value. A  28 year old associate who has never had 
a real job outside of the venture capital industry acting as a director can only add marginal 
value.
Q.3. What conditions are necessary for a portfolio company to able to derive 
m ost benefits from  the value-added efforts o f venture capitalist?
Ans: Senior management must be coachable and primarily interested in creating capital gains 
rather than building empires, proving they are right, or servicing their own egos.
Q.4. D o  you believe that venture capitalists that are more involved in their portfolio companies 
perform  any better? Why/Why not?
Ans: Yes, provided they have solid domain experience.
Q.5. D o  you believe that the relation between you and the owner of your portfolio company is 
a principal/agent relation? Why/Why not?
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Ans: I ’m  not sure I understand the question. The shareholders own the portfolio company. 
Management works for the shareholders, whose interests are represented by the board The 
board is responsible for hiring and firing senior management, including the founders who were 
"owners" only up until the day they sold preferred stock to a third party. The percentage of the 
company owned by the founders is irrelevant as the concept remains the same.
M ost o f our boards contain two VGs, two representatives from management, and one 
independent director (an outside industry expert) nominated by management and approved by 
the VGs. This group is responsible for maximizing shareholder value.
ID E N T IT Y : V IJA Y  A N G A D I, M A N A G IN G  D IR EC TO R  ICF A N D  TREASU RER O F 
TH E IN D IA N  V EN TU R E CA PITA L ASSN.
D A T E : M AY 2,2001
CO U N TRY: IN D IA
Q .l. Is Asian venture capital culture different form venture capital culture in the United States 
and Europe? In what respect?
Ans: quite different from  U S.xould be similar to europe or to late stage funds in the US...
-lack o f tech talent pool in r&d/academ ia to cross-pollinate ideas, check tech, help develop 
tech... vc's do not work together as in the us., keep deals to themselves..
Q.2. D o  you believe that venture capitalists in Asia are having an easier time as compared to 
their counterparts in Europe/U nited States?
Ans: difficult to say. there aren't a lot o f high quality opportunities in India... lots of companies 
but o f low  quality so inexperienced VC's can lose money easily... ..lots of problems in investing 
in companies in Asia that are not typically found in U S/Europe: ethics (have to be extremely 
careful about doing business in Asia), intentions are not always aligned with V C .it is not 
uncommon to have companies that want to spinoff divisions into separate companies etc.
Q.3. D o  you believe that venture capitalists in Asia allocate more time and efforts toward 
involvement in portfolio companies than venture capitalists in the United States and Europe? 
W hy/W hy not?
Ans: N o., m ost have financial/investment banking backgrounds and neither have the contacts 
nor the skills to help a company...
Q .4. What factors have hindered you in building up an ideal value-added relationship with your 
portfolio company?
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Ans: depth o f team , can often be lacking so time is spend is doing too many mundane/low 
end work rather than use contacts to do alliances etc.
Q.5. D o you agree that the value-added role of venture capitalist is more hype than reality? 
W hy/W hynot?
Ans. no., absolutely necessary if one is investing at early stage.....becomes less important in
later stages.
ID EN T ITY : FR É D É R IC  D E  LA M IN N E, G E N E R A L M AN AGER, E-CAPITAL 
D A TE: M AY, 2 ,2001 
CO U NTRY: B E LG IU M
Being a fairly recent fund (launched in late 1999), we have only limited experience.
Q .l. H ow  do you determine whether your portfolio company needs your assistance?
Ans: Sometimes, we react to a demand coming from  the company (additional funding 
needed,..) but we try to be pro-active and to raise issues
Q.2. What conditions are necessary for a venture capitalist to be able to add more value in his 
portfolio company?
Ans: It depends on (a) the maturity of the portfolio company if it is young and is under­
staffed, it is easier for the V C  to add value by bringing additional knowledge and (b) the 
abilities o f the V G  if it is specialized in a sector and/ or has a good network of interesting 
people, it can add value by bringing together the portfolio company and other companies 
Q.3. What conditions are necessary for a portfolio company to able to derive most benefits 
from  the value-added efforts o f venture capitalist?
Ans: The management of the portfolio cy must be open to discussion and it should not beleive 
that it knows better its own business, both the management and the VC must be convinced 
that they share the same interest
Q.4. D o you believe that venture capitalists that are more involved in their portfolio 
companies perform  any better? Why/Why not?
Ans: Yes: that is why we try to be more and more "hands-on”
Q.5. D o you believe that the relation between you and the owner of your portfolio company is 
a principal/agent relation with you as principal and the owner as your agent? Why/Why not?
Ans: It is important that both parties share the same interest and act in the same direction to 
avoid the principal/ agent relationship.
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ID E N T IT Y : N IK L A S H ED BO R G , V EN TSH A R E M A N A G EM EN T AB 
D A TE: M A Y 2 ,2001  
GOUNTRY: SW E D E N
Q .l. H ow  do you determine whether your portfolio company needs your assistance?
Ans: We always work closely with our portfolio company.
Q.2. What conditions are necessary for a venture capitalist to be able to add more value in his 
portfolio company?
Ans: Network, financial knowledge, strategic advice, restructuring possibilities.
Q.3. What conditions are necessary for a portfolio company to able to derive most benefits 
from the value-added efforts of venture capitalist?
Ans: Open-minded management, sharing the same shareholder's agenda.
Q.4. D o you believe that venture capitalists that are more involved in their portfolio companies 
perform any better? Why/Why not?
Ans: Yes, as long as they are able to divide the operations performed by the management from 
the strategic work made by the board/owners.
Q.5. D o you believe that the relation between you and the owner of your portfolio company is 
a principal/ agent relation with you as principal and the owner as your agent? Why/Why not? 
Ans: O f course this relation is in some ways a principal/agent relation, but which relation is 
not today?
ID E N T IT Y : H A RA LD  U N D LA R , COM M UNICATIONS M ANAGER, B-BUSINESS 
PA R TN ER S
D A T E : M A Y 4 ,2001
GO U N TRY: B E LG IU M
Q .l. H ow  do you determine whether your portfolio company needs your assistance?
Ans: We never determine this. One o f our USPs is, that portfolio companies can benefit from 
our hardwired network of investors like ABB, SEB, Hewlett-Packard, Investor etc.... They 
have joined forces to provide capital an know-how. Thus, if a portfolio company needs help, 
they would a sk ... Companies we invest in always remain independent... that's our philosophy 
Q.2. What conditions are necessary for a venture capitalist to be able to add more value in his 
portfolio company?
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Ans: Adding value in our industry means to build companies. As mentioned before, we provide 
capital and knowlege, using a hardwired network of investors. We have a committment to built 
- we are not a pure finance company. This is, what makes us different.
Q.3. What conditions are necessary for a portfolio company to able to derive most benefits 
from  the value-added efforts o f venture capitalist?
Ans: They simply have to be open. A  company we invest in does have all necessary pre­
conditions for building a company. First of all they have to fit our business model. If they are 
working in an area, where one of our partners works also, we could create synergies, that others 
can only dream of.
Q.4. D o you believe that venture capitalists that are more involved in their portfolio 
companies perform  any better? Why/Why not?
Ans: Yes, but its not a one-way-street. If VCs and portfolios regard business as partnership, 
they can benefit from  all advantages they combine.
Q.5. D o you believe that the relation between you and the owner of your portfolio company is 
a principal/agent relation? Why/Why not?
Ans: N o - independence is vital for building a business.
ID EN T ITY : C O N FID E N T IA L O N  R EQ U E ST  
D A TE: M AY 5,2001 
CO UNTRY: FRA N C E
Q .l. How do you decide whether your portfolio company needs your assistance?
Ans: Though we do not manage the companies we have in portfolio, we have extremely close 
relationships with their management. Therefore we know pretty well what are the needs of the 
company and will propose our advice if we believe it can help.
Q.2. What conditions are necessary for a venture capitalist to be able to add more value in his 
portfolio company?
Ans: First the Venture Capitalist needs to spend time with the company and be available in 
order to establish the relationship necessary in every investment.. This is part of his job but it 
has to be reminded because it implies that a single VC cannot follow 40 investments at the 
same time. Even if there are many opportunities he has to be selective when investing in order
to anticipate the phenomenon.
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Second, experience is the key thing. Technical experience will allow the V C  to have a clear 
vision on the business and the technological challenges the management will face. This may be 
of great help when the management team is focussed on a very specific aspect o f the business 
development without having a strategical view of the situation. Experience in a field also 
implies a network o f expertise you can use to establish contacts between the com pany you 
invested in and potential partners (financial institution, experts, key people for recruitment, 
customer). O f course this is just an help that makes the contact easier. Once the two parries 
talk together, it is up to the company to convince the other and take the maximum benefit o f 
the opportunity.
Q.3. What conditions are necessary for a portfolio company to able to derive m ost benefits 
from the value-added efforts o f venture capitalist?
Ans: When investing in a company we pay great attention to the management's ability to listen 
to external advices. It means that your relation won't be fruitful with som ebody that never 
listen to your suggestions and believes he is always right. On the contrary, som ebody too open 
with no personal opinion on what you say who follows everything you say won't be 
independent enough to run a company by himself. Only a balanced management will get the 
maximum of a V C  investment.
Q.4. D o you believe that venture capitalists that are more involved in their portfolio companies 
perform any better? Why/W hy not?
Ans: Theoretically yes. The pieces o f advice an experienced clever VC brings can only be a 
plus. There are so many outside aspect that influence the success o f a business that it is not a 
warranty but it has definitely a positive impact.
Q.5. D o you believe that the relation between you and the owner of your portfolio company is 
a principal/agent relation with you as principal and the owner as your agent? Why/W hy not?
Ans: It is a real business partnership, thus we are at the same level as shareholders sharing the 
same goals o f success.
I hope this will help you to have a better view on the position of a VC in Europe. Looking 
forward to having a first draft on your picture on the Asian VC business, which is not that 
developed according to what I can see from Paris (Australia...Japan...Taiwan...Singapore).
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ID E N T IT Y : C O N H D E N T IA L  (O N  REQ U EST)
D A T E : M AY 08/2001 
CO U N TRY: U N IT E D  STA TES
Q .l. H ow  do you decide whether your portfolio company needs your assistance?
Ans: It depends on the needs o f the portfolio company.
Q.2. What conditions are necessary for a venture capitalist to be able to add more value in his 
portfolio company?
Ans: The ability to intervene requires either a strong board position or shareholders agreements 
requiring the investor's consent for certain major decisions such as senior staff appointments, 
capex, acquisitions, borrowing, exit (sale or flotation); this can also sometimes be achieved 
more informally subject to the relationship the venture capitalist has with the investee 
company. The venture capitalist's experience in the fields o f financing structures, acquisitions 
and sales and a particular sector should be helpful also.
Q.3. What conditions are necessary for a portfolio company to able to derive m ost benefits 
from the value-added efforts o f venture capitalist?
Ans: Should be receptive to V C  advice.
Q.4. D o you believe that venture capitalists that are more involved in their portfolio companies 
perform any better? Why/Why not?
Ans: Yes but depends on the V C  as well
Q.5. D o you believe that the relation between you and the owner o f your portfolio com pany is 
a principal/agent relation with you as principal and the owner as your agent? W hy/W hy not? 
Ans: I believe it more like a partnership although in certain cases it can become a 
principal/ agent relation.
ID EN TITY : FR A N K  BA C H IN SK Y , M A N A G IN G  PA R TN ER , V IR ID IA N  V E N T U R E S 
D A TE: M AY 10,2001 
CO UNTRY: U N IT E D  STA TES
Q .l. H ow  do you decide whether your portfolio company needs your assistance?
Ans: I work with all o f them on a one-to one basis.




Q.3. What conditions are necessary for a portfolio company to able to derive most benefits 
from  the value-added efforts of venture capitalist?
Ans: no comment
Q.4. D o  you believe that venture capitalists that are more involved in their portfolio companies 
perform  any better? W hy/W hy not?
Ans: Yes. All companies can benefit from  active VC participation.
Q.5. D o you believe that the relation between you and the owner of your portfolio company is 
a principal/ agent relation with you as principal and the owner as your agent? Why/'Why not? 
Ans: N o. I view the relationship more as a partnership with the entrepreneur.
ID E N T IT Y : K E V IN  CO N N O RS, G EN ER A L PA RTN ER , SPRAY VENTURE 
PA RTN ERS.
D A TE: M A Y 16,2001
CO U N TRY: U N IT E D  STA TES
Q .l. H ow  do you determine whether your portfolio company needs your assistance?
Ans: As an early stage investor, we are active in nearly all of our projects. At the very early 
stages, the company may not have a C EO  or has an incomplete management team. Later, the 
team may need help in financing or corporate deals. As an active VC, we are involved in these 
activities every week across our portfolio, whereas a portfolio company management team 
raises capital every 1-2 yrs.
Q.2. What conditions are necessary for a venture capitalist to be able to add more value in his 
portfolio company?
Ans: Experience, congruent goals, and compatible operating style and people skills.
Ans: See Q5
Q.3. What conditions are necessary for a portfolio company to able to derive most benefits 
from  the value-added efforts of venture capitalist?[
Ans: Same as Q2 See Q  5
Q.4. D o you believe that venture capitalists that are more involved in their portfolio companies 
perform  any better? W hy/W hy not?
Ans: Please define involvement. Depends on the experience of the CEO. I believe that if a 
board o f directors is involved, is working with the CEO  and management, and is qualified, the
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company’s odds of success arc improved. If the company is orphaned and no one is helping 
the C E O , probability of success is reduced.
Q.5. D o  you believe that the relation between you and the owner of your portfolio company is 
a principal/ agent relation with you as principal and the owner as your agent? Why/Why not? 
Ans: Neither. We arc partners and co-owners with the founders and management of our 
portfolio company. We all act in the best interest of all the shareholders. We would not get 
involved if this "partnership" was not possible.
We work hard to not have the "adversarial" relationship that your questions imply.
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